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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) are tasked with providing 
counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) defense for a multitude of mission facets. 
Using the plethora of C-UAS capabilities available for market purchase, both 
services have invested in non-complementary C-UAS capabilities. Furthermore, 
C-UAS coordination and integration is not well-defined in USN or USMC warfare 
doctrines. This work addresses the current and future C-UAS hardware 
interoperability and effectiveness needs by distinguishing where and when 
interoperability is appropriate, identifying operational interferences, and 
recognizing any duplication of efforts. Areas of responsibility and host nations’ 
operational authority, legal restrictions, and variances in unmanned aerial system 
(UAS) threats serve as constraints and impose restraints on which C-UAS technologies 
are optimal for universal employment. We focus on threats from smaller, handheld, 
commercially available UASs. To meet the demand of joint C-UAS requirements, 
the USN and USMC must divest from the previous mentality of interim solutions to 
solve a permanent problem. Long-term, interoperable C-UAS solutions capable of 
performing at high rates of effectiveness against current and future UAS threats are 
needed.
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Executive Summary
The threat imposed by commercially available, modifiable unmanned aerial systems (UASs)
can no longer be viewed as a temporary problem set. To adequately address current and
emergent UAS threats, the United States Navy (USN) and United States Marine Corps
(USMC) must graduate from a mentality of quick fixes, workarounds, and on-the-job
training andmatriculate to a level of sustained, interoperable, andmature counter unmanned
aerial system (CUAS) capabilities to identify, detect, classify, track, and neutralize the UAS
problem set. Currently, the Department of Defense (DOD) and its subsidiaries leverage
and operate from a plethora of over 235 CUAS capabilities that serve as quick reaction
capabilities (QRC) and common operational pictures (COPs) as delineated in this research
and the current CUAS market [1]. As denoted by the Joint Counter-small unmanned aerial
system Office (JCO), these capabilities are not capable of generating, maintaining, and
populating a shared COP for the tactical and operational warfighter, or senior decision
maker to adequately address the growing UAS problem set [2].
Our area of research is in support of Marine Corps Forces Command (MARFORCOM)
and Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). It was founded to evaluate current
CUASs employed by the USN and USMC for their effectiveness and ability to interoperate
amongst themselves in light of the joint CUAS requirements created by the JCO in 2020.
In 2019, the DOD issued DOD Directive 3800.01E, placing the U.S. Army as the executive
agent for countering Groups 1 through 3 UAS threats domestically and abroad [3]. To
meet the growing presence and concerns imposed by Groups 1 through 3 UASs operating
over or in the vicinity of friendly forces and installations, both domestically and abroad,
the JCO, under direction of the Army, selected Forward Area Air Defense Command and
Control (FAAD C2) as the proprietary means of providing a shared COP for managing,
disseminating, and collaborating on information regarding UAS threats. Furthermore, the
JCO identified eight counter-small unmanned aerial system (C-sUAS) solutions categorized
into three systems-of-systems approaches and one command and control (C2) system:
1. Fixed/Semi-Fixed Systems
• Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System
(FS-LIDS): sponsored by [U.S.] Army.
xxv
• Negation of Improvised Non-State Joint Aerial-Threats (NINJA): sponsored by
[U.S.] Air Force.
• Counter-Remote Control Model Aircraft Integrated Air Defense Network
(CORIAN): sponsored by [U.S.] Navy.
2. Mounted/Mobile System
• Light-MADIS (L-MADIS): sponsored by [U.S.] Marine Corps.
3. Dismounted/Handheld Systems
• Bal Chatri: sponsored by Special Operations Command.
• Dronebuster: no sponsor [but] commercial off-the-shelf capability.
• Smart Shooter: no sponsor [but] commercial off-the-shelf capability.
4. Command and Control
• FAAD C2: sponsored by [U.S.] Army.
– FAAD C2 [includes] interoperable systems like the Air Force’s Air Defense
System Integrator (ADSI) and theMarine Corps’ Multi-Environmental Do-
main Unmanned Systems Application Command and Control (MEDUSA
C2) [3].
To understand how to evaluate the effectiveness of the current CUAS capabilities against
current and emergent threats imposed by Groups 1 through 3 UASs, our research takes the
unique approach by evaluating the UAS threat from a maritime and ground perspective.
Understanding the adversary and their associated offensive capabilities and limitations
allows for the best assertion of what defensive capabilities and level of force is required to
protect, defend, and conduct counter offensive where applicable.
Our research uniquely defines and categorizes the threat actors and their associated means
of UAS application through the lens of a military tactician. We define the threat actors who
operate Groups 1 through 3 UASs with the National Intelligence Council (NIC) definition
of hobbyist, state, and non-state actors. This definition is applied to the historical context of
adversarial UAS applications in every area of responsibility (AOR) and the extent of damage
yielded to human life and infrastructure. This context of understandingwho operates Groups
1 through 3 UASs and how they have wielded UASs as a tool to thwart DOD strategy and
policy is then translated into what means of C2 are leveraged in every AOR to support
adversarial UAS flight and payload operations. Knowledge of the means of C2 accessible
in an AOR is leveraged to support the assessment of what adversaries are able to conduct
xxvi
currently with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) UASs, as well as what adversaries will be
able to execute with emergent technology, infrastructure, and innovation.
After evaluating how adversaries are able to employ Groups 1 through 3 UASs in the
varying AORs, our research investigates the current CUAS capabilities recommended by
the JCO and employed by the USN and USMC to support countering UASs. Thereafter,
further research is conducted to evaluate the degree of effectiveness associated with specific
CUAS capabilities leveraged to support identifying and neutralizing varying numbers of
UAS threats. We implement and leverage unbiased simulations to demonstrate the rate
of effectiveness and the level of interoperability with other subsidiary CUAS subsystems
needed to support the CUAS kill chain. This unique, unbiased approach is intended to inform
senior decision makers of the actual effectiveness of current CUAS capabilities employed
in the Fleet, versus the commercially advertised effectiveness.
Our research concludes on the discernment of legal limitations imposed upon existing and
emergent CUAS capabilities needed to support the CUAS kill chain against UAS threats.
Our unique application of radio frequency (RF) deconfliction methods, procedures, and
capabilities further delivers the potential for understanding the extent of CUAS capabili-
ties’ active emission applications in an AOR. Further, we delineate Advanced Refractive
Effects Predication System (AREPS), Real-Time Spectrum Operations (RTSO), Own Force
Monitoring (OFM), and Builder as predictive analysis tools capable of supporting RF de-
confliction and approval to operate existing and emergent CUAS capabilities, as well as
determine how effective CUAS capabilities will be if applied to a specific area, weather, or
terrain.
Conclusion
The operational environment is saturated with both UAS and CUAS products with increased
use by adversarial operators. There remains an emergent need to establish requirements for
the USN and USMC to conduct joint, interoperable CUAS operations against Groups 1
through 3 UAS threat. We observe the effectiveness of current USN and USMC CUAS
capabilities could worsen as more UASs are operated in AORs with advance technology. To
meet the demand of joint CUAS requirements, the USN and USMC must divest from the
previous mentality of interim solutions to a permanent problem. Long-term, interoperable
CUAS solutions that are capable of performing the high rates of effectiveness against today’s
and future UAS threats are needed.
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Recommendations
The following list encapsulates suggested recommendations to improve CUAS interoper-
ability and effectiveness in the geopolitical environment:
• Establish a common baseline architecture to be used as the foundation for the
Department of the Navy (DoN) CUAS supported by:
– Configuration management for evolving software
– Change management for requirements or mission shifts
• Integrate spectrum analysis tools such as AREPS, RTSO, or Builder into existing and
future CUASs capabilities and CUAS planning to improve radar and RF detection,
tracking, and neutralization techniques.
– Leverage spectrum analysis tools to compute and display passive RF probability
of detection in varying weather and terrain environments.
– Leverage spectrum analysis tools to support the prediction of fratricide, mini-
mization of electromagnetic interference (EMI), and legal deconfliction for host
nation employment.
• Acquire and implement CUAS capabilities to provide:
– high probability of detection at extended ranges
– interoperability with the JCO mandated FAAD C2 architecture
– high probability of detection for increased numbers of simultaneousUAS targets,
such as clusters and swarms
• Conduct site surveys and blue force laydown to support accurate sensor placement
to account for multi-domain threat axis, geometry for the terrain, and friendly force
emissions.
The threat UASs pose today are here to stay and will likely get worse in the near future. If
the suggested recommendations are implemented, they should help to protect DOD interests
against current and emerging UAS threats.
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counter unmanned aerial system (CUAS) technology is the reference of an ability to detect,
classify, and intercept unmanned aerial systems (UASs) of a suspicious nature. The emer-
gence in this area of research and development was founded to meet the growing presence
and concerns of malicious UASs operating in or in the vicinity of United States Navy (USN)
and United States Marine Corps (USMC) friendly forces and installations. This research
evaluates the currently used CUAS capabilities leveraged by the USN and USMC for their
effectiveness in supporting the CUAS kill chain, as well as their ability to interoperate with
other means of CUAS deployed within and between the services and the Department of
Defense (DOD). Furthermore, this research investigates the level of interoperability and
support the current CUAS capabilities provide to meet the requirements established by the
Joint Counter-small unmanned aerial system Office (JCO) in 2020.
The JCOwas created in 2019 to support the CUAS interoperability needs by the joint force
against Groups 1 through 3 UASs in the DOD [1]. The JCO identified the DOD lacked the
requisite command and control (C2) architecture, doctrine, and commonality to adequately
address combating UAS threats domestically and abroad. To support identifying a common
C2 architecture for the DOD to adhere to, the JCO placed the U.S. Army as the executive
agent for all DOD Group 1 through 3 CUAS matters in DOD Directive 3800.01E [2].
UASs are considered threats if they present the imminent potential to conduct hazardous,
malevolent, or undesirable acts against equities deemed essential or protected. These threats
must be handled with systems containing the appropriate de-escalatory techniques suitable
for the operational environment they are employed in. CUAS research has been an area of
interest for the U.S. and its allies for over a decade, commencing with a North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) led study in 2003 during the Global War on Terrorism in the
Middle East. Prior to the proliferation of small, portable, radio frequency (RF) enabled UAS
products, CUAS research focused on low, slow, and small aerial targets known as Low Slow
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Flyers in an area of armed conflict. The area of research has matriculated at a reactive rate, 
proportional to the proliferation of UAS technology and affordability in the commercial 
markets.
In 2008, the RAND Corporation published their first report on threats instigated by UAS 
to the United States’ strategic equities, thus defining the operational need for CUAS [3]. In 
the following years, CUAS products have flourish throughout the commercial sector led by 
several laboratories, organizations, private firms, and contractors. In 2018, there were over 
235 CUAS products produced by 155 manufacturers in 33 countries [4]. With the plethora 
of CUAS capabilities available for use, the U.S. Department of the Navy (DoN) must 
consider which type of CUAS product is best for wide acquisition and application against 
emergent threats across our designated areas of responsibility (AORs) during active and 
non-active conflicts. The USN and USMC are tasked with providing global CUAS defense 
for a multitude of mission facets to include fixed i nstallations, forward operating bases, 
maritime assets, and mobile ground elements. Using the plethora of CUAS capabilities 
available for market purchase, both branches of the DoN have invested in non-
complementary CUAS capabilities to provide protection and reassurance. Further, CUAS 
coordination and integration is not well defined in USN or USMC amphibious and 
expeditionary warfare doctrine. This work addresses the future hardware and 
interoperability development needs for USN and USMC CUAS kill chains by 
distinguishing where and when interoperability is appropriate, identifying operational 
interferences, and any duplication of efforts. This includes consideration of which CUAS 
capabilities serve best for wide acquisition and application against emergent threats across 
our designated AORs during active and non-active conflicts.
AORs and associated host nations’ operational authority, legal restrictions, and variances 
of UAS threats serve as a constraint and restrain to which CUAS technology is optimal 
for universal employment. We focus on threats imposed by smaller, handheld, commercial 
UASs to the civilian and military environments. This work informs and supports future 
requirements and concepts of operations for DoN CUAS kill chains to improve interop-
erability for USN and USMC CUAS operations. The DoN must ascertain which CUAS 
capabilities meet the desired threshold for detection, classification, and neutralization. Fur-
thermore, host nations’ authority, legal restrictions, and variances of UAS threats serve as a 
constraint to which CUAS technology is optimal for universal employment. Here, we shall
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focus on the threats imposed by smaller, handheld, commercial UASs to the civilian and
military environments. This research is intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of
current UAS threats and legal restrictions to CUAS applications in all AORs to determine
the most ideal CUAS technology for procurement and operationalization.
1.2 Methodology
There exists an overabundance of CUAS products containing a variety of technologies to
identify, locate, track, and neutralize nefarious UASs in the civilian and military operational
environments. Further, CUAS is befall with limitations just as any emerging technology.
The ambiguity of deciding upon a best means of CUAS capability to address a UAS problem
set is compounded by the lack of DoN policy for acquiring interoperable technologies. As
product availability proliferates throughout the commercial and contracted business sectors,
product performance will be varied. Thus, the level of variance between expected CUAS
performance against a threat may be skewed. This challenge is exacerbated as the growth
in the UAS industry continues to yield improved technology and cheaper hardware. The
forward momentum of the UAS market inevitably plagues the CUAS market as a reactive
means of addressing the problem. As the market continues to expand, CUAS technology
will require more flexibility in capabilities.
Critical and efficient interactions between CUASs depends on an interoperable techno-
logical foundation defined by common architecture, modularity and parts interchangeability,
data transport integration, and standardized C2. To accurately assess the operational ad-
vantages and disadvantages for CUAS employment, an analysis of the predominant UAS
threats in each area of responsibility (AOR) and the disparity of inherent legal and opera-
tional restrictions in each AOR must be understood. Additionally, an analysis of currently
fielded CUASs and their intended locations of employment is required to assess where inter-
operability is appropriate. To adequately defeat emergent UAS threats with the appropriate
CUAS technology, we must understand how the adversary employs UASs in each AOR.
The following methodology is implemented in the following chapters of this research:
1. Review and analyze historical and current UAS and CUAS tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs), technology, and systems in use or development by the USN
and USMC to establish the levels of interoperability, interference, duplication, and
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limitations that exist.
• We assess the implication of historic UAS TTPs against current CUAS TTPs.
• We leverage U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command (MARFORCOM), Navy
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), Office of the Chief of Naval Op-
erations (OPNAV) N2/N6, and DOD and civilian agencies for information on
current CUAS technologies and systems in use or development.
2. Review and analyze USN and USMC mission sizes, geographic location conditions, 
and communication environments for differences and similarities with respect to 
AOR.
• The study of UAS C2 links, nodes and architecture support arguments for 
proposals to leverage complementary CUAS technology against current 
and emergent UAS threats.
• We leverage factual information from USN and USMC service command ele-
ments in each geographic combatant command (COCOM) on CUAS standard 
operating procedures, authorities, force employment, and best practices.
3. Review and analyze hobbyists’, non-state actors’, and state-actors’ UAS TTPs 
em-ployed with respect to the operational and informational environment in each 
AOR.
• UAS operations are inherently connected to the technological constraints of 
the geographic area and actors that employ them. Therefore, trend analysis 
ensued to determine what UAS technological aspirations are and will become 
operationalized to enable future UAS engagements.
• To achieve the desired tactics, research is conducted to determine the technolog-
ical means employed by UASs in combative and non-combative environments 
to support current and future CUAS TTPs.
• Information obtained from USN and USMC service command elements in 
each geographic COCOM obtained to support our analysis on adversaries’ UAS 
employment history, trends, and capabilities.
4. Identify host nation and geographic operational and legal restraints to CUAS techno-
logical application.
• Research ensued to identify operational and legal restraints CUAS technological 
application, as it pertains to each AOR and associated host nations.
– Our forward deployed forces operate on a leased capacity of U.S. soil in 
foreign countries. Therefore, host nations hold jurisdiction over operational
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planning and subsequent endeavors that impact rules of engagement.
• Supporting information for host nation and each AOR’s operational and legal
restriction to the employment of CUAS capabilities gathered and evaluated.
5. Develop future-looking concept of operations (CONOPS) for different sizes and
locations of CUAS missions.
6. Identify employment gaps in existing and projected CUAS kill chains from an oper-
ational perspective and an interoperability perspective.
7. Develop models and simulations of expected CUAS hardware behavior to identify
shortfalls and successes within the CUAS kill chain, as related to deficiencies with
hardware or interoperability.
The aforementionedmethodology is used in the subsequent chapters of this thesis to assess
the optimization of CUAS capacities within the legal bounds of an AOR by conducting
comparative analysis of the UAS threat and the decided upon CUAS countermeasure. After
identifying the most suitable means of CUAS capabilities for an AOR, we contrast the
capabilities’ operational means against the legal bounds of the host nation and AOR. The
CUAS capability must possess the inherent flexibility and pedigree to meet the required
legal restrictions of an AOR during combative and non-combative rules of engagement.
The study of the aforementioned UAS and CUAS tactics, technological applications, and
employment restraints underpin the necessity of identifying a CUAS capability capable of
adaptation to meet the interoperability needs of the USN and USMC.
This thesis concludes with recommendations proposed to the USN and USMC to support
the acquirement and operationalization of effective and interoperable CUAS capabilities
to support the current and emergent threats posed by adversaries and their employment of
UASs.
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This chapter provides the requisite background information and context of the UAS problem
set, which is later elaborated upon in the following chapters in greater detail. Here, we inform
the reader of the historical application of small, commercially available UASs in the global
geopolitical environment and their relevance to this area of research. It further associates
the historical application of UASs to their present day use. We define and identify the legacy
UAS TTPs and varying modes of C2 used to support UAS flight and payload operations
leveraged by various hobbyist, non-state, and state actors. We define the CUAS targeting
cycle and its relevance in detecting, tracking, and mitigating current and emergent UAS
threats in the operational environment. We lastly discuss the legal constraints associated
with potential emergent CUAS capabilities in the global operational environment.
2.1 Unmanned Aerial System Groups
The development and perceived growth of CUAS technology is related and attributed to the
growth and militaristic use of UASs in the civilian and military environments. The inception
and use of UASs for militaristic means have been present throughout modern warfare for
centuries. The DOD defined UAS groups in 2009 based upon their weight, above ground
level (AGL), and speed as shown in Figure 2.1.
7
Table 2.1. UAS Groups. Source: [5].
UASs and their employment have become ubiquitous inmilitary, civilian, and recreational
environments. This ubiquity is attributed to technological advancements in micro electrical-
mechanical systems-based precision sensors used to control the pattern of movement, speed,
and stability for UASs. The depreciation in cost and mass manufacturing of these attributes
have aided in the inclusion of UASs into modern life.
2.2 UAS Employment in History
Thefirst recordedmilitary employment of aUASwas during the ItalianWar of Independence
in 1849, with the use of unmanned balloons loaded with explosives [6]. The evolution of
technology and employment of UASs in warfare would continue to improve and serve as a
low cost, low risk, high reward means of conducting tactical operations to achieve strategic
advantages.
2.2.1 U.S. Military Investment In UASs
The U.S. commenced research and development of UASs in 1916, during the First World
War. C2 failures of RF remote controlled UASs ensued, resulting in a digression of UAS
aspirations to rudimentary anti-aircraft targeting practice. During World War II, approxi-
mately 15000 UASs were manufactured in southern California for this sole purpose [7].
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However, the ultimate intent remained as a means to deliver pilotless aircraft capable of con-
ducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and launching kinetic combat
operations. In 1918, the result yielded the U.S. Army’s Kettering Bug, which was capable
of diving deep into well-defended adversarial territory to deliver kinetic payloads [8]. Sub-
sequently, Germany leveraged this ideology and capability during World War II to develop
their own UAS as a variant of their V-1 flying bombs. These unmanned vehicles were
leveraged in the first-ever use of a terrorist related UAS campaign, flying haphazardly and
indiscriminately targeting civilian and military targets alike [9].
Following the employment of the Kettering Bug, in 1932 the USN commenced develop-
ment of radio-controlled aircraft under its Curtiss N2C-2 UAS program [10]. Thereafter,
mass production of UASs commenced in support of World War II. This mass production
is widely attributed to Reginald Denny and his Radioplane OQ-2, which served as the
first remote-controlled aircraft produced for the U.S. military [10]. The U.S. DOD would
continue to invest, acquire, and field UASs for decades to come until the maturation of
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) necessitated an official requirement and
budgetary expenditures for the employment of UASs. Section 220 of the NDAA, FY2001
established the following long-term goals of UAS employment:
• Goal – It shall be a goal of the Armed Forces to achieve the fielding of
unmanned, remotely controlled technology such that:
– by 2010, one-third of aircraft in the operational deep strike force
aircraft fleet are unmanned; and,
– by 2015, one-third of the operational ground combat vehicles are
unmanned. [9]
2.2.2 U.S. Military UAS Influence On Adversaries
This research delineated the U.S. military becoming more vested and reliant on UAS
technology to support, enable, and lead several warfighter capabilities and efforts to achieve
desired tactical advantages. However, the display of U.S. UAS technology and superiority
has also provided a pedigree of test beds to enable and train state and non-state actors,
allied and adversarial alike. The broad procurement and operationalization of commercially
available UASs has provided a means for converting the most rudimentary of air forces
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and air defense systems to rival that of recognized superpowers such as the United States,
China, and Russia. Subsequent maturation and increased sophistication in RF, cellular,
Wi-Fi, satellite, and Bluetooth communications has provided for improvements in the UAS
employment model [11]. As such, UASs are now more reliable, protected, and can travel
farther as discussed in Chapter 4. What once was perceived as benign and germane to the
technological era which incepted it, has become a more menacing problem to defeat.
2.3 UAS Employment by Non-state Actors
UASs have played a relevant role throughout modern history, leading to present day threats
represented by state and non-state adversarial actors. The use of UASs by non-state rec-
ognized actors can be dated back to 1994 by Japanese cult-like followers known as Aum
Shinrikyo [12]. This group successfully employed remote controlled helicopters with aerial
dispensatory systems to release Sarin nerve agents on the Matsumoto courthouse and Tokyo
Subway systems. Subsequent terrorists plots ensued, including:
1. July 2001, al-Qaida attempted attack using Group 1 UASs equipped with improvised
explosive device (IED) against Group of Eight (G8) Summit leaders [13].
2. February 2002, al-Qaida attempted attack using Group 1 UASs equipped with anthrax
payloads against the English House of Commons [14].
3. June 2002, al-Qaida conceptual plot to use Group1 UASs equipped with IEDs against
civilian airliners [13].
4. August 2002, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) plot to use
Group 1 UASs to carry out IED strikes against Colombian Army and civilian equi-
ties [15].
5. December 2003, Hizbollah, Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and Fatah form a joint plot
to use UASs equipped with IEDs to attack perceived Jewish trespassers in the Gaza
Strip [16].
The aforementioned cases were all plots that were either foiled due to law enforcement
or military intervention. However, there are several instances of initial and grand scale
successes with UASs that garnered international attention and necessitated the need for
products to counter the use of UASs. Examples of these instances are captured in Table 2.2.
10
Table 2.2. Non-state Actor Use of UASs. Adapted: [17]
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– Table 2.2 – continued from previous page
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– Table 2.2 – continued from previous page
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2.3.1 Common Commercial UASs Employed By Non-State Actors
We assess the affordability and ease of use for UAS products increases their appeal for
civilian and military use. At present day, it is estimated that a few million small UASs
exist in the operational environment. From the varying types of UAS products currently
employed, Sandia Laboratories articulates that seven play a major role in the open market
based on price, payload, range, and flight time. Table 2.3 annotates the UASs based on order
of proliferation by consumers. Of note, this list is from 2017 and is subject to change as
UAS technology evolves and becomes more accessible to the commercial industry.
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Even if attacks involving UASs are unsuccessful, there still exists an excessive threat to
life and operations on the ground. During Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR), U.S.
Army Special Forces spokesman LTC Joe Salinas stated the U.S. had no control of the
airspace below 3,500 feet in Syria and Iraq due to the prevalence of unauthorized UASs in
the operating environment [19].
2.4 Modern UAS Threat Scenarios
The use of UASs lowers the risk of human life in the pursuit of conducting ISR and
kinetic missions for the purposes of air superiority and dominance. UASs also enable
near-peer adversaries the ability to augment traditional air force elements with low-cost
and less attributable means of ISR as well. These actions are further codified as Grey Zone
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activities, below the threshold for armed conflict but committed with the intent to support an
operational or strategic means. Such activities are conducted in the Indo-Pacific Command
area of responsibility by the Chinese, in support of their regional hegemonic desires of
expanding their ISR coverage around the Spratly Islands and harassing U.S. Naval forces in
the area [20].
Further, UASs have enabled adversaries lacking the monetary means, technological capa-
bilities, or logistical resources to compete for air superiority against superpowers such as the
U.S. As anticipated, the massive surge in sensationalism and technological advancements
in C2 have made malevolent UAS employment in any theater a considerable threat to force
protection and operations. Commercially availableUASs and tech savvy adversaries are now
capable of conducting a wide barrage of operations due to the sensationalism associated
with the UAS market. Table 2.4 shows how adversaries are leveraging UASs to accomplish
means that were once either unattainable or only achievable through nation state actors as
a means to complement their preexisting UAS TTPs.
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Table 2.4. Modern UAS Employment Options.
Type of Operation Pictorial Application
Sustained and Long Range ISR for Operational Preparation of
the Environment or Battle Damage Assessment
DJI Phantom4 Pro quadcopter w/embedded camera
Example use case of the Group 1 UAS to provide the covert
capability of conducting ISR in an area of interest by means of
the onboard camera and gimbal. Although the DJI Phantom4
Pro quadcopter does not come commercially with a camera, it
possesses the capability, like many other brands of UASs, as
depicted here to add a camera and gimbal as a payload options.
Synchronized and Coordinated C2 of Ground and Air Elements Autonomous quadcopter piloted w/smartphone device for C2
Example use case of a generic quadcopter with a smart phone
device added as a payload to support C2 between the UAS
vehicle and a GCS. This payload option is generic in nature, and
can be leveraged to serve and support the extension of C2
between the UAS and the GCS, or other surrounding UASs
operating as a cluster or swarm.
Distributed Messaging for Information Operations Qualcomm quadcopter w/5G, LTE network connectivity
Example use case of a Qualcomm quadcopter with a 5G LTE
distributed messaging payload included to support the mass or
directed dissemination of multimedia messages to personal
communication devices operating on a network of interest.
Although the Qualcomm quadcopter does not come with a
distributed messaging payload, it possess the capability, like
other brands of UASs, as depicted here to add a message
distribution device as a payload.
As identified during the early onset of OIR in Syria and Iraq, there were more UASs
manufactured from more countries and being flown by more state and non-state actors than
in any other conflict in history. If at least half a dozen of disenfranchised groups operate a
moderate variety of UASs, they would be able to tip the scales of decisive engagements in
their favor [21].
16
2.5 UAS Modes of Operation
Due to the wide availability of commercial UAS products and technological advancements
in C2, themeans of employment are associated with the technology of given time frame. The
means of control and communication are obtained through the use of RF-reliant protocols,
which includes cellular and satellite communications, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth technologies.
It is imperative to understand which means are leveraged by UAS operators to support the
procurement of the requisite CUAS products to deter and counter UAS operability.
2.5.1 Bluetooth Control (2.4GHz– 2.5GHz)
Tiny, novice, and commercially available UASs predominantly operate in the spectrum of
2.4GHz to 2.5GHz under Bluetooth control. Due to the range of control in this portion of
the RF spectrum being limited to approximately 100 meters, we assess UASs leveraging
this technology to be more applicable to civilian recreational use or for short-ranged,
tactical adversarial operations as denoted in Table 2.4. The use of Bluetooth technology
is not widely hardened, and is therefore more susceptible to interference from other forms
of RF as a means of countermeasure as expounded upon in Section 4.4.2.1. As with
any C2 communication link, Bluetooth technology also enables the sharing of telemetric
information such as air speed, course, and altitude between UASs and their controllers.
The lack of security hardening, however may make such information susceptible to forgery,
eavesdropping, device spoofing, or other misuse.
2.5.2 Cellular and Wi-Fi Control (900MHz – 2.4GHz)
Most commercially available, remote-controlled UASs operate at or around 900 megahertz
(MHZ), while customhardware andmore sophisticatedGroupOneUASs operate around 2.4
GHz. The ability to maneuver through the UHF portion of the spectrum between 900MHz
and 2.4GHz provides UAS operators the ability to exercise C2 and exchange data via
cellular networks, Wi-Fi, and other services, extending the range and mobility of the UAS.
Commercially available UASs leveraging cellular networks to support their C2 make use
of ground transmitters using cellular connectivity to support the exchange of data. Cellular
networks range across 2G Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM); 3G code
division multiple access (CDMA), time division multiple access (TDMA), and frequency
division multiple access (FDMA); 4G LTE; and 5G. The employment of these technologies
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to support UAS C2 for flight and payload operations is expounded upon in Chapter 4
Section 4.4.1. The associated ground control station receives subsequent connectivity to
the previously mentioned networks by means of a base transceiver station (BTS) receiving
service through an associated cellular service provider. Commercially availableUASs can be
equipped with 802.11 Wi-Fi enabled processors as well. The handler possesses a controller
that serves as the transmitter, with a receiver located onboard the UAS. Both transmitter
and receiver are tuned to the exact same frequency. To avoid denial of service (DoS) from
competing devices that may be operating on the same frequency, the UAS transmitter and
receiver use a radio frequency identification (RFID) chip. The receiver and transmitters
pertaining to one or more UASs is then paired using the RFID chip associated with its UAS.
All commands sent over the designated frequency are transmitted with the prefix of the
RFID, and the receiver is aware that the associated command messages are intended for it
and only it [22].
2.5.3 Satellite Control (1.2GHz – 1.5GHz)
Global Positioning System (GPS) technology leverages the use of satellites operating in
medium earth orbit (MEO) as a means of obtaining locational waypoints for a means
of navigation. GPS enables a UAS to span a much farther distance by means of pre-
programmed waypoint navigation. This form of flight allows for semi-autonomy through
the use of predetermined waypoints, terrain, or celestial navigation enabling a UAS to fly on
preplanned waypoints [23]. The waypoints inform the UAS where to fly and the estimated
time it should take to reach a destination. The estimated time to reach the destination will
include the anticipated speed the UAS should use and the altitude is should achieve and
maintain for the duration of the flight. GPS satellites transmit data in the UHF portion
of the RF spectrum, using satellite communications (SATCOM) L1 1575 MHz and L2
1227 MHz [24]. The L1 and L2 signals are leveraged by the GPS satellites to support the
broadcasting of civil use GPS signal to support commercial needs. The legacy L1 signal
was superseded by the L2 signal, which has a higher effective power output to support
transmission through trees and infrastructure. The use of GPS requires that a GPS receiver
onboard the UAS be capable of receiving frequencies that GPS satellites leverage to transmit
data.
SATCOM is also leveraged as a means of extending the ability to exercise C2 for UAS
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control beyond visual line of site (BVLOS). The use of SATCOM antennas allow for UASs
to utilize SATCOM to exercise C2 when out of range of potential terrestrial RF coverage. In
this regard, the SATCOM antenna utilizes an uplink to a satellite which can serve as a relay
or amplifying means of RF signals between the UAS and the associated ground station.
The UAS is therein able to operate in the satellite’s provided field of view or footprint
casted on the earth’s surface. This implementation provides UAS operators over the horizon
operability for exercising UAS control, and will be further elaborated on in chapter 4.
2.6 UAS Tactics Overview
The previous means of UAS control can be used solely or in conjunction with each other.
These means significantly impact the differentiation in UAS tactics at the disposal of UAS
operators in the operational environment.While noviceUAS usersmay leverage commercial
vehicles over a Bluetooth connection for short range control, savvy technicians can leverage
cellular and Wi-Fi services to extend the range of coverage and employ multiple clusters of
commercial vehicles under a single C2 node. As anticipated, UAS methods of employment
can be summarized in the categories of single use, cluster use, or swarm use. To defeat any
of these employment options, the tactic must be identified. The technological means of C2
between the UAS or UASs and their operator must be known. Armed with knowledge of
the tactics and C2 means, an adequate form of CUAS capability can be applied to deter,
degrade, or destroy the detected UAS.
2.6.1 Single Use
A lone UAS is a single UAS controlled over RF by an operator, semi-autonomously, or au-
tonomously via pre-programming. This can be accomplished via complete human-control
or through some level of semi-autonomy attained via satellite control and GPS waypoint
navigation. This method of employment is vastly leveraged and attainable with commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) products and has been displayed historically by disenfranchised orga-
nizations, terrorists, and various other non-state actors. The kinetic goals of employment
range from crowd dispersal through the delivery of homemade IEDs to assassination of high
value targets. Moreover, the ISR means of employment can augment the lack of organic,




A cluster is a grouping of single UASs used for the purposes of attaining a mutual goal. This
too can be completely under human control or obtained through a level of semi-autonomy.
Therefore, a cluster may be controlled under one, or many different C2 nodes.
Aspirations of semi-autonomous UAS clusters use for kinetic targeting has been exempli-
fied in previous terrorists’ plots against commercial airliners, simulating a bird strike during
takeoff [25]. Similar to that of a single UAS use, the operational purposes for using a cluster
range from kinetic targeting of commercial airliners, IED crowd targeting, chemical weapon
dispersal, logistics, cyber and electronic warfare, and messaging. Such an employment of
UASs in an already crowded commercial airspace represents a direct and imminent threat
to human life at a catastrophic level. Use of clusters implies a larger scale of warfare, and
therefore an increased risk to casualties and operational end state. As such, this method of
employment reaches beyond tactical levels of war and to operational aspects as applied by
state actors, surrogates, and proxies.
2.6.3 Swarm Use
A swarm is identified as a set of aerial vehicles working in unison to accomplish a specific
mission. A swarm can be controlled either manually or autonomously using pre-processors
or pre-programming [26]. Missions are singular in nature, necessitating the need for the
drones to self-organize to fulfill a requirement and achieve a desired effect. The DOD further
defines a swarm as demonstrating collective decision-making and adaptive formation flying
[27]. Similar to the use of single UASs or clusters, the threat by the weaponization and
employment of several dozens to potentially thousands of UASs in a swarm directly impacts
national security and is an indication of a superior level of adversary. The use of swarms
serves as an elevated demonstration of capability and war. As such, this employment method
is anticipated only by state actors, although the technology and accessibility is commercially
available for purchase and employment. If swarms are equipped with chemical warheads
or other explosives, they carry the capability to threaten large scale military and civilian
equities such as power plants, bases, large crowd gatherings, and other protected events and
assets. Their range of employment also covers large scale electronicwarfare and cyber effects
and weapon of mass destruction (WMD) dissemination. The aforementioned acts serve as
an escalated level of capability and threat to civilian and DOD infrastructure and personnel;
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therefore, swarms represent a strategic means of employment in war time. Per Figure 2.5, it
was assessed by the DOD in FY2017 that UAS swarm technology would not present itself
until 2042 [28]. However, in light of modern events, we assess swarm technology as readily
accessible for acquirement and employment in an AOR. The associated communication
links associated with swarm capabilities serves as another point for the assessment of when
swarm technology would become practical, as expounded upon in Chapter 4.
Table 2.5. Comprehensive Roadmap for UAS Autonomy. Adapted: [28].
Contradicting this claim as shown in Figure 2.1, however, is a 2005 DOD assessment that
the operational fielding of fully autonomous swarm technology would appear in as little as
two decades from the year 2005 [29].
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Figure 2.1. UAS Autonomy Capability Levels. Source: [29].
Figures 2.5 and 2.1 attempt to draw a comparison of similar criteria, although their
conclusions vary by two decades. This ambiguity is related to what clearly defines the
levels of autonomy for UASs. The levels of autonomy are based upon varying levels of
intercommunication, tasks, coordination, and decision making conducted by the UASs
in a swarm. The levels range from no autonomy to complete autonomy without human
intervention. The University of North Dakota published an article relating autonomy of
UASs to a decision cycle a UAS swarm would follow to fulfill a desired purpose [30]. The
decision chain of a swarm is provided in Figure 2.2, providing a paradigm for potential
autonomous decision making.
Figure 2.2. Decision Chain of an Autonomous System. Source: [30].
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Furthermore, the uncertainty of when swarm technology will be operationalized is based
upon the fielding of C2-capable equipment that spans the current cellular, Wi-Fi, and
satellite architectures while properly satisfying the associated decision chain paradigms to
meet full-autonomy. It is therefore difficult to assess if a cluster of UASs is truly operating
under full autonomy and serving as a swarm.
2.6.4 UAS Tactics – Levels of War
The levels of war, as quantified by the U.S. DOD are tactical, operational, and strategic [31].
The tactical level of warfare is therefore the level that is short in duration, determining
small decision points in combat. The operational level of warfare is the outcome of the
tactical level decision points, and serves as an escalated phase of warfare. The strategic
level of warfare is therefore considered the highest level of planning and execution, with
political foresight and end state. The employment of these tactics provides a depiction for
the level of sophistication an adversary possesses. It further provides indication of which
level of warfare is being conducted. The use of a single UAS to augment ISR capabilities
and conduct non-traditional warfare provides tactical level advantages on the field of battle.
Tactical warfare is leveraged to determine small, contested conflicts in an ongoing wartime
environment. The use of a cluster of UASs to support logistics or wage larger scaled kinetic
effects against an opponent serves as a means of supporting operational endeavors in a
wartime plan. However, the employment of a swarm for the purposes of delivering WMDs
or conducting full-scale attacks serves as a strategic means, with attempts to cripple an
opponent kinetically or informatively. Table 2.6 consists of a compilation of UAS tactics
that have been historically used, attempted, or planned.
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Table 2.6. Group 1-3 Historic UAS Tactics Used




to support terrorism against
targets of opportunity or
logistical compensation.
Possible scenarios: ISR, IED
delivery, and smuggling
Tactical level of war
Single UAS Autonomous Sophisticated means to
enable terrorism against
targets of interest.
Possible scenarios: long range
ISR, IED delivery, WMD
delivery, smuggling, and EA.
Tactical level of war
Cluster of UASs Human
Controlled/Semi-autonomous
Air-to-air redundancy or




Possible scenarios: ISR, IED
delivery, messaging, C2,
smuggling, EA, and ES
Operational level of war
Cluster of UASs Autonomous Sophisticated compensation




lead/primary focus of effort.
Possible scenarios: long
range ISR, IED delivery,
WMD delivery, messaging,
logistics, C2, long range
smuggling, EA, and ES
Operational level of war
Swarm of UASs Human
Controlled/Autonomous
Artificially controlled






delivery, WMD delivery, and
EW
Strategic level of war
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2.7 U.S. CUAS Technology
TheDODhas held a vested interest in CUAS products since 2008, following the proliferation
and subsequent widespread use of commercial UAS products for terrorism and adversarial
militaristic means in military conflicts [32]. This section explores these technologies.
2.7.1 U.S. Interest In CUAS Technology
The U.S.’s interest in CUAS capability spiked during OIR, when terrorist organizations
such as the ISIS demonstrated the ability to procure, arm, and operationalize quadcopters
at an alarming rate against American and allied forces. Central Command (CENTCOM)
reported that ISIS primarily leveraged Chinese-made DJI quadcopters to serve as grenade
launchers, kamikaze bombers, decoys, and to enable ISR. The need for CUAS technology
was further warranted in other military conflicts such as in Yemen, when Iranian backed
Huthi rebels leveraged UASs as a low-cost, high reward means to inflict heavy material
and civilian casualties to the Saudi-led coalition at the Saudi and Yemini border. In 2019,
the use of UASs in the Yemen war was exacerbated during the Huthis most audacious
attack to date [33]. In this attack, ten UASs were used to inflict massive material damage
to two critical oil installations deep inside Saudi territory. This attack leveraged the use of
cheap, commercially modified UASs to defeat the world’s third largest spender on military
equipment. This attack also delineated a subversion of amulti-million dollar, U.S.-purchased
air defense system by cheapUASs. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) became vested after
a 2015 incident, when a civilian accidentally crashed a hobby DJI quadcopter on the White
House lawn [34]. This incident served two purposes. First, it showed how vulnerable the
most protected real estate in the U.S. was against cheap hobby kits. Second, it delineated the
vulnerability of the White House and secure government facilities to attacks from novice
actors, with rudimentary knowledge in the field of RF and IED making.
Europe Command (EUCOM) and CENTCOMboth drew concern during a 2016 incident,
when an inexpensive Russian-made UAS flew deep into Israeli territory from Syria for
perceived surveillance, only to avoid being intercepted by successive Israeli Patriot Missile
and Israeli fighter air-to-air missiles [35]. This failure drew heavy criticism for the inability
to successfully intercept the threat, and for the failure to intercept the threat after the
employment of extremely expensive, U.S.-manufactured and sold air defense systems. U.S.
law enforcement, in conjunction with NORTHCOM’s appetite for CUAS, swelled after law
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enforcement and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) surmised that malicious
actors could inexpensively employ UASs to jeopardize airports, large crowds, political
events, concerts, sporting events, religious gatherings, and other organized functions that
draw in masses of people.
The operational need for CUASs is to detect, track, classify, and interdict unidentified or
unresponsive UASs operating in the vicinity of government property or displaying hostile
intent. Interception is dependent on the CUAS technology. This could imply the employment
of countermeasures to deny the progression of the UAS towards friendly equities, disrupt
the employment of the UAS, or destroy the UAS.
2.7.2 U.S. Expenditures On CUAS Technology
The presence and potential for the malicious employment of UASs in the vicinity of civilian
and military assets presents a direct threat to force protection and operations. Without
intervention, this very presence could contribute to the undermining of global national
security endeavors and jeopardize lives. The aforesaid examples of antagonistic UAS uses
all evaded military defense radar detection. Traditional military air defense systems have
shown they cannot adequately detect and track commercial UASs due to their size, altitude,
manufactured materials, and speed. We assess the operational requirement to rapidly field
CUAS products arose from exacerbated use of UAS products to undermine U.S. foreign
policy. For fiscal year (FY) 2020, the DOD intended to spend at least $373 million on
CUAS research and development and at least $200 million on CUAS acquisition and
operationalization [36].
2.7.3 Legacy Air Defense System Shortfalls
We assess previously and currently employed non-CUAS air defense systems affixed upon
mobile platforms such as the USN’s carrier strike group (CSG) and amphibious readiness
group (ARG), Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and Special Purpose Marine Air Ground
Task Force (SPMAGTF) assets, or upon fixed sites such as military bases are ineffective and
uneconomical when tested against UASs. Traditional air defenses and their ineffectiveness
against COTS UASs experience shortfalls in three areas of concern—the ability to detect
the threat, the ability to classify the threat for subsequent neutralization, and neutralization
of the threat with overly excessive force and monetary expense [33], [37].
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The USN’s Aegis combat system, designed by Lockheed Martin, is a surface-to-air
missile and radar system used to identify, track and guide weapons to destroy designated
aerial targets [38]. It was incepted and deployed in 1983 with the intent to track large, fast
moving fixed wing and rotary aerial objects. Similarly, the USN’s SPY-1 multi-function,
phased-array radar is a highly mobile, land and sea-based radar that operates in the S-band
portion of the RF spectrum with the intent of tracking larger, fast moving aerial targets.
The S-band serves as a designated portion of the RF spectrum between 2 GHz and 4
GHz that is leveraged for aerial surveillance, surface ships radars, and communications.
When combined in the maritime and expeditionary environments, Aegis and SPY-1 are
only effective against traditional military assets operating in the S-band portion of the RF
spectrum utilizing known or well trackable frequencies.
2.7.4 Adversarial UAS Exploitation Of Legacy U.S. Military Air De-
fenses
Legacy U.S. military air defense technology is actively exploited by our adversaries in
locations such as the South China Sea, where China is extending and reinforcing its ISR
capability with Groups 1 through 5 UASs connected to mobile and fixed C2 commercial and
military sites [39], [40]. This addition provides China’s preexisting ISR an all-seeing, low
detectable eye in the sky. China’s modified commercial drones will leverage their advantage
of lightweight, high maneuverability, dynamic video payloads, against the U.S.’s inability
to successfully track them in the maritime environment with legacy air defense systems.
Subsequent exploitation and usurpation of U.S. traditional air defense technology was
displayed in the aforementioned Saudi oil pipeline attack on September 19, 2019 [41]. Saudi
Arabia, as previously stated, is the world’s third largest spender on military arms—spending
$67.6 billion in 2018 alone. However, this rudimentary yet successful attack initiated by
the Huthis illustrated that technological superiority does not equate to a wartime advantage.
Here, SaudiArabia’s $1 billion air defense failed to defeat the low-flying, cheap, unregistered
drones used to carry out the attack. Their inability to defeat the threat was partially related to
the ineffectiveness of their air defense systems against small UASs and use of coastal defense
cruise missiles. At the time, Saudi Arabia possessed the U.S. made Patriot missile defense
system and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), German made Skyshield air
defense cannons, and French Shahine mobile anti-aircraft systems.
27
2.7.5 Cost Effectiveness Of Legacy Air Defenses Against Commercial
UASs
All of these systems are designed to detect and intercept traditional military targets operating
at elevated altitudes. Each of the previously mentioned systems and batteries come at a price
tag of several millions to hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars. Further, the price tag of a
single missile averages $1 to $8 million. The cost of a single shot from the most recent
variant of the Patriot missile is approximately $5 million [42].
This price begs the question if a strategic defensive capability should be used as a sole
means of defense against a commercially available UAS, which could cost as low as a
few hundred dollars. In June 2019, the Army Symposium disclosed a U.S. ally did indeed
leverage a $3 million PAC-3 missile to intercept and shoot down a $200 Amazon purchased
drone procured and operated by a non-state actor [43]. This demonstrates a horrific economic
loss and a disproportionate response to inexpensive, vastly available threats. Therefore, the
gap in defensive capability and the prevalence of UAS threats must be filled with more
economic, practical, and effective hardware. We recommend this hardware being designed
to meet this specific asymmetric threat, vice retrofitting preexisting legacy systems with lip
service and further monetary losses.
2.8 CUAS Market
We assess the shortfalls of legacy air defense systems and growth of Groups 1 through 3
UASs has contributed to a growth in the CUAS market. Research shows that the CUAS
market is projected to be worth $4.43 billion by 2026, making it one of the fastest growing
spending categories in the defense budget [44]. The market for CUAS products is trending
due to several categories, including concerns for personnel and material safety, increased
use of COTSUASs in the civilian andmilitary environments for malicious gains, an increase
in availability of UAS capabilities on the open market, and the relative decrease in cost to
procure and modify UAS technology for strategic, operational or tactical endeavors.
CUASs from a militaristic perspective are employed on high valued assets such as bases,
secure installations, and naval, air, and ground assets to support and enhance force protection.
Likewise CUASs, from a civilian perspective, are employed on high valued assets such
as airports, sporting events, political events, VIP transportation, marine reserves, secure
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facilities and infrastructure, and counter narcotics and weapons operations.
2.8.1 Foreign Influence On U.S. CUAS Market
We asses fiscal growth in the domestic CUASmarket being attributed to global superpowers
such as China, Russia, and the U.S. investing in laser-based anti-drone systems to protect
high valued civilian andmilitary equities. This is exemplified by the U.S. Army’s acquisition
request in August 2018 for Drone Dome Systems [44]. The army’s Drone Dome system was
designed and built to disable mobile UASs with a two-second concentrated laser weapon,
capable of generating five kilowatts of power for hard kill. This is further delineated through
the U.S. Army’s contract with Raytheon in November 2018 for Ku-band RF radars, capable
of detecting small, commercially available or modified UASs. In 2008, there existed no
CUAS capability on the market to meet the urgent operational need to detect, classify, and
neutralizemalignUASs operating in critical airspace [45]. However, in 2015 it was estimated
by Sandia Laboratories that just ten to twelve CUAS products existed as a result of the joint
urgent operational needs fielded by the U.S. armed services and other countries. However,
in 2019 it was estimated that approximately 537 CUAS products proliferated the market
and operational environment [46]. The excessive growth in the market has brought upon
a new challenge altogether. Now the market is inundated with CUAS products containing
different claims of capabilities for detection, classification, and interdiction.Moreover, some
products offer only one capability whilst others may offer one or more. The challenge now
ensues on which CUAS product is best suited for the operational environment and legal
authorities it is applied in.
2.8.2 Current CUAS Product Capabilities
Weassess one short term goal of CUAS is to compensate for the shortfall presented by legacy
and traditional air defense systems, which is to detect, locate and track, classify, and interdict
small, low-flying, commercially available or modified UASs. We further assess a long term
goal of CUAS is to support the intelligence community’s collection of UAS signatures and
technology. Figure 2.3 shows a definedCUASkill chain of events leveraged by theDOD [47].
This figure provides a baseline of the desired effects for CUAS products. To successfully
support the USN and USMC’s intent of protecting its personnel and infrastructure from
adversarial Groups 1 through 3 UAS threats, CUAS needs to be able to perform all of the
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functions designated in the targeting cycle. Chapters 6 and 7 address the current CUAS
capabilities and the need to support all aspects of the targeting cycle and interoperability
amongst otherCUASs.Chapters 6 and 7 further delineate the requisite supporting framework
a CUAS targeting cycle requires, and demonstrate the necessity of transparency between
the CUAS and other targeting cycles leveraged by the DOD shown in Figure 2.4 [47].
CUAS products’ desired end state is the assured protection of forces and installations from
unknown, unidentified, malign UASs. As one system may not meet all needs, there exists a
goal to complement kinetic weapons deemed suitable for interdiction against commercially
available UASs by providing indications and warning for queuing.
Figure 2.3. CUAS Targeting Cycle. Adapted from: [47].
Figure 2.4. DOD Targeting Cycles. Adapted from: [47].
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2.9 CUAS Targeting Cycle
2.9.1 Detection
The first step in the CUAS targeting cycle is the detection of a threat [47]. Detection of
a threat implies a targeted UAS is within the range of the CUAS system’s sensors. This
action is followed by a subsequent alert to the CUAS operator that a potential target UAS
of interest has been detected for further actions to ensue.
Detection is accomplished by first understanding how the UAS is communicating with
its handler in the RF spectrum. It could also cover how the UAS emanates noise as it is
propelled throughout the air, yielding an acoustic frequency that’s detectable as a sound
wave. It may also encompass how the UAS appears based on its surface area, dimensions,
reflectivity of light, and amount of heat it emits [48]. From these differing perspectives of
detectability, we assess that UASs may be discovered via sensors such as radar, RF, electro-
optical (EO), infrared (IR), acoustic, or a combination of these also known as sensor fusion.
The CUAS technology chosen will vary based on which techniques are used for detection.
Table 2.7 provides a background overview of CUAS detection means used to identify the
presence of a UAS. This table will be further elaborated upon in Section 6.2 to support
applicability to current CUAS detection means leveraged by the USN and USMC.
31
Table 2.7. Detection, Tracking, and Classification Sensors.
Sensor Description
Radar Identifies the presence of commercial UASs based on the presence of a radar
signatures used in the RF spectrum [47]. All radars operate by transmitting a radio
signal of known frequency and power in a focused direction, and then utilizing the
Doppler effect to detect the reflected signal that is returned after it impacts the target.
Doppler radars differentiate whether the target is moving toward or away from the
sensor, allowing the determination and discrimination of the type of object detected.
The use of this method employs Doppler shifting and associated algorithms to
discern between stationary objects and noise from the environment. The use of
Doppler shifting is the change in frequency as an object draws nearer or farther from
a source observing the object. This is an active form of emissions and sensing.
Radio Frequency Leverages a library and rota of cataloged, known frequencies used by commercially
available or modified UASs in an operational environment. The rota algorithm scans
in the associated RF spectrum to search for known FOIs in an ascending order, and
starts over if nothing is active. Once a FOI is identified as active, associated direction
finding occurs to identify lines of bearing and enable tracking and queuing. This is a
passive form of emissions and sensing [47].
Electro-Optical The use of cameras to detect and classify a UAS based on its visual signature and
unique characteristics [48]. Collects information in the visible spectrum. The
uniqueness of UASs is cataloged in an updated and maintained library of known
UASs, supporting the ability to distinguish between different classes and types of
UASs. Differing sensors require specific features of a UAS be captured for accurate
detection and classification of a UAS. The features captured on an EO/IR sensor are
dependent upon the angular position of the sensor to the UAS. This is a passive form
of sensing.
Infrared The use of cameras to detect and classify a UAS based on its electromagnetic
signature produced during operation [47]. Collects information in the infrared
spectrum. This sensor typically includes wavelengths between 400 nanometers to 1
millimeter to support identification and discernment between short wavelength and
long wavelength objects. This is a passive form of sensing.
Acoustic The use of highly sensitive microphones to detect active UASs in an environment
based on the unique sounds emitted by the UASs’ propellers and the associated
interference caused by air resistance [47]. This requires an updated and maintained
library of catalogued sounds generated by known commercial UASs based on
differing environments. This is a passive means of sensing.
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2.9.2 Locate and Track
The second step in the CUAS targeting cycle is the ability to locate and track a threat once
it is identified using the previously mentioned capabilities in Table 2.7 [47]. Locating an
identified UAS implies the inherent ability to discern an accurate geographical location
for it. This location can be provided in the form of latitude, longitude, and altitude on
a display, military grid reference system (MGRS) on a grid map, or intersecting line
of bearings (LOBs) on a quadrant as delineated in Section 6.2. The accuracy of this
determination sets the tone for the ability to precisely track the targeted UAS’s location as
it maneuvers in the environment. Tracking is the anthology of the aforenoted reports over
the period the UAS is active. The tracking should be presented as a legible means of points
to an operator to support situational awareness.
2.9.3 Classification
The third step in the CUAS targeting cycle is classification of the threat [47]. Classification
is the ability to discern a target UAS from the ambiguity of the environment it is operating
in. Additionally, it is the ability to rule out background noise such as animals, debris,
or commercial planes. Classification of a UAS is also based on the UAS make, model,
manufacturer, and protocols used to operate and communicate between other UASs or the
operator. Another means for UAS classification is made feasible through the Drone Remote
Identification Protocol (DRIP), which is under development. DRIP serves as a rudimentary,
trivial means to identify and classify the UAS by means of required self-broadcasting of
the UAS’s identification and location information for reception by other parties [49]. This
form of identification intends to make the previously available remote identification (RID)
protected and broadcasted publicly to support the efforts of the FAA, law enforcement, and
the DOD with tracking unauthorized UASs. The ability to perform all of this requires a
dynamic, living library that maintains a catalog of known UASs and their associated unique
identifiers. After the detection and tracking of the UAS occurs, classification ensues based
on the techniques from Table 2.7 and the comparisons against previously collected and
logged UASs. Current UAS classification techniques are addressed in Section 6.2.
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2.9.4 Mitigation
The final step in the CUAS targeting cycle is the mitigation of the threat by a means
of interdiction [47]. Interdiction implies the use of kinetic or non-kinetic capabilities to
render the detected, located, and classified threat as neutralized so that it poses no threat
to designated high valued equities. Interdiction by means of non-kinetic effects is achieved
through RF jamming between the transmitter and receiver of the UAS and its controller, or
uplink/downlink jamming between the transmitter and receiver of the UAS and the satellite
communications link being used to operate either autonomously or semi-autonomously.
Another means of non-kinetic mitigation is to usurp or spoof the protocol used to control
the UAS, thus seizing control of the UAS. Kinetic effects used to neutralize the UAS include
the use of directed energy weapons systems. This use was exemplified by the first-ever
employment of a laser weapon system (LaWS) on the USS Ponce in 2014, operating out of
Manama, Bahrain in support of maritime and expeditionary force protection [50]. Another
means of kinetic neutralization is the use of netting and projectiles. Both are intended
to entangle or destroy the UAS upon aerial impact or subsequent impact with the ground.
Depending on theCUASproduct leveraged, one ormore of the neutralization techniquesmay
be applied as tiered options of escalatory use. Table 2.8 provides an overview, summarizing
the interdiction means that may be leveraged by a CUAS products. This overview is further
elaborated upon in Section 6.3.
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Table 2.8. CUAS Interdiction Systems and Means.
Capability Description
RF Jamming Disrupting or degrading the RF connection (cellular, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth) between the UAS receiver and its
transmitter, detrimentally impacting both the C2 and telemetric data for the system. Types of jamming may
include barrage jamming, spot jamming, or sweep jamming on the desired frequency. Once the frequency’s
bandwidth is flooded with excessive noise, the connection between the source and receiver will be severed.
Typical UAS response actions when experiencing RF jamming are as follows: (1) Remain in place, hover (2)
Remain in place, land (3) Return to base (4) Continue to preprogrammed destination.
SATCOM Disrupting or degrading the UAS’s GPS satellite uplink or downlink, detrimentally impacting its ability
GPS to receive temporal and spatial information in the operational environment [51]. This method detrimentally
Jamming impacts a UAS’s ability to operate semi-autonomously or autonomously. GPS jamming requires the jamming
capability be located within the footprint of the satellite and UAS receiver. Downlink jamming disrupts the
transmissions sent from the satellite to the UAS receiver by mimicking the frequency of the satellite downlink
transmitter. Uplink jamming disrupts the transmissions received by the satellite receiver from the UAS transmitter
and requires much more power and capability to perform successfully. Typical UASs response actions when
experiencing GPS jamming are as follows: (1) Remain in place, hover (2) Remain in place, land (3) Attempted
return to base if preprogrammed waypoints and another means of determining spatial orientation are available.
Spoofing Identification and surreptitious manipulation of the RF and protocols used to control the UAS [52]. This means
requires the foreknowledge of a weakness or exploitation of the communication protocol between the UAS and
its controller, allowing it to be exploited, denied, and usurped for subsequent commandeering. This attack allows
the UAS to continue its normal operation under the clandestine control of the spoofed signal, which is posing
as a legitimate source. The capability allows the CUAS controller to consequently obtain telemetric data, point
of origin, destination, and potential payload data from the UAS. Additionally, the CUAS operator may benignly
snoop on the communications and data exchange between the real controller and UAS. Alternatively, the CUAS
controller can send C2 commands to the UAS and augment temporal and spatial data transmitted to the UAS for
the purposes of altering its flight path.
Directed Energy The use of directed energy weapons such as the LaWS or high-powered microwaves to form and direct intense
light or radio waves at a UAS [53]. The directed energy is focused into a beam and directed along the flightpath
of the UAS. Directed energy is Intended to degrade or destroy a UAS by causing excessive damage to its circuitry
and airframe.
Netting The employment of netting guns to entangle a UASs propellers and render it unable to continue flight.
Projectiles The use of small armament ammunition to destroy identified UASs within the associated range of the armament.
2.10 Current CUAS Technological and Legal Limitations
CUASs are subjected to employment limitations just as any emerging technology. In addition
to this, there exists no international nor domestic standard for the construct of commercially
available UASs and CUASs. We assess as product availability proliferates throughout the
commercial and contracted business sectors, product performance will be varied. Thus, the
level of variance between expected CUAS performance against a threat may be skewed.
This challenge is exacerbated as the growth in the UAS industry continues to yield im-
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proved technology and cheaper hardware. The forward momentum of the UAS market
inevitably plagues the CUASmarket as a reactive means of countermeasures. As the market
continues to expand, CUAS technology will require more flexibility in capabilities and cost-
effectiveness. Also, as countries’ cellular and wireless infrastructures improves, so does the
ability to leverage better forms of UAS C2 for covert means and elongated, more secure
ranges of operation. Additionally, as CUAS products are operationalized we inherently train
malicious UAS users to their capabilities. They gain from the ability to learn from previous
and current CUAS capabilities and limitations, therein gaining better insight of the requisite
modifications needed to defeat current and potential future CUAS technologies.
2.10.1 CUAS Technological Influence On Future UAS Operations
As contemplated, the incessant use of UASs in different environments supports the training
and development of adversarial TTPs needed to defeat emergent CUAS capabilities. Future
UASs may be employed in clusters, swarms and patterns that disguise the intent and desired
outcome of their employment. This employment option also produces a large surface area
and increased ambiguity of how to leverage current CUAS interdiction means. We may start
to see UASs fabricated with material that lowers their radar cross section to further degrade
CUAS detection capabilities. Such capabilities are used today on USN ships and aircraft.
UAS operators may start to leverage dampening materials to absorb the noise emitted by
their propellers, degrading acoustic detection capabilities. This technique is applied to USN
submarines. Shielding could be applied to the body of the UAS and its circuitry, to buffer
it from directed energy systems.
2.10.2 CUAS Legal Constraints
In addition to the CUAS technological shortcomings are the legal constraints of CUAS
employment. Depending on the AOR, rules of engagement and the associated authority
to leverage active means of detection and interdiction are handled and treated differently.
Even for the U.S. to deploy weapons and countermeasures that ascertain directed energy
as a means inside and outside the continent of the U.S., a rigorous oversight process is
included. All directed energy weapons deployed both domestically and abroad must un-
dergo a Directed EnergyWeapon Review and Approval Process (DEWRAP), with approval
authority resting with the office of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) [53]. This was the
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case for the installment and use of the LaWS on the USS Ponce in the Arabian Gulf between
2014 to 2018.
In allied countries, the use of directed energy weapons and electronic attack measures in
the RF spectrum may be received as hazardous to operations, public safety, and health. The
employment of these system may even be legally restricted or prevented in certain countries
due to these circumstances. In the U.S., the use of CUAS detection means such as radar
to intercept electronic communications, including telemetric data, spatial and temporal
information, and associated source, destination, and operator details is considered a direct
violation of theWiretap Act [54]. Furthermore, the use of a cyber-attack to exploit and spoof
a C2 RF link between the UAS and its operator could be prosecuted under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act [55]. Furthermore, if a UAS C2 link is usurped by spoofing and results
in the commandeering of the UAS, you must have and maintain a remote pilot certificate to
pilot the vehicle [56].
The aforementioned legal challenges must be rigorously deconflicted and accounted for
by host nation legal authorities and country teams. In some cases, a sensitive level of
capabilities, limitations, and specification of CUAS means must be disclosed to ensure
operational mishaps between the CUAS technology and preexisting host country public
infrastructures are understood andminimized.However, such an intrusion into the intricacies
of the CUAS specifications and capabilities may jeopardize the security associated with the
functionality of the system. These observed restraints in the authority to operate CUAS plays
a meticulous role of what CUAS means of detection and interdiction should be acquired for
successive employment. We elaborate on this in Chapter 8 Section 8.4.
2.10.3 Challenges to CUAS Detection, Location, and Tracking
We assess UAS detection techniques as exceptionally challenging as the CUAS market
expands in C2 capabilities, design features, and methods of operation. The use of radar
and RF requires the active emission of a signal to detect an intruding UAS; therefore,
requiring line of sight access to the UAS. This can become increasingly difficult for cluttered
operational environments, where UAS operators may use the terrain to mask their locations
and movements.
Further, radar and RF accuracy are susceptible to weathering. Precipitation and heavy
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cloud cover may cause unintended absorption or reflection of emitted wave forms that are
intended to detect and track a UAS. The use of radar is less reliant on a robust library for
detection, but moreso for classification. However, RF must make use of a library of known
UAS frequencies to validate the presence of a UAS to meet detection criteria. If a UAS has
been modified, or not yet catalogued, then it may not be detected if it is not operating within
LOS of the CUAS system. Therefore, a library must be maintained and updated routinely
to ensure radar, RF, acoustic, and EO detection capabilities are accurate. The same criteria
of library maintenance apply to acoustic and EO detection as well.
Acoustic sensors are also detrimentally affected by weather, since they rely on the receipt
of sound waves unique to a UAS’s propellers for detection. Adverse weather may cause
distortion of sounds waves, causing a misinterpretation of a UAS or missed detection al-
together. EO detection capability may only be leveraged during daylight hours, as these
sensors rely on the visual observance of unique features to a UAS for detection. EO sensors
are vulnerable to cluttered operational environments as well and are susceptible to mis-
construing innate objects as UASs. Furthermore, EO sensors must be within visual line of
site (VLOS) of the UAS to support accurate detection and are also detrimentally affected by
adverse weather conditions. Infrared, however, is not affected by weather and can operate in
day or night settings. However, infrared must too rely on a library to support classification
of UASs upon detection. Table 2.9 provides a summation of our assessment of the CUAS
detection limitations posed by each of the aforesaid sensor types.
Table 2.9. CUAS Detection, Location, and Classification Limitations.
Adapted from: [47]







Radar Yes Yes Yes Yes Constrained by
library
Radio Frequency Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Electro-Optical Yes No Yes Yes Constrained by
library
Infrared Yes Yes No No Constrained by
library
Acoustic Yes Yes Yes Yes Constrained by
library
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2.10.4 Challenges to CUAS Interdiction
Nomeans of CUAS interdiction has proven to be 100 percent effective all of the time. This is
related to the growth and maturation of UAS technology and the TTPs leveraged to operate
them. The CUAS market will have to constantly keep up with these challenges.
2.10.4.1 Challenges To UAS Jamming
Current uses of RF and GPS jamming is becoming antiquated as compared to the updated
UAS market and TTPs used to avoid them. Jamming only works by disrupting the RF link
between the UAS and its controller’s receivers and transmitter, after the C2 link is detected.
However, many UASs may now be programmed to frequency hop when a disturbance is
experience on a primary frequency. This frequency hopping technique allows for sustained
communications between the UAS and the operator during periods of jamming. Such a
technique requires rapid detection and jamming on all observable frequencies, assuming they
have already been deconflicted with local authorities. Also, some UASs are preprogrammed
to operate either semi-autonomously or autonomously via waypoint navigation using GPS
after launch. In the event of this instance, RF jamming is futile. However, GPS jamming is
useful in this scenario. But, UASs are being equippedwithmeans to overcomeGPS jamming
using methods such as hardening, GPS boosting, and encryption. Also, redundant means
of navigation may be preprogrammed and leveraged such as inertial, spatial, and temporal
depending on the surrounding operational environment. These methods are similar to those
employed on military aircraft and missiles. Such a technique allows for the UAS to operate
in GPS denied environments, as costly as it may be [57].
2.10.4.2 Challenges To UAS Link Interdiction
The use of inherent, protected communications links over an encrypted network provides
for hardening against electronic attacks such as spoofing. Additionally, the use of deception
tactics such as fake frequencies as bait can be leveraged to honey pot spoofing tacticians
to a benign frequency of interest. Hardening of fabricated UASs’ bodies and circuity may
be employed to defeat directed energy weapons. The use of materials such as lightweight,
highly absorbent polymers are not as sensitive to concentrated heat. This could provide time
for an operator to manipulate their UAS out the LOS of the directed energy weapon. The
employment of clusters and swarms also serves as a tactic to defeat directed energy and
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netting weapons. This is due to the wide surface area covered by the vehicles, eradicating 
the ability to successfully interdict all of them.
2.11 Applications of CUAS Products
Although nascent, we assess CUAS products’ being employed more throughout the oper-
ational environment in several high profile events. Its demonstrated success has fueled the 
market growth and variations of products. CUAS has been used to support force protection 
and queuing on bases, CSGs, ARGs and mobile ground assets [4]. Their inclusion into mil-
itary planning has complemented existing weapons systems such as Aegis, Patriot 
missiles, small arms, and counter-mortar systems through the indications and warning 
provided by their queuing. Conversely, CUASs have been incorporated in the civilian 
environment to support airspace protection and awareness at sporting events, political 
rallies, VIP protec-tion services, and for law enforcement endeavors [4]. Figure 2.5 
provides a delineation of previous CUAS uses in the U.S. for militaristic and civilian 
purposes.
40
Figure 2.5. Previous CUAS Employment. Source: [4].
2.12 Summary
This chapter provides the foundational background of our research – the need for effective
and interoperable CUAS employment to support force protection of USN and USMC per-
sonnel and equities. It further provides our initial background assessment of the challenges
associated with satisfying the CUAS targeting cycle as UASs evolve over time due to the
technological advances in specific operating areas. Lastly, this chapter introduces the legal
constraints associatedwith CUAS employment, once effective and interoperable capabilities
are identified to mitigate emergent UAS threats. Holistically, all of this must be considered
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This chapter addresses the current actors employing COTS Groups 1 through 3 UASs in 
the operational environment. This chapter contextualizes the historical application of which 
actors have employed UASs to address the current capabilities and limitations associated 
with UAS employment. Here, we define t he actors employing UASs using t he National 
Intelligence Council (NIC) interpretations for hobbyist and adversaries.
3.1 Unmanned Aerial System Employment Overview
To date, approximately 90 nations and non-state actors have been proven to own and operate 
UASs [58]. Similar to the pursuit of nuclear weaponry, in 2015 there were an estimated 20 
additional counties with purportedly developing armed drone programs [58]. As anticipated, 
weaponized drones will shift from serving as a commodity to commonplace employment 
in the near future as described by the DOD UAS Roadmap [5]. Previously described in 2.2, 
many non-state actors have already leveraged COTS UASs to support rudimentary tactical 
endeavors to include ISR, smuggling, IED delivery, and biological attacks to undermine 
U.S. national strategy.
The aforementioned increase in UAS employment can be attributed to their ease of 
modification with complementing technology, thus exacerbating the threat. The threat of 
adversarial UAS operations detrimentally impacts the U.S., its allies, and its national security 
endeavors both domestically and abroad. The threat, its underlying technologies, and an 
understanding of the actors that employ them must be thoroughly understood to decisively 
determine, acquire, and deploy the requisite means of CUAS technology and associated 
training in support of USMC and USN operations and U.S. national security endeavors.
Adversarial UASs and their means of employment vary based on their quality, 
capability, accessibility, and affordability, which is constrained to their geographic area 
and the em-ploying party. This variance arrives in the form of low-cost, short range, line-
of-site COTS UASs to technological advanced, six figure, state sponsored UASs that 
require a substantial operational infrastructure. In this chapter, we will categorize the 
actors employing UASs by
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the degree of UAS accessibility and the underlying technological infrastructure to support
their means of employment. As such, the type of adversaries employing Group 1, Group
2, and Group 3 UASs can be codified into the categories of hobbyist, non-state actors, and
state actors.
3.2 Hobbyist
Hobbyist UAS operators refers to the recreational employment of COTS Group 1 UASs.
Although hobbyist and the commercial development and employment of UASs are benign
in nature, its nascent influence on the market asserts a crucial aspect on the procurement and
modification of UASs by non-state actors. Hobbyist UASs accounted for an approximate
3000 percent increase in annual revenue for UAS use worldwide in 2014 [59]. This growth
in popularity and influence on the commercial market can be originally attributed to the
Chinese based Shenzhen DJI Technology Company between 2011 and 2013. The rise of
consumer demand for recreation drone use has been equally met by producer supply chains
supported by SZ DJI, continuing to their rise of market capital from $130 million in 2013
to $500 million in 2014 [59].
3.2.1 COTS Impact On Hobbyist UASs
As sales of COTS UASs continue to increase and the underlying technology to operate them
becomes more available, the overall cost of COTS UASs will decrease. This is exemplified
by the 2013 Phantom 1 DJI equipped with additional gimbal and power management unit
cost of $1430. The Phantom 1 was plagued however by shortcomings associated with
telemetry, range, power, interoperability for customization, and speed. The 2017 Phantom
3 DJI however, may be purchased as low as $399 and includes a three axis gimbal (as
compared to the 2013 two axis gimbal), three times the flight time, double the range, third
party software application to extend range and capabilities, and intelligent flight modes such
as points of interest and waypoints to support semi-autonomous operation [60].
3.2.2 Software Impact On Hobbyist UASs
The ability to support third party software provides a level of customization suitable to
the operational environment in which the UAS is employed, thus enabling cutting-edge
capabilities that were previously monopolized by state sponsors and infrastructure. Such
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inclusion of GPS waypoint navigation removes the shortcomings associated with the line-
of-sight coverage of the legacy 2013 DJI Phantom, allowing the UAS to remotely determine
its position, navigate, and return to its point of origin on point of programming. Additional
upgrades associated with third party software include the ability to navigate to points of
interest by means of a smart phone application. Chinese owned and based UAS startup,
EHANG, performed and deployed commercial models capable of this feat in 2014 after
procuring basing in San Francisco, California. By use of EHANG’s Ghost Drone smart
phone application and accelerators in tandem with COTS UASs, UAS operators may now
navigate their UAS by tapping a spot on the application’s map interface and controlling
the angle of the UAS’s attached GoPro camera. The use of a mobile application makes the
navigation of droneswidely accessible to any user and removes the necessity and learnability
associated with radio controllers [61].
3.2.3 Hobbyist UASs Impact Against USN and USMC Operations
Although some COTS systems contain foundational firmware to preclude the overflight
of airports, sporting events, or government facilities, this can be subverted through pro-
gramming and aftermarket components by non-state and state actors. However seemingly
innocent or unconfrontational in nature, hobbyist and their associated COTS UASs pose a
significant threat to USN and USMC operations ashore and abroad due to the opportunity
they provide more aggressive, malevolent actors. As Chapter 1 demonstrated, hobbyists’
intentional and unintentional actions with COTS UASs demonstrate a low risk, high re-
ward capability to non-state and state actors. Hobbyists’ actions such as the DJI quadcopter
downed on the White House lawn in 2015 or use of high-definition GoPro for live video
feeds demonstrate the unique capabilities and room for expansion for the desiring adver-
sary [34]. This expanded use and the subsequent proliferation of recreational UASs has
indeed increased the prospects for the disruptive employment of COTS UASs by non-state
actors.
3.3 Non-state Actors
The NIC defines non-state actors as non-sovereign entities asserting increased socioe-
conomic influence over a particular country’s national interest. These organizations and
subsidiary actors can include trade unions, community entities, religious followings, eth-
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nic minorities or majorities, and academic institutions [62]. The NIC further regards state
actors’ roles based on their ability to ascertain and exercise power and influence over a
population based upon the areas’ political, economic, and social infrastructure. We assess
these areas as weak states, developing/post-industrial states, and modernized states.
Non-state actors exercise more influence in weak and developing states such as Iraq,
Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Iran, vice modernized states such as China, Russia, India or the
U.S. The NIC defines “weak states” as former holdings from western colonialism that failed
to transition to a viable nation following their independence [62]. The existing governments
of weak states that are subsequently formed often find difficulty providing reputable support
to their people, and therein resort to violence, reprisals, and force to maintain the semblance
of peace. In this regard, weak state governments are often formed from religious or tribal
factions, and therein based on the biased interpretation of legacy tribal of religious practices.
Developing or post-industrial states are defined as having evolved from prehistoric state
sovereignty used in modern states, where nationalism only exist to protect the identity of
the governing body [62]. Borders in this instance are not as relied upon as identification
of statehood, and the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is ambiguous and
treated with equal calamity.
3.3.1 Non-state Actors Employment Of UASs
We assess non-state actors’ employment of UASs as a function of hobbyists’ demand
and operationalization of UASs. Hobbyists and their associated UASs typically do have
inherent high-definition cameras and EO based sensors to support sensor-based sense-
and-avoid capabilities. Further, modification can be made to support the employment of
semi-autonomy or autonomous operations through GPS waypoint navigation, for example.
These modifications are leveraged as a method of overcoming the necessity of human
control and allow for semi-autonomy or full autonomy of the vehicle to support stealth,
endurance, and non-attribution of the operation. Although most hobbyist deployed COTS
UASs have short ranges, limited power, and limited payload capacity, non-state actors have
demonstrated the ability to overcome these with third party software, modified rotors, and
added storage features to support successful nefarious actions [17].
As shown in Table 2.2, non-state actors have employed COTS modified Group 1, Group
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2, and rudimentary Group 3 UASs to conduct ISR, smuggling, and IED delivery against
U.S. and coalition forces domestically and abroad. Basic non-state actors will leverage
Group 1 UASs to carry out simple tactics of ISR and deterrence, followed by the potential
weaponization of UASs via IEDs and grenades as seen in Syria by Hezbollah and ISIS. As
previously alluded to, non-state actors consists of such groups that aim to undermine U.S.
legitimacy through guerrilla style tactics that yield small material affect and a minor threat
to life, but serve as a deterrence nonetheless.
3.3.2 State Sponsored Impact On Non-state Actors
Non-state actors that are aligned with state sponsors such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Houthis,
and Hamas are capable of receiving unacknowledged aide from state sponsors such as Iran
and Russia. Such support provides the capability of access and use of Group 3 UASs such
as the Iranian supplied Ababil III UAS, with an endurance of four hours and range of 100
kilometers, enabling increased loiter time to improve targeting, ISR, and C2 [63].
Due to the inability to control supply and demand of COTS UAS and non-state actors’
modification of UASs, we assess the amount of damage a Group 1 through 3 UAS can inflict
extends beyond country borders. As delineated, modified COTS UASs are not confined to
state actors and their associated nation states. As of 2020, approximately 90 countries,
operate midsize commercially available UASs which we codify as Groups 1 through 3, and
up to military grade UASs we identify as Groups 4 and 5 [64]. Figure 3.1 captures the
gravity of the wide dissemination of and subsequent threat imposed by COTS UASs.
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Figure 3.1. Countries with Group 1-3 UASs. Source: [64].
As depicted, the growth of the UAS market and the associated employment of UASs by
countries of interest for hobbyist intended purposes can be usurped by non-state actors for
the purpose of malicious endeavors against the U.S. The inherent or modified capabilities
of COTS UASs hold destructive potential in the hands of non-state actors. This increased,
proliferated, global use of UASs to conduct, cheap, malicious attacks provides the basis for
the evolution of future warfare. As explained by American military and national security
affairs journalist Yochi Dreazen, “the next evolution of warfare-by-remote-control, when
weaponized robotic planes give terrorist groups de facto air forces” [65].
3.3.3 Impact Of Non-state Actors UAS Operations
The representation and subsequent damage inflicted by a non-state actor UAS holds both
a psychological meaning as well as a kinetic meaning. Psychologically, it represents the
ability of a low-end, non-state sponsored actor having the ability to compete with a nation
state to deliver an operational or tactical level of military impact. It allows these same actors
to figuratively punch above their weight class, providing themwith themeans of a traditional
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air force, such as ISR, C2, or ordinance delivery. These mechanisms, typically reserved for
state actors and nation states, we assess as strategic levels of employment. Figure 3.2 is
an indication of the level of sophistication achieved by non-state actors and their use and
modification of COTS UASs.
Figure 3.2. Non-state Actor UAS Capabilities. Adapted from [64].
3.4 State Actors
State actors are entities, organizations, and persons that represent and are acting on behalf
of a formally recognized world government. As expected, state actors and their associated
actions are inherently held liable by the country they are affiliated with. Further, state actors
and the country they are affiliated with are held to globally recognized standards, treaties,
agreements, accords, and normalcies. State actors therefore tend to holistically operate
Group 3 UASs due to their traditional military nature and intended uses. Their use of UASs
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portray the next, and final step in this continuum of cost efficient aerial vehicles to deliver 
the similar effects of a traditional aerial force.
3.4.1 State Actor UAS Employment Methods
The intended uses of state actor UASs are anticipated to augment and complement a nations’ 
preexisting, or non-existent air force in regards to ISR, logistics, weapon delivery, C2, 
and electronic warfare. State actors’ procurement and consequential modification of UASs 
include increased flight time endurance, range, and ability to hold more payloads. This is 
exemplified by vehicles such as the Israeli Heron, with a top speed of 112 knots, 20,000 
to 45,000 foot altitude barring modifications, and endurance of approximately 30 hours on 
station. This brand of UAS is available for distribution and flown by over 20 EU and NATO 
countries to date, with payload capability exemplified in Figure 3.1.
Table 3.1. Israeli Heron Group 3 Capabilities. Adapted from [66].
3.4.2 Weaponized UAS Programs
We assess the necessity for state actors to match the aerial capabilities of rival nations
driving the pursuit of developing weaponized drone programs and payloads to accompany
Group 3 UASs. As shown by the Ababil III, Mohajer IV, and Heron, these Group 3 UASs
already have an inherent ability and capacity for a weapons payload. As of 2015, over 10
countries possessed armed and weaponized Group 1 through 3 UASs in their arsenal, with
50
more than 20 countries actively pursuing armed UAS capability as indicated in Figure 3.3.
In this reference and regard, armed UASs constitutes the ability to deliver missiles, bombs,
explosives, chemical or biological payloads, or using the UAS itself as a projectile.
Figure 3.3. Countries with Armed UAS Programs Source: [64].
Although armed UAS programs may vary in capability, the intent and desired end state
remain consistent – the use of armed UASs to support preexisting military aerial infras-
tructures to support regional and global pursuits. This variance in capability is exemplified
between the U.S. and Pakistan armed UAS programs. Although Pakistan’s armed UAS pro-
gram is nascent in nature, it still demands attention due to its rapid growth and acceleration
in technological achievements. Pakistan’s Burraq UAS shows this, with its inherent 16,000
feet altitude, 80 knots speed, and capability to carry kinetic armaments. Further, it delineates
Pakistan’s ability to seek measures beyond traditional kinetic armament into the realm of
directed energy.
In 2015, Pakistan stated its intention to deploy the Burraq with laser armaments in an
attempt to deter and defeat non-state actors operating along its coast andwithin country [67].
The laser guided munitions were advertised to operate with pinpoint accuracy and operate
in all-weather categories. This accelerated UAS capability is yet another indication of the
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already occurring race among state actors to emulate the U.S. by acquiring and deploying
UASs as an extension in their instruments of war.
3.5 Adversarial UAS Employment Association
Cumulatively, hobbyist, non-state, and state actors employment of UASs is dependent on
the strategic goals associated with the operational employment and underlying technology
employed, but can be summarized by Table 2.6 (see Chapter 1). Here, the use is depicted
based on the level of autonomy and number of UASs being employed. The strategic goals for
the employment of UASs by the aforementioned actors will be elaborated upon in Chapter
5.
3.5.1 USN And USMC CUAS Response To Adversarial UAS Employ-
ment
Although the USN and USMC present varying degrees of presence in each AOR with
independently classified CUAS TTPs, their CUAS TTPs have been made publicly available
through demonstration against adversarial UAS encounters. The USN and USMC’s use of
force under previous rules of engagements in areas of armed conflict have therein provided
an affordance to the previously mentioned categories of adversaries to study, understand,
and develop similar UAS capabilities. However, U.S. doctrine writ large allows geographic
combatant commanders and their subsidiary service components the freedomof interpreting
the adversarial problem set at their discretion. This is exemplified in every theater’s posture
statement to the Senate of Armed Services Committee.
Posture statements are intended to provide a transparent portrayal of a combatant com-
mander’s guidance and policies for their AOR, and issue direct and indirect guidance for
their service elements to act upon. EUCOM’s current posture statement is an overt display
of this discretion. In February of 2020, EUCOM Commander General Lyons commented
upon the vast amount of potential for the production, acquirement, and employment of
autonomous UASs in his AOR [68]. He further stated, that although this threat existed on
the horizon, that every U.S. military service was seeking their own solutions to prepare and
remedy their shortcomings against the possibility of such a threat. The disparity in under-
standing the consistent and persistent threat amongst AORs while the adversaries develop
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sustained programs to undermine our traditional military capabilities serves as an inter-
operability issue. To adequately address this concern and threat, this research is intended
to subsequently understand the threat holistically as defined in this chapter, and determine
suitable means of CUAS to address these adversarial threats.
3.6 Summary
This chapter defines the threat actors who are leveraging UASs in varying AORs. We utilize
the definition of threat actors provided by the NIC to support our assessment of how the
threat is currently employed, the associated goals for employment, and the potential for
future advanced employment goals of UAS operators, regardless of AOR. The enemy and
threat imposed by their use of UASs always has a vote in every operational plan. As stated
in Chapter 1, the threat must be adequately understood to support adequately defeating the
threat.
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This chapter discusses the current technologies leveraged by UAS actors in the global
geopolitical environment to support UAS C2. We define the current communication ar-
chitectures available to support UAS C2, their associated vulnerabilities, and the security
used by each architecture. We place emphasis on the ability to further leverage existing
and emergent technologies to modify and augment COTS UAS’s C2 to support flight and
payload operations. We further address the ability to modify COTS UASs and GCSs using
the associated programming libraries pertaining to a vendor. To accomplish this, we use the
widely employed DJI platform as a case study for altering UAS flight behavior.
4.1 Unmanned Aerial Systems Architecture Overview
The ability to counter adversarial UAS use and operations is dependent on our understanding
and knowledge of the art of adversarial UAS employment. Effectively countering small
UASs is not met without challenges, as quoted by General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy at the
House Armed Services Committee, “Our adversaries have watched, learned and invested
to offset our strengths while exploiting our weaknesses. They have demonstrated patterns
of behavior that indicate their capability, capacity and intent to hold our homeland at risk
below the nuclear threshold.” [69]. The art of drone use, as generally discussed in Chapters
1 and 3, can be categorized based on the UAS means of achieving and maintaining flight,
the C2 architecture for communication, and the modes of operation.
The UAS architecture holistically consists of the vehicle’s frame, motors, power supply,
and flight controller to link these components together to achieve and maintain flight
and support UAS operations. The use of GCSs are leveraged to enable data exchanges
between the operator and UAS using variable means of C2, which are also referred to
as communication data links. For this research, we shall focus on the flight controller
component of the UAS, its impact on motion pertaining to the UAS, and the potential
means of modification to it.
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4.2 UAS Flight Controller
The flight controller serves as the linkage between the aforementioned UAS components,
the GCS and C2 associated with UAS flight operations and mission profiles. Figure 4.1
provides a graphical, exemplified depiction of the flight controller for a DJI UAS.
Flight controllers vary based upon UAS capability and employment, from hobbyist use
to commercial use. Hobbyist flight controllers serve as the most common multipurpose
flight controller, providing a limited range of control functionality to support recreational
activities. Commercial flight controllers consist of more advanced avionics to support
premeditated flight path, semi-autonomy, and the transportation of cargo. As anticipated,
hobbyist and non-state actors alike typically leverage the prepackaged hobbyist flight con-
trollers to support the rudimentary tactics described in Chapter 3. These flight controllers
are typically manipulated from their COTS standard or used directly out-of-box. This is due
to the previously mentioned capabilities provided by the COTS flight controllers to support
inherent manual and semi-autonomous navigation, telemetry, and the ability to support the
carriage of stowed materials.
Figure 4.1. Example UAS Components. Adapted from: [70].
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The flight controller on a small UAS typically resembles a circuit board and varies in size
depending upon the complexity associated with the UAS’s inherent or modified modes of
operation. The flight controller circuit typically consists of a microprocessor, sensors, and
associated input and output accessories, and serves as the central processing unit for the
drone. Expectedly, the flight controller provides the UAS operator the ability to operate the
UAS during flight by providing the foundational capabilities for sensing objects around the
UAS, controlling the UAS, and communicating with the UAS while in flight.
4.2.1 Flight Controller – Sensory Functions
To support the sensory level functions for the UAS, the flight controller is connected to the
requisite UAS instruments providing information pertaining to the UAS’s altitude, speed,
orientation, and heading. Typical instrumentation that supports the achievement of this
are barometers to determine altitude, pitch, and angle through the use of Doppler against
the terrain. Other instrumentation used to support the sensory functions of the UAS are
exemplified by the use of an inertial measurement unit to determine angular momentum
and subsequent orientation of the UAS.
4.2.2 Flight Controller – Controlling Functions
To support the controlling of the UAS’s speed, course, and altitude, the use of speed
controlling mechanisms within the flight controller articulate the desired motion from the
UAS handler to the individual motors on the UAS platform. To achieve this, the flight
controller can employ instruments such as Electronic Speed Controllers to articulate the
speed from the GCS to the UAS platform motors, while relying on the aforementioned
sensors to provide feedback to the handler regarding the status of the flight.
4.2.3 Flight Controller – Modification Through Programming
The firmware associated with UAS operations is most often coded in lower level program-
ming languages such as C or C++. The firmware is associated with the coordination of UAS
internal functionalities and their interoperability to support flight operations. At this layer,
there exists direct communication among UAS components to support flight operations.
There also exists further actions required at this layer of communication to support the req-
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uisite reception, parsing, and reading of bytes from a controller to the UAS flight controller,
dictating the required actions for the UAS to assume.
The Flight controller exists at a layer of programming that is most often coded in higher
level languages such as Python or Java to support interoperability and ease of use by
hobbyists and novices. This higher level of programming language is delineated by the
associated user level applications associated with COTS UASs, allowing the operator to
modify and customize flight methods. At this level of programming, the UAS is holistically
functioning as a complete unit as attributed to the flight controller. Furthermore, Operations
at this level of programming constitute take offs, landing, pre-programmedwaypoints, semi-
autonomous and autonomous operations. Further, at this level of programming, it is safely
assumed the firmware is pre-configured and readily available to accept commands from a
controller and subsequent flight controller.
4.3 UAS Ground Control Station
TheGCS contains capabilities to support land or maritime based communications and hand-
offs from one GCS to another to extend the range of operations and UAS coverage. The GCS
provides human operators with the requisite foundation to control, monitor, communicate,
and pilot their UASs and associated UAS payloads through data exchanges from source to
destination over wireless communication standards or proprietary alternatives. These data
exchanges are made possible via the C2 leveraged between the GCS and UAS.
4.4 UAS Command and Control
The UAS and its operator may leverage a variety of C2 options to support their means of
controlling andmonitoring the UAS, which are dependent upon the operational environment
and inherent infrastructure they are confined to. These C2 options are often described as
data links, but will be referred to as C2 for the purposes of this research. C2 serves as
the ability to leverage the previously mentioned UAS networking architecture and GCS to
receive and transmit data to and from the UAS to support telemetry, payload, and flight
operations. Therefore, the main components that comprise the C2 payloads are the UAS
control, video payload transmission, and the UAS telemetry.
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4.4.1 Command and Control Radio Frequencies
The most common frequencies leveraged by COTS UASs to control and manage the ve-
hicle and transmit telemetric information are 2.4GHz and 5.8GHz, similar to that of WiFi
compatible devices. Other hobbyist UASs can be further modified to send and receive data
within the ultra-high frequency (UHF) band between 433MHz and 915MHz. The ranges
associated with C2 vary among UAS proprietary capabilities, terrain, atmospherics in an
area of operation, the hardware serving as a transmitter or repeater, and the power output
of the transmitters or repeaters. The range of 2.4GHz is limited to approximately one mile,
which is considered line of site (LOS), and does not perform optimally well in heavily
brushed areas due to the smaller, more susceptible wavelengths [71]. However, for the DJI
setup using a 2.4GHz band for UAS control, one may expect up to 4 miles of range [52].
The most common video payload transmission C2 frequencies are 1.3GHz, 2.4GHz, and
5.8 GHz. 8GHz serves as the most popular commercial C2 frequency due to its high data
rate capacity; however, it is hindered due to its shorter wavelength property and therefore
generally limited to about 5 miles of range. The most common telemetric C2 frequencies
are 400MHz and 900MHz due to their extended range capability, ability to penetrate ob-
structions, and lower probability for data loss; although they also have narrow bandwidth
and data rate restraints to the longer wavelengths [52]. The ranges associated with these
telemetric frequencies can expected be between 19 miles and 50 miles based on transmitter
power output [72]. C2 frequencies are of particular interest for CUAS technologies, as
denying the communication link to the operator inhibits control of a device.
4.4.2 C2 Varieties and Security
UASs leverage varying means of C2 to support the transfer and dissemination of data during
flight and payload operations. In this case, we shall summarize the security of Bluetooth,
WiFi, common virtual private network (VPN) options, cellular, and proprietary software
leveraged to support data transfers between theUAS andGCS.Aswith C2 radio frequencies,
security on the C2 channel is of particular relevance for CUAS technologies since breaking
the security layer would provide the CUAS with control of the hostile device.
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4.4.2.1 Bluetooth
Bluetooth serves as ameans of short rangewireless technology operating in theUHF portion
of the RF spectrum at 2.4 GHz. It allows for the exchange of data between fixed and mobile
devices, and limited to short ranges in light of the radio wave length. In this regard, this
means of C2 supports LOS communication; therefore point-to-point between the UAS and
the GCS.
Currently, internet of things (IoT) devices use Bluetooth 5.0 as the latest version of Blue-
tooth wireless communication [73]. However, Bluetooth technology is backwards compati-
ble and therefore capable of operating in a transparent manner with older Bluetooth software
running on current devices. Bluetooth 5.0 observes greater speed and ranges, however, as
compared to the legacy versions of Bluetooth. Data rates range around 2 Mbps and can
communicate upwards of 800 feet, as compared to Bluetooth 4.0 which was capable of half
the data rates and about 200 feet of range.
Bluetooth security provides the ability to support authentication and encryption, but is
only device specific and not user specific [74]. This authentication is based on the secret
link key created and shared between paired devices. This secret key is necessary during the
paring process between the devices attempting connection. Bluetooth insecurity arises from
the inability to protect the integrity and authenticity associated with Bluetooth keys. Legacy
Bluetooth capable devices leveraging versions 5.0 or previous are subjected to key vulner-
ability attacks such as the BLURtooth attack, which takes advantage of the cross-transport
key derivation (CTKD) component during the paring process [75]. This vulnerability causes
the potential for the Bluetooth key to be overridden and usurped thereafter by potential at-
tackers, allowing for subsequent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. However, rudimentary
versions of Bluetooth such as versions 1.0 or 2.0, which did not require key authentica-
tion upon pairing, are extremely susceptible to security vulnerabilities that allow for basic
exploitation by an attacker in range of the devices, leading to eavesdropping of data ex-
changes, denial of service (DoS) by preventing services from running as designed, orMITM
attacks [76].
4.4.2.2 WiFi
Most COTS UASs either use WiFi or are WiFi enabled to support UAS payloads between
the UAS and GCS. WiFi functions in the UHF portion of the spectrum and is therefore
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limited by the distance it is capable of transmitting. This distance is dependent upon the
version of WiFi used for C2, COTS manufacturer, and use of after market gear such as
amplifiers, but is typically about 1 kilometer commercially [77].
802.11 WiFi serves as a wireless RF capability enabling the communication between
smart devices over the internet. The frequency bands associated with WiFi use are 2.4 Ghz
and 5 GHz. 802.11 serves as a cadre of variances amongst wireless local area networks.
Within this cadre of wireless interfaces between clients and base stations are the following
WiFi standard specifications leveraged as C2 for COTSUAS controls using 802.11, 802.11a,
802.11b, 802.11n, 802.11ac, and 802.11g [78]:
• 802.11: The most basic wireless means of communication over the internet through
a local area network (LAN), functioning at the 2.4 GHz band. 802.11 provides
between one to two Mpbs of data transmission and leverages frequency hopping
spread spectrum (FHSS) technology or direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS)
technology as a means protection from electromagnetic interference (EMI), jamming,
or exploitation. FHSS allows for the rapid changing of a carrier’s frequency while
transmitting data over the prescribed radio signal. The carrier’s frequency is changed
based on the use of a predetermined algorithm that is shared between the receiver
and transmitter. DSSS achieves this reduction in potential for signal interference by
modulating the bits associated with the data and altering the size of the transmitted
signal to be wider in bandwidth than the actual data or information being transmitted.
• 802.11a: Serves as an upgraded extension to the legacy 802.11 infrastructure, oper-
ating in the 5 GHz band and allowing for the transmission of data at rates as fast
as 54 Mbps. 802.11a uses orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) vice
DSSS or FHSS. This method of encoding is leveraged against data on multiple carrier
frequencies, vice a singular carrier frequency. It provides similar protections against
EMI, jamming, and exploitation, while protecting against more severities associated
with attenuation and multi-path interference.
• 802.11b: Serves as a high data rate extension to the 802.11 wireless LAN over the
2.4 GHz band. 802.11b allows for the transmission of up to 11 Mbps and makes use
of the DSSS for data encoding.
• 802.11g: Serves as upgraded extension to the 802.11 wireless LAN over the 2.4 GHz
band. 802.11g allows for data transmission speeds in excess of 20Mbps and leverages
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the OFDM for data encoding.
• 802.11n: Serves as the upgraded extension to 802.11g, operating at either the 2.4 GHz
or 5 GHz band and allowing for increased data transmission speeds up to 600 Mbps.
Its intent was to serve as a means of keeping pace with the technological demands
of equipment and software capabilities, to include video transmission and streaming.
Similar to 802.11g, it makes use of OFDM for encoding, as well as DSSS. 802.11n
is also backwards compatible to the legacy version of 802.11 to support software
interoperability.
• 802.11ac: serves as yet another improvement to data transmission speeds, operating
at the unlicensed band of 5.8 GHz. It is primarily leveraged as the C2 between smart
phones, WiFi televisions, and video game consoles to support the high data rate
demands associated with the devices and their inherent services. 802.11ac provides
for data rates of transmissions between 1 Gbps to 7 Gbps. 802.11ac introduced the
use of binary phase shift keying (BPSK) and quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK)
for encoding. BPSK achieves encoding by representing the binary 0 and 1 in a
transmission by two different states in the associated carrier signal in transmission.
QPSK achieves encoding by modulating two bits at once during phase shift keying
and selecting one of the four possible associated carrier phase shifts for transmission.
Both allow for the transmission of more data at once, with QPSK providing for twice
the amount of data transmission than BPSK.
COTS UAS furthermore typically make use of 802.11s for C2 when using WiFi [79].
802.11s supports communication between two end systems through the interaction of air-
borne relays serving as a mesh network. However, 802.11s makes use of the legacy 802.11
services to support the actual transmission of the data between two end systems.
To support the encryption and protection of data in transit, WiFi makes use of wired
equivalent privacy (WEP), WiFi protected access (WPA), WiFi protected access 2 (WPA2),
and WiFi protected access 3 (WPA3) as the most prevalent protocols to support data
encryption:
• WEP: Serves as the most common encryption protocol available to 802.11a and
802.11b LAN [79]. WEP makes use of the RC4 cipher stream [80]. WEP provides
base 40 or 104 bit encryption with use of a static encryption key of 64 or 128 bits
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that must be manually entered on wireless access points and is unchangeable [80].
However, WEP’s rudimentary principles make for a weak encryption algorithm and
is therefore legacy in nature. These weaknesses are attributed to its small key size,
small initialization vector, and ability to easily forge authentication messages.
• WPA: Leverages the WEP functionality while employing temporal key integrity
protocol (TKIP), which generates a new 128 bit key on the fly for each packet of
data transmitted between two end devices [80]. WPA also introduces integrity check
as a means of preventing potential attackers from intercepting and altering the data
transmitted between two devices. However, WPA2 is vulnerable to replay attacks,
allowing for a potential attacker to replay messages sent between two end devices,
steal credentials, and serve as a MITM for subsequent attacks.
• WPA2: Serving as the successor to WPA, WPA2 employs the mandatory use of the
advanced encryption standard (AES) for encryption. AES makes use of varying key
sizes, 128 bit, 192 bit, or 256 bit [80]. It encrypts data through the use of sending the
encrypted source data into the cipher text and cumulatively through a NAND gate
for storage and transmission. Use of the AES 256 bit is advertised as impenetrable
to brute force attacks due to the amount of time required to break the encryption.
However, WPA2 is vulnerable to key re-installation attacks, which employs a replay
attack during the initial four-way handshake of the protocol while in proximity of the
wireless network. This vulnerability also leads to the aforementioned MITM attack.
• WPA3: Replacement to the WPA2 protocol. WPA3 employs a 192 bit encryption and
replaces pre-shared keys from the previous encryption protocols with simultaneous
authentication of equals (SEA) [80]. SEA provides for better security in key exchanges
and is compatible with the introduced 802.11s WiFi standard used by UAS.
4.4.2.3 Cellular
The use of cellular infrastructure to support UAS C2 can provide for operations BVLOS
through daisy chain-like operations through the use of BTS [81]. Cellular networks serve as
high speed and high data capacity application to support the exchange of data between two or
more end devices. The incorporation of BTSs in the C2 architecture for UAS data exchanges
includes the use of cellular communications such as 2G GSM; 3G CDMA, TDMA, and
FDMA; 4G LTE; and 5G. The use of the legacy 2G architecture for UAS C2 is exemplified
through the example implementation of using an Android OS and proprietary applications
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associated with the UAS to communicate with a UAS via a GSMmodem onboard serving as
a payload [82]. The use of the 3G and 4G C2 architectures to support UAS control is made
feasible through the subsequent payload addition of onboard 3G or 4G receivers, as found
in the quality of service research conducted by Aalto university [83]. Lastly, the potential
use of 5G to operate COTS UASs was identified to be feasible, attainable, and help augment
UAS distance to BVLOS, improve data latency required for high demandUAS payloads, and
support semi autonomy or full autonomous operations [84]. The functionality of a cellular
network consists of the GCS, which in this instance is the smart device used to control the
UAS, the BTS, relays as appropriate, and the end device. The BTS encompasses the cellular
service providers associated towers to support user connectivity and data exchanges. The
varying types of security pertaining on cellular networks are identified in chronological
order of introduction to the commercial market as 2G, 3G, 4G, and 5G:
• 2G: 2G GSM serves as the most primitive in current digital cellular communications,
providing for rudimentary send and receipt of of voice calls and simple messages
between mobile telecommunication and smart devices. 2G served as the first concept
employing multiplexing for mobile communications, allowing for multiple users to
leverage a single channel to exchange data [81]. 2G leverages circuit switching for
the delivery of data between end devices. 2G allows for speeds up to 64 Kpbs, with
a purported bandwidth of 25 MHz. 2G operates in narrowband for the provision of
internet services.
• 3G: 3G Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) expounds upon the
infrastructure of 2G to provide increased data rates between end devices, leveraging
packet switching. 3G allows for voice and message exchange, in addition to video
and GPS use [81]. 3G operates at a range of 2 GHz with a bandwidth of 15 MHz
to 20 MHz [81]. 3G provides data rates up to 2 Mbps and allows for the receipt
and transmission of larges data through its increased capacity. 3G operates in the
broadband for the provision of internet services.
• 4G: 4G LTE and WiMAX achieve improved data rate speeds from it 3G predecessor
with its incorporation of OFDM and multiple input multiple output (MIMO) tech-
nology [81]. 4G serves as the current standard for mobile telecommunications in
regards to data rates and security. 4G’s application expounds upon 3G with support
to application requiring high data rates, to include mobile TV. It provides data rate
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speeds up to 20Mbps and allows for the inclusion of multi hop networks, allowing for
the use and inclusion of adhoc networks to support daisy chain operations to elongate
the range of coverage between end devices [81]. 4G has a bandwidth of up to 100
MHz [81]. 4G operates in ultra broadband for the provision of internet service.
• 5G: 5G is the latest technology in commercial mobile communications, providing
increased speeds and reliability through the use of MIMO, OFDM, and millimeter
wave technology. 5G operates in the band of 30 GHz to 300 GHz, adding to the
appeal of use due to the rare application of these bands. 5G makes use of small
cell technology and beam forming to add to the increased coverage of an area and
reduction in latency. 5G also support network slicing, which allows for the provision
of tailorable services to an operators need to support dynamic application in an area
of interest. 5G’s application expounds upon 4G with higher resolution, less latency,
and support to the control of unmanned assets such as UASs. 5G operates in the
wireless world wide web for the provision of interest services.
Cellular encryption varies based upon the service used. It is therefore dependent upon
the service used and shall be discussed by service. Cellular encryption is attained via the
following means:
• 2G: Encrypted data over the network is accomplished through the use of the A5
algorithm [81]. A5 is a family of algorithms ranging from no encryption (A5/0) to the
strongest encryption (A5/3). A cipher mode request us used to initiate the request for
encryption across the network between end devices. The use of the A5 algorithm and
corresponding cipher key is used to encrypt and decrypt traffic between devices. The
A5/1 algorithm is a 64 bit key capable of encrypting bits as they are received [81].
The A5/3 algorithm however uses a block cipher and leverages a 128 bit key [81].
The A5 algorithm is vulnerable holistically to MITM attacks due to the weakness
of the keys with modern password breaking techniques, or through key differential
attacks [81].
• 3G and 4G: Encrypted data over the 3G and LTE network is accomplished by means
of a 128 bit AES algorithm, which is capable of leveraging a 128, 192, or 256 bit
key [85]. However, the WiMAX network makes use of the 168 bit digital encryption
standard (DES) to support encryption of over the air transmissions [85]. To achieve
encryption over the air, the 3G and 4G networks leverage transport layer security
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(TLS) [85]. TLS provides the requisite confidentiality and data integrity between
applications running on end devices communicating across a network. Although
shorter key lengths are vulnerable to attacks related to brute force, dictionary, replay,
or MITM, the AES 256 bit key length serves as a current Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) standard [85].
• 5G: Encrypted data over the 5G network is accomplished by means of a 256 bit
AES encryption, while also encrypted the users identity while being transmitted
juxtaposed to the predecessor 2G, 3G, and 4G services [86]. However, 5Gs shift
from hardware based architectures to the software defined network (SDN) concept
through its implementation of small cell technology to increase coverage areas pushes
the protection requirements to the software and end devices, as well as the rest of
the architecture. This broadly increases the attack surface area. Furthermore, like
its predecessors, 5G lacks the end-to-end encryption of data transmitted over the air,
making interception and exploitation of data still a possibility [86]. Due to 5G’s shorter
range using millimeter wave technology, more cell towers will need to be placed to
support coverage and potential network slicing capabilities [86]. This further increases
the attack surface area for potential exploitation.
4.4.2.4 Satellite Communications
SATCOM is used to support BVLOSC2 for UASs in an area of operation, due to the inability
or inefficiency associated with the aforementioned LOS communications. In this regard,
communication capable satellites serve as relays to amplify the broadcasted RF between the
GCS and UAS to support flight or payload operations. Associated SATCOM satellites are
typically in either geostationary orbit (GEO) or low earth orbit (LEO). The utilization of
GEO provides sustained, steady-state coverage. However, GEO satellites are encumbered
with potential latency issues due to the greater distance from Earth. LEO satellites provide
less latency but less sustainability due to their short dwell time over a given region on
Earth’s surface. The associated frequency bands provided by SATCOM in these orbits vary
between L-band, S-band, C-band, X-band, Ku-band, and Ka-band dependent on order of
wavelength size and frequency [87]. Expectedly, smaller wavelengths and higher frequency
bands allow for less susceptibility to exploitation during over-the-air transmission and a
higher bandwidth due to the availability of more channels, but are encumbered with more
potential to interference by atmospheric and man-made RF. Higher frequency bands are
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less susceptible to exploitation due to the requirement of exploitation techniques to be in a
closer proximity to collect the signal while being transmitted over the air, due to the small
wavelength properties associated with it.
Commercial satellite communications practice encryption at the network layer to ensure
data is protected during transmission between the satellite and terrestrial devices [51]. To
minimize the issues associated with encryption and the potential for signal degradation due
to distance related attenuation, natural interference due toweather, ormanmade interference,
keyed encryption or asymmetric keys encryption is leveraged.
4.4.3 C2 Employment
The type of C2 employed for UAS communication is based on the underlying networking
infrastructure restraints of an environment. The C2 employed for UAS operations can further
be codified in terms of the amount of latency and reliability that is tolerable and acceptable
for operations, as well as compatible with the UAS. Of the variances of C2, UASs are
reliant upon communication employment options using primarily three types of networking
options:
4.4.3.0.1 UAS-to-UAS UAS-to-UAS is a steadily evolving concept, some leveraging ma-
chine learning techniques or automation through pre-programming applications to sup-
port swarm UAS tactics and protocols. Particularly, the use and implementation of neural
networks-based machine learning in tandem with supervised learning models are leveraged
to create, support, and adjust an intelligent UAS’s wireless communication architecture [88].
UAS-to-UAS C2 allows for daisy-chaining with one or multiple UASs serving as relays be-
tween the GCS and a controlled vehicle for the purposes of supporting subsequent flight
or payload operations. Characteristics associated with UAS-to-UAS communications vary
within the ultra-high frequency and super high frequency ranges of the RF spectrum, with
all UASs operating on the same chosen frequency. Further, all UASs within the swarm or
cluster operate from the same chosen GCS. Example of this type of C2 is illustrated in
Figure 4.2:
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Figure 4.2. Example UAS-to-UAS C2 Architecture.
4.4.3.0.2 UAS-to-Ground Control Station The use of ground stations leverages preex-
isting technology associated with mobile, cellular communications. This method further
leverages standard and proprietary protocols associated with wireless and cellular commu-
nications, as mentioned previously, depending on the geographic region hosting the service
and the UAS’s underlying C2 architecture. This C2 serves as the link to manage the flow of
data between the UAS and the corresponding GCS that is within its navigational area based
on terrain, distance from the GCS, and associated signal strength. The UAS distance from
the GCS is categorized as within VLOS. VLOS implies C2 is exercised from the GCS to the
device directly. The use of multiple ground stations serving as relays support the ability to
control UASs BVLOS through the use of hand-offs with surrounding ground stations along
the point of intended movement for the UAS [89]. This terrestrial relay technique is often
referred to as ’daisy chaining’ and is therefore an indirect form of communication from the
ground controller to the UAS. This operation using cellular means of communication is
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exemplified in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3. Example UAS Cellular C2 Architecture.
The C2 connection between the ground operator and UAS, and the associated data rate
between them is dependent upon the level of autonomy desired for the UAS to operate. More
autonomous systems require less data transfers between the operator and UAS. Conversely,
semi-autonomous or complete user control require more data transfers that induce more
latency due to the higher demands placed on bit rates. Semi-autonomous or complete
user control missions require data transfers between the C2 architecture for operations to
include hovering, landing, take-off, point-to-point navigation, telemetric data, and more.
Such information inherently induces more latency across the perspective medium used
for C2. However, data within completely autonomous systems includes mission-oriented
details associated with navigating to specific coordinates and returning to a point of origin,
as well as telemetric data associated with the flight and vehicle status. This information
and associated data can be directly preprogrammed on a UAS’s flight controller, or in this
regard, it can be sent to the flight controller over the selected means of C2 using a smart
device such as a tablet, smart phone, or laptop. As anticipated, less bandwidth requirements
are required for fully autonomous UASs.
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4.4.3.0.3 UAS-to-Satellite Communication The use of SATCOM enables the UAS op-
erator to command and control the UAS BVLOS without the limitations of relying on a link
to the GCS or other associated communication architectures in the geographic area. The
use of SATCOM allows for the ability to relay and amplify radio or microwave frequencies
and therefore data between the UAS and the GCS.
While operating within VLOS, a UAS is able to use direct radio waves to transmit flight
control data between the UAS and the GCS (and consequently to the human operator for
control and navigation). While operating BVLOS, the UAS requires controlled hand-offs
between SATCOM to support extended coverage and subsequent communication between
surroundingGCSs and human operators. The employment of SATCOM requires the UAS be
physically located within the footprint of the satellite coverage area, which therefore requires
more coordination and reliance on factors that cannot be manipulated by a rudimentary
operator.
An example of common, commercial SATCOMcoverage arrives in the formof companies
such as Honeywell. Honeywell’s SATCOM serves as a lightweight, compact means of
providing SATCOM communications to small UASs by interoperating with INMARSAT’s
SwiftBroadband services [90]. The use of this provides long range C2 while delivering the
capabilities such as real-time video, navigational waypoints, and telemetry data. The use of
SATCOM to support C2 between a GCS and UAS is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4. Example UAS SATCOM C2 Architecture.
Separate from the above-mentioned C2 links for operator control, there also exists the
ability for a UAS to operate semi-autonomously under waypoint navigation. The use of
waypoint flight navigation allows the UAS operator to pre-program sequences of actions
for a UAS to assume based on topographic features, navigational locales, or infrastructural
landmarks. This method of flight operation allows the UAS to fly semi-autonomously on a
flight route as chosen by a UAS operator, limiting C2 link communication need.
4.5 DJI UAS Case Study
To exemplify the programmable and modifiable means of the aforementioned UAS opera-
tions pertaining to the flight controller and GCS, we shall leverage the highly popularized
and widely used DJI UAS as a case study example.
4.5.1 Flight Controller – Usurpation Through Vulnerabilities
Flight controllers often leverage C2 links that are neither secured or encrypted to support the
commercialization and mass dissemination of the onboard products. This lack of security
and oversight by vendors and subsequent UAS operators can yield the inherent potential for
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surreptitious usurpation of the UAS by means of exploitation or denial of service achieved
bymeans of CUAS products. Examples of inherent Group 1 UAS vulnerabilities can be seen
with the COTS DJI Phantom 3. Commercially, the DJI Phantom 3 arrives as a UAS vehicle
with pre-programmed flight controller internals, a handheld remote controller for piloting,
and an Android or iOS application for synchronization with a smart device to support the
transfer of telemetry information. The frequency range is between 2.4 GHz to 2.483 GHz,
where the controller in this regard serves as the requisite access point for UAS C2. When
the DJI Phantom 3 is utilizing WiFi services, a basic network mapper (NMAP) scan reveals
the following information pertaining to the flight controller as delineated in Figure 4.5 [91].
Figure 4.5. DJI Phantom 3 NMAP Results. Source: [91].
Of the services discovered from theNMAPscan, the file transfer protocol (FTP) andTelnet
services present a significant vulnerability due to their open, unencrypted connections to
the network if no security layer is used. Furthermore, the FTP connection’s allowance of
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anonymous logins affords even benign operators the ability to surreptitiously login and
commit FTP related attacks against the UAS. Such deliverance of payloads via a vulnerable
FTP server can yield credential harvesting and subsequent MITM attacks that allow for
the potential of the UAS to be remotely usurped. The open Telnet service presents another
significant vulnerability to the UAS and flight controller. Telnet serves as an application
layer based protocol on a local area network to support bidirectional text communication.
In this regard, it supports the communication between the operator or controller to the
flight controller onboard the UAS. This connection is facilitated using a virtual connection
known as Telnet. By re-enabling the Telnet services during the boot process, one may
ascertain the flight controller’s underlying system; therefore gaining the ability to usurp the
UAS remotely, gain root level access to the UAS, and subsequent root level access to the
underlying subsystems associated through the flight controller [91].
4.5.1.1 DJI Command and Control Constraints Exemplified
The use of specific C2 by varying manufacturers is exemplified by the DJI and its COTS
UAS employment of the 2.4 GHzDataLink3 technology [92]. This form of C2 is intended to
be interoperable with the DJI ground station, which can be a manufactured DJI DataLink3
controller, any smart device with the DJI application, or a personal computer leveraging
the DJI application programming interface (API) and associated programming methods.
The DataLink3 controller provides users with a default option of 2.5 mile controllable
ranges and 15 hours of battery life to support UAS dwell times. Furthermore, the DataLink3
providesmore security from jamming andEMIby using frequency-hopping spread spectrum
technology. Additionally, the narrower bandwidth plays a positive role against the potential
of interference from other common household and civilian devices that make use of the
same 2.5GHz frequency band for operations. The DJI DataLink3 default remote controller
is interoperable with third-party software and hardware, as long as they utilize the requisite
serial bus protocol [92].
The serial bus protocol used by DJI serves as a digital communications protocol using
digital, serialized data to transmit control related signals between receivers and transmitters.
The serial bus protocol represents the most widely used remote control protocol amongst
consumer devices and COTS UAS receivers [93]. The serial bus protocol is a digital
protocol. It further carries the ability to transmit up to 16 channels with equal bands of
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100Hz, which can be further codified down to enabling the 2048 different values in bits on
each channel as denoted in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6. Serial Bus Data Frame. Source: [93].
As delineated in Figure 4.6, byte 0 pertains to the header information of the data being
transmitted from the UAS operator controller to the flight controller, bytes 1 through 22
pertain to the data being transmitted to control the UAS, byte 23 contains optional data, and
byte 24 contains the footer to conclude the message. Each channel pertaining to the data
transmitted between the UAS operator controller to the flight controller in bytes 1 through
22 can carry 11 bits each. Base 2 operation therein provides a maximum of 2048 different
values capable of being stored in command send and receive messages between the UAS
controller and flight controller to support UAS flights and missions.
4.5.1.2 Command and Control Constraints
Aside from distance and reliability, another constraint associated with C2 pertaining to
UAS operations is the interface related to the UAS and the ground operator. The interface
ties the data required to be transmitted between the uplink and downlink to the operator
and UAS [94]. This interface is exemplified by either benign push-button missions or more
detailed and intrusively controlled missions that leverage semi-autonomy or full control
from the user. These push-button missions will inherently require smaller data frames and
leverage higher-level commands to support mission related tasks, and not require user input
to control flight path, altitude, speed, and other related tasks through an uplink connection to
the UAS. Further, user interfaces typically do not require larger data frames as they are often
sporadic in nature and with less information sent in an uplink to the UAS. Regardless of the
means of communication used by the UAS to support operations and receipt of commands,
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the presence of a downlink and uplink for relaying and receiving information is forever
present. Every UAS passes several parameters to support the sustainment of operations in
flight and mission requirements. The parameters pertaining to a UAS depend on the number
of UAS engines, mission, and optional add-on capabilities such as full motion video.
4.5.1.3 Downlink
The UAS downlink is leveraged to relay telemetric data to the UAS operator to support
situational awareness of the UAS flight status, health, and receipt of commands. A typi-
cal message pertaining to the basic necessities of UAS flight parameters passed over the
C2 network are standard in nature. These standard parameters are provided below, with
























END INERTIAL MANAGEMENT UNIT()
– exit


























This exemplified telemetric UAS message is approximately 3600 characters in length,
which computes to 3600 bytes in length [95]. The message contains notifications pertaining
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to the UAS flight path, altitude, speed, temperature, payload, and heading. These parameters
are public methods for a UAS and support software associated with the flight control unit,
inertial navigation movement, GPS, and UASs’ ability to leverage sensing of the operational
environment to avoid obstacles based on terrain. This message serves as a service list for
the native software running on the UAS platform, communicating over a defined network
as a medium. The data abstractions pertaining to the parameters is a generic description
of the overarching hierarchy affecting the functionality required to support generic UAS
operations. The outputs serve as the requisite telemetric data the operator needs to support
their situational awareness of the piloted UAS, as well as the ability to make corrective
actions during flight via the uplink. This example service list, although not completely
inclusive, supports the construct required to enable a manual, non-autonomous UAS’s
flight. The universality of this message type implies that UASs operating with additional
features, such as video streaming, would require additional parameters and therefore the
passage of more data in the form of methods associated with their inherent class. Such
additional details in data warrant the requirement for more bandwidth across the medium
that is leveraged for UAS C2.
4.5.1.4 Uplink
Conversely, the uplink is used by the ground operator to control the UAS or UASs by means
of adjusting or altering their flight path or mission requirements. Typical UAS flight plan
parameters will therefore consist of telemetric data associated with waypoints, altimeter
readings, GPS inputs, flight controls, and camera movements. An example of this uplink








































The content of this exemplifiedmessage represents uplink parameters leveraged to control
the UAS. A typical uplink message is therefore usually greater than 1000 bytes in length
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based onmission complexity and requirements by the operator [95]. There exists no standard
format or requirement for specific uplink message parameters to occur for every variant of
UAS. Therefore, there exists no standard rate for updating these messages between the
ground controller and the UAS. However, UASs that are operating using GPS waypoint
navigation receive update messages between every one to ten seconds, based on the GPS
receiver and necessity to update waypoints for potential error correction [95].
4.5.2 Ground Control Station Modification – DJI Employment Exam-
ple
Exemplary to the DJI UAS, it provides UAS operators the ability to leverage APIs associated
with the DJI library to augment, modify, and customize flight operations. Upon downloading
the associated UAS user level application on any smart device, one is able to connect and
interact with the UAS after importing the associated libraries pertaining to the UAS and
connecting to it through the establishment of an object, as demonstrated in the Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7. DJI Drone Python Setup. Adapted from: [96].
In this regard, the UAS Tellos object is instantiated through the creation of a variable
called my_uas. This variable then allows the UAS operator to leverage the associated li-
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brary function from theDJI TellosAPI. These functions serve asDJI’s software development
toolkit, which provides the requisite operating system, hardware platform, and program-
ming language to create the desired user behavior for the drone. It further allows for the
modification of the flight profiles pertaining to the UAS, to include speed, altitude, yaw
angle, pitch angle, and camera settings. In Figure 4.7, the use of the connect() function for
the created my_uas object leverages the following DJI API source code to connect to the
drone per Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8. DJI Drone Connection API. Source: [96].
Following connection to the UAS using Python programming and the associated DJI API
library, one may make customized modifications to the vehicle’s flight planning through use
of subsequent UAS control functions. These functions carry the resident parameters asso-
ciated with takeoff, landing, moving forward, backwards, counter clockwise, and clockwise
by numerical measurements associated with centimeters by default. These functions are
thereafter called in the DJI UAS’s send() and receive() functions to transmit the data calls
from the GCS to the onboard flight controller. As contemplated, if a terrain is previously
mapped or known by an operator, pre-planned waypoints may be used as inputs to these
DJI functions, thereby removing the need for sustained C2 between the UAS and a GCS
and allowing for the vehicle to operate semi autonomously. Use of the send() and receive()
functions is represented in Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.9. DJI Drone Receive and Transmit Functions. Source: [97].
After setting the requisite send() and receive() functions for between the UAS operator
controller and UAS flight controller, all that is required is to leverage the preexisting DJI
API to manually input the desired waypoints, motion, and distance in centimeters in the
associated send() and receive() functions, as delineated in Figure 4.10.
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Figure 4.10. DJI Drone Waypoint Programming. Source: [97].
4.6 Summary
This chapter details the varying means of C2 Groups 1 through 3 UASs can leverage to
support flight and payload operations. It also addresses the ranges associated with UAS
flight operations, and the potential for modification using the aforesaid means of C2. Fur-
thermore, this chapter demonstrates user modification to UAS flight behaviors can be readily
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accomplished through the implementation of APIs associated with the COTS UAS. Flight
modification can be accomplished to support semi-autonomous behavior by the use of way-
point navigation with the same UAS library functions. This addresses our assessment of
how UAS flight and payload operations can be modified to support nefarious adversarial
UAS endeavors and defeat potential CUAS means of detection, tracking, and mitigation.
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CHAPTER 5:
UAS Threats In Each Area of Responsibility
This chapter addresses the current UAS tactics used in each AOR based upon the existing
communications infrastructure and the availability of COTS hardware and software. Using
each AOR’s projected implementation of emergent communications technology, we make
assessments for the ability to support future UAS flight and payload operations.
5.1 Adversarial Tactics by Area of Responsibility
The UAS tactics used by adversaries will be evaluated in this chapter, to evaluate the
threat and therefore narrow the scope of how to counter adversarial UASs with the most
appropriatemeans of CUAS. Further, this chapter will help provide the basis of how effective
our current CUAS capabilities are against current and emerging UAS threats posed by actors
in differing AORs. Although the TTPs and technology used by Groups 1 through 3 UASs
against USN and USMC equities are holistically similar, their employment in each AOR is
highly dependent upon the specific technology accessible to the adversarial actors and their
associated aspirations.
Although each AOR’s adversaries aspire to ultimately undermine, usurp, and invalidate
U.S. presence and strategic endeavors abroad, the adversarial approach is also dependent
upon the physical representation the U.S. presents in each AOR. This is exemplified by the
U.S. former one and a half CSG presence in the Arabian Gulf located within NAVCENT’s
jurisdiction, per previous Global Force Management (GFM) policies. In 2015, this presence
was reduced to more than half of its previous CSG presence within the Arabian Gulf in
pursuit of the former SecDef General (ret) James Mattis’s Dynamic Force Employment
strategy [98]. This reduction in presence was also related to the manifested and emboldened
threat imposed by Russia and China in the Pacific and European theaters, referred to as the
GPS. As expected, the National Security Strategy and the subsequent 2017 GFM policy
redirected more USN and USMC military assets to support U.S. strategic policies of power
projection, deterrence, and partner nation to support the PACOMAOR. Therefore, the USN
and USMC footprint within the CENTCOM AOR varies vastly from the U.S. sustained
CSG and ARG presence in other theaters such as the Pacific theater. Further, in addition to
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the presence of a CSG and ARG, the U.S. also maintains a continuous, short term, sustained
forward deployed naval force (FDNF) within the Pacific theater to support rapid, sustained
action should an operational requirement arise. As anticipated, the footprint within the
CENTCOM and Pacific Command (PACOM) AORs varies vastly by location, surface area,
capability, and intent. Therefore, this research will consider how adversaries leverage and
adjust their Groups 1 through 3 UASs TTPs for the purposes of ISR, smuggling, C2, weapon
delivery, deterrence, ruses, queuing, targeting, etc. in each AOR.
In addition to the USN and USMC presence and concomitant activities in each AOR,
our research will evaluate adversarial UAS tactics as tied to the technological infrastructure
associated with their operating environment. The underlying foundation supporting and
enabling civilian and military communications and C2 in an AOR will inevitably determine
the TTPs adversaries are able to seize and leverage against USN and USMC equities
using UASs. Expectedly, technologically advanced countries and societies will observe
more advanced use of adversarial UASs and their associated capabilities. Conversely, less
advanced countries, perceived as third world or economically constrained, will observe
simpler UAS TTPs.
5.1.1 Africa Command Area of Responsibility
AFRICOM’s intent is to focus on strengthening partners ties, emboldening partner countries
with the requisite ability to defend their boarders and govern themselves, and broaden com-
munication endeavors to improve regional stability and security cooperation [99]. Within
the AFRICOMAOR, the U.S. maintains a sleek, stealthy, and agile footprint with contingent
quick reaction forces to further the U.S. strategic mission of enabling partner nations and
touting the U.S. as a partner of choice. The USN and USMC teams maintain no major naval
ports, facilities, or training sites within the AOR that provide a substantial surface area or
footprint for an adversary to surveil, target, or attack [100]. Moreover, the USN and USMC’s
presence within the AFRICOM AOR is primarily limited to Djibouti or maintained with
mobile sites, forward operating bases, and afloat forward staging bases provided through
ARGs, CSGs, and independent ships [100]. The associated militarized USN and USMC
forces that embark and deploy within the AFRICOM AOR serve as quick reaction forces
under the auspice of special warfare, urban warfare, battalion landing teams, amphibious
assault teams, and reconnaissance teams. The intended purposes for their operations are in
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support of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), noncombatant evacuation
operations (NEO), embassy and consulate reinforcement, rapid response, counterpiracy,
combatting terrorism, countering adversarial surrogates and proxies, conducting coalition
exercises, and other associated legitimacy operations [99]. The primary locations of USN
and USMC operations are focused about and towards audiences residing in the locales of the
“Lake Chad Basin (Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Mali); Horn of Africa (Somalia
and Kenya); in the Maghreb (Libya and Tunisia); and in/around the Gulf of Guinea coun-
tries (Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote
D’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome, Gabon, and Congo)” [99].
5.1.1.1 AFRICOM Communications Infrastructure
In addition to the footprint and associated operations conducted by USN and USMC forces,
the inherent infrastructure of the associated African countries and their contribution towards
UAS enablement must be of consideration. Although the use of telecommunications and
the inherent rudimentary networks they were incepted upon commenced mass distribution
in the 1970s, it did not reach the African continent until the 1990s [101]. This delayed
introduction into the African infrastructure is further delineated by the reliance on legacy
telecommunication networks and architecture. Within the regions of the Lake Chad Basin,
Maghreb, Horn of Africa, and Gulf of Guinea, the following telecommunication networks
are primarily used [101]:
• Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) – 900/1800/2100MHz
• Long Term Evolution (LTE)
• Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX)
The choice of UASs’ communication methods in these areas is therefore limited to the
rudimentary communication infrastructure of the host country. In this instance, the use
of GSM and LTE to support BVLOS C2 for a UAS serves as a dominant, but not sole
means of operation. Although legacy in nature, the use of GSM allows for a degree of
autonomy in UAS operations through the relay method mention in Section 4.4.3.0.2. It
further allows a mundane solution for uplinking high-level, command-oriented data such
as flight control, navigation, queuing, and subsequent mission related tasks pertaining to
communications, coordination, and surveying, and the downlinking of telemetric data to the
controller. This telemetric data expectedly encompasses the flight status of the UAS to the
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operator. Of significance, the use of GSM also affords the UAS access to the World Wide
Web. This access provides the UASs with additional accesses to bandwidth, databases, and
the enablement for real-time video streaming to support tasks associated with surveillance
and target queuing.
The Africa continent has a delineated the capability and desire to leverage UASs for the
purposes of extending military-related coverage and capabilities, while lessening the cost of
financial burdens on forces has been conceptualized since 2010 [102]. Denel Dynamics, a
South African company, developed and exported combat-ready UASs to allied and partner
forces and nations for profit. Denel Dynamics serves as South Africa’s largest provider of
defense materials and equipment, and a leading missile and UAS proponent. Denel’s mass
production of Groups 1 through 3 UASs for the Africa continent include capabilities ranging
across the following spectrums [102]:
• Aero-engines consisting of longer and cheaper maintenance and life cycles, with
reduced acoustic signatures;
• Additional sensors to support day and night methods of flight operations such as
reconnaissance, targeting, and patrols;
• Improved tracking with the incorporation of range finders and laser designators;
• Automated take off and landing capabilities as of 2012;
• Dual band data links to allow for the incorporation of additional UAS payloads;
• Ranges of up to 250 kilometers using LOS C2, with the potential for the addition of
SATCOM C2 in support of BVLOS communications.
Denel Dynamics continues to serve as the continent’s leading producer of innovative
aerial defensive and offensive solutions, as it is owned by the South African government. It
also fosters partner relationships with the U.S. through foreign military sales, in addition to
South America and the Middle East [103]. Its ties to governmental funding and endeavors
emboldens its ability to support UAS research and development domestically and abroad.
5.1.1.2 AFRICOM UAS Threat
As anticipated, adversarial UAS actors in the AFRICOM AOR primarily manifest in the
form of non-state actors and hobbyist. AFRICOM identifies the actors as the ISIS and their
associated proxies or surrogates, al-Qaida and their adherents and affiliates (AQAA) which
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includes Al-Shabaab per U.S. designation of violent extremist organization (VEO), and any
other U.S. designated foreign terrorist organizations that are defined by the U.S. definition
of VEOs operating in Africa [99].
African UAS tactics vary from single to cluster UAS employment against USN and
USMC’s equities and personnel. From prehistoric to modern employment, the tactics are
observed as rudimentary, but threatening in nature to human life and facilities. Adversarial
UAS tactics in AFRICOM range in implication and are further codified as a means of ISR,
C2, and weapon employment to support information gathering of U.S. plans, intentions,
and TTPs, as well as serving as a tactical deterrence.
The first noted and assessed use of Groups 1 through 3 UASs within the AFRICOMAOR
was committed by the Libyan National Army (LNA) in Libya and Nigeria, as provided by
theWorld of Drones assessment. The U.S. designates the LNA as an opposition group to the
United States’ backed and recognized government of Libya. The LNA gained possession
of Groups 1 through 3 Wing Loong II UASs by affiliation with the UAE. As a result, the
acquisition and deployment of the Wing Loong II UAS in northern Africa has resulted in
the operationalization of over 2,000 aerial strikes including UASs since 2014 [104].
5.1.1.3 UAS C2 Assessment In Africa Command
The north western countries of Africa, such as Algeria, Morocco, and Senegal have taken
a staunch stance for reserving the use of UASs for government security purposes only.
However, other countries such as Niger, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Namibia, Kenya,
and South Africa leverage the use of the commercial UAS industry and production to
support security and public services in support of safety and oversight, while allowing the
general public to enjoy commercial UAS use [105]. We therefore assess the use of UASs in
an expanding, novice communications infrastructure will continue to contribute to the use
of nefarious UAS use in the ARFICOM AOR. This assessment is also attributed to the lack
of sustained oversight in a developing AOR, where many counties and factions of leadership
are continuing to vie for power and control.
AFRICOM’s wide and consistent utilization of the rudimentary GSM and LTE cellular
infrastructures in the many disparate, rural locations of the continent supports basic C2
architectures for UAS employment. GSM and LTE can support the transmission of flight
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and payload associated data, as well as support BVLOS operation. Based on non-state and
state actor acquisition and operationalization of UASs in the AOR, it is assessed future
occurrences of UAS use is currently limited to VLOS, although aspirational use to BVLOS
can be anticipated. These long range UAS operations would be made possible by the use of
GCS to BTS communication, with BTSs serving as relays in the chain of communication
between the GCS to the UAS. The ability to leverage GCS-to-UAS C2 is constrained to
ability to acquire the requisite hardware capable of supporting the necessary C2 protocols to
between the UAS and GCS. Additionally, the ability to achieve BVLOS through the use of
existing BTSs serving as relays is dependent on the area UASs are employed in, although this
too can be augmented by theGCS and associated hardware viaWiFi capability. However, the
African continent must first overcome its shortfall in the number of users actually leveraging
smart devices to access the internet and cellular data [106]. As contemplated, UAS flight
and payload operations will result in predominant BVLOS on existing 3G and 4G network
infrastructures.
5.1.2 Central Command Area of Responsibility
The CENTCOM AOR has transitioned from a “Fight Tonight” mantra to a “Ready Force”
mantra in light of the previous Dynamic Force Employment policy impacting the DOD’s
equities across the global operational environment [98]. However, the CENTCOM AOR
remains a domicile of many war efforts, endeavors, adversaries, and conflicts. This is
exemplified throughout recent history in the inception of CENTCOM in the 1980s to train,
engage, and fight in modern warfare against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
CENTCOM’s vast history of conflict is further delineated by the twenty-year global
counterterror campaign waged following the flight hijacking and subsequent strikes against
the U.S. Trade Center. Simultaneously, the U.S. has been engaged in a forty-year campaign
against the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has engaged in hegemonic pursuits in theMiddle
East under the auspice of domestic and international facilitation of terrorism.
These conflicts have led to the U.S.’s sustained military presence throughout the Middle
East in the countries of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Syria, the United
Arab Emirates, Iraq, Oman, and Pakistan. The U.S. presence in these countries ranges in
the form of fixed naval presences with small Patrol Crafts, Mine Sweepers, Destroyers,
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a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), SPMAGTF, and quick reaction force (QRF), to
infrequent deployment of ARGs and CSGs with inherent MEU attachments.
The U.S. presence in CENTCOM is intended to support deterrence against Iranian
endeavors to leverage the military element of national power and influence to counter U.S.
and partner nation actions and policies [107]. In this regard, deterrence serves as a military,
diplomatic, and political concept based upon the U.S. commitment to the region militarily,
economically, and politically against the threats imposed by Iran and its surrogates and
proxies. In addition to these threats imposed by Iran in surrounding countries, the U.S.
competes with Russia and China on an economic scale for placement, access, and influence
throughout the Middle East as well.
As contemplated, CENTCOM does not have a sole strategic focus, and must exert the
ability to maintain flexibility, agility, and evolve as the character of war evolves. CENTCOM
must therein remain able to balance multiple priorities and tasks as the threat evolves. We
assess CENTCOM’s current efforts to include deterring Iran, countering Iranian surrogates
and proxies, degrading weapons, human and drug trafficking and facilitation networks,
enabling partner nations, and building relationships with partner nations. Nonetheless,
CENTCOM’s top priority remains deterring Iran and their destabilizing activities within
the AOR [107]. Iran’s destabilizing activities in the Middle East is exuded by their sustained
quest for nuclear capability, influence, and hegemonic behavior that has threatened the
U.S. and its regional partners within the AOR. Since May 2019, Iran has publicly been
condemned of its support to VEOs, surrogates, and proxies that have been codified as Shia
Militia Groups (SMG) under the U.S.’s counter-Iran planning policies. Iran’s support to the
aforementioned groups has contributed to the attribution of attacks against U.S. interest in
the Bab el Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan
with UASs for the purposes of ISR and kinetic effects [107]. Iran’s use of UASs against
U.S. equities has contributed to the increased Grey Zone threats of asymmetric warfare.
5.1.2.1 CENTCOM Communications Infrastructure
The Middle East is heavily reliant on its mobile communications infrastructure to support
C2, communications, and the relay of civil safety features for their civilian and military
functions of society. These forms of mobile communications range from GSM to the onset
of 5G and dominate the market vice fixed broadband forms of communications. However,
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fixed broadband communications play an essential role to the development and backbone
of the incoming 5G network infrastructure, as well as the desire to transition cities to smart
cities on the 5G architecture. This is attributed to the pre-existing infrastructure being used
to transition such areas to 5G. However, the Middle East holistically lacks the foundational
necessities of fixed broadband in rural or war torn countries such as Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and
Afghanistan due to poor economies or successive years of conflict [108]. This lack of fixed
broadband limits the subsequent development of 5G attainment in these areas.
Tomake up for the recent surge in demand for data and associated bandwidth requirements
during the COVID pandemic, countries in the Middle East have adopted concepts of mobile
tower sharing of existing 4G networks, while the desire and aspirations remain to develop
4G LTE networks and accelerate acquisitions into 5G in countries such as Bahrain, Iran,
Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Yemen [109].
This sharing of network and bandwidth space and capabilities is further codified by the
Gulf Cooperation Council, consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
Yemen, and their establishment of the FARAJ interregional fiber-optic network [110]. This
coalition of countries and their associated fiber-optic network links each country and its
underlying telecommunications capabilities and infrastructure together to form a formalized
conglomerate approach to network sharing and processing. Furthermore, this networked
approach also links into the Fiber-optic Link Around Globe (FLAG) cable system, which
serves as a fiber-optic link that is owned and operated by the FLAG corporation in support of
global communication and information sharing. This data communication sharing between
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and other subsidiary countries in the Middle East
is indicative of a shift from basic GSM communication to 4G and LTE communications.
As contemplated, such momentum bodes to support the inherent use of commercially
operated and modified UAS in a means that leverages GSM, 4G, and LTE as a method for
communication, control, and monitoring.
5.1.2.2 CENTCOM UAS Threats
The threat imposed by Iran is exacerbated by its facilitation and employment of nefarious
UAS activity throughout the AOR [111]. The use of these supplied UASs have circumvented
the traditional air force capability gap Middle Eastern non-state actors experienced. Now,
these actors are able to conduct aerial surveillance and aerial kinetic strikes. CENTCOM’s
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posture statement acknowledges the presence and the associated threatUAS’s impose against
U.S. forces in the Middle East. It further acknowledges the gap in CUAS capability against
the UAS threat, due to their ease of attainment and use in the AOR, and their associated
ability to inflict large scale damage against U.S. critical infrastructure and personnel [107].
The first predominant instance of arming UASs for the purposes of conducting kinetic,
destabilizing tactical operations within the CENTCOMAOR arose in 2016 with ISIS [104].
ISIS created and leveraged a formal drone unit known as the Unmanned Aircraft of the
Mujahideen to conduct surveillance, target acquisition, and strikes against U.S. and coalition
forces in Syria and Iraq [104]. Further, ISIS developed a trafficking ring for commercial
drone technology in as many as 16 countries, and provided means of demonstrating how
to attach small munitions to deliver kamikaze attacks [104]. ISIS leveraged their UAS
surveillance techniques to further support and galvanize other state and non-state actors
to conduct strikes against U.S. equities within Syria and Iraq, further popularizing and
influencing the method of warfare in the 21st century. This is exemplified by the New
York Times report in March 2016 from General (retied) MacFarland regarding intelligence
reporting of adversarial drone surveillance techniques to support targeting:
InMarch, GeneralMacFarland andAmericanmilitary commanders in Baghdad
received an intelligence report that the Islamic State had posted surveillance
video online that had been taken by a small drone. The video footage showed a
newly created series of bases in northern Iraq where American and Iraqi forces
were stationed. Just days after the video was put up, a Katyusha rocket landed
in the middle of an outpost of more than 100 American Marines, killing one
who was rushing to get others to shelter in a nearby bunker. The strike was
so accurate that military officials described it as a “golden shot” to pierce the
defenses put in place, and there was speculation that a drone was used in the
targeting. [112]
Further exemplified use of UASs in the CENTCOMAOR have been demonstrated by the
Iranian backed Houthi rebel group in Yemen and al-Sham terrorist organization in Syria.
The Harakat Tahrir al-Sham organization serves as the successor and premier jihad cell to
the Jabhat al-Nusra organization after its splintering in 2017 [113]. This group demonstrated
the first recorded example of UAS swarm tactics in January 2018 against the Russian naval
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port of Tartus in Syria. Russian Defense officials reported the use of thirteen armed drones,
rigged with explosives, flying in a synchronized, coordinated manner under a common
C2 [114].
5.1.2.3 UAS C2 Assessment In CENTCOM
What can be asserted is the telecommunications infrastructure across the Middle East
holistically lags in its initiative to implement new, innovative forms of communications such
as 5G. Although the GCC has broken ground towards the implementation of 5G through
their associated Telecommunications Regulatory Authorities, the surrounding countries
lack the requisite funding, support, and coordination. It is these countries where nefarious
actors originate, thrive, and usurp USN and USMC personnel and operations. This lack
of synergy is attributed to the lack of centralization throughout the GCC and surrounding
countries, marginalized presence of foreign investors, and the disproportionate presence of
populations in desolate regions [110], [115].
Due to this knowledge, we assess the Middle East several years away from the ability
to produce and leverage Groups 1 through 3 UASs on sophisticated data link architectures
such as WiMAX or 5G. UAS tactics for operations and exercising C2 will inherently be
reliant upon the ability to modify commercially available UASs to meet the purposes of low
detection and serve as disposable should detection and usurpation be committed against
them by CUAS technologies.
Adversarial employment of UASs in areas of armed conflict in the CENTCOM AOR
will remain confined to either the existing communication network architectures of 2G,
3G, and 4G architectures, or the procurement of proprietary or modified hardware capable
of supporting C2 between the GCS and UAS via RF means such as WiFi. In light of the
foreign and domestic influence from Russia, China, and Iran in disenfranchised regions, the
potential for advanced UAS employment tactics with proprietary software, hardware and C2
is anticipated. Therefore, we assess the level of UAS employment will remain innovative in
nature. As contemplated, UAS employment BVLOS through the use of the current cellular
infrastructure, mobile hotspots, and nation state influence is possible for UAS flight and
payload operations. Flexibility can and will be augmented with the employment of WiFi
and subsequent hotspots using cellular services in regions of poor connectivity to maintain
C2 to support UAS flight and payload operations. Prehistoric tactics leveraged by terrorists,
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surrogates, and proxies in the Middle East have encompassed the use of hotspots to support
the triggering of IED from distant, BVLOS base camps [116] The aforementioned tactics all
support the daisy-chaining of relays to elongate coverage to support long range operations
against USN and USMC equities in the region.
5.1.3 Europe Command Area of Responsibility
EUCOM is, has been, and remains a combat-ready, war fighting theater postured for threats
ranging from international terrorism, HADR, and the Great Power Competition. EUCOM,
one of our few combatant command headquarters located outside the continent of the united
states (OCONUS) in conjunction with AFRICOM, is located in Germany and consists of
approximately 64,000 civilian and military personnel. Its role has since expanded consid-
ering the emergence of the Great Power Competition and Russia’s influence in Eastern
Europe, the Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, Baltic Sea, Barents Sea, and Israel.
Russia, through military combat and non-combat operations, has expressly exerted its
desire for restoration as an internationally recognized global power and influencer in geopo-
litical affairs. As such, Russia has previously employed its military aggressively throughout
eastern Europe in Crimea, Ukraine, and Georgia to expand their influence, coerce neigh-
boring countries, and undermine their inherent sovereignty [117]. Additionally, Russia has
repeatedly operated in the Grey Zone, an area of conflict and warfare that does not illicit ki-
netic response options but serves as a means to undermine, exploit, and subvert the U.S. and
its coalition partners. Russia accomplishes this though information operations, to include
UAS operations and facilitation for surveillance, intimidation, and C2.
Expectedly, EUCOM supports and operates a range of land, air, sea, space, and cyber
domain operations with regional allies and partners to dissuade and deter Russia aggression,
defense the sovereignty of Israel, enable global commerce and free trade, and counter poten-
tial external threats originating from actors within the EUCOM AOR. EUCOM priorities
include:
• Constantly improve the war-fighting readiness of the U.S. Joint 
Force
• Strengthen solidarity and unity with U.S. Allies and partners
• Foster a highly-motivated Team of Patriots [118]
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In recent history, EUCOM has continued to adapt a policy that emboldens partner and
coalition countries as a means of obtaining and amassing a holistic approach to countering
malign threats from insurgency to state actors such as Russia. This is further emphasized
in the current U.S. presidential administration’s approach in improving the U.S.’s maritime
posture through strategic realignment in Europe [119].
This shift in U.S. presence in Europe entails a potential transfer ofmilitary equities, assets,
and personnel from Germany to elsewhere in Europe for the purposes of improving partner
relations, training, and time sensitive decision making to enhance deterrence against China
and Russia. Themove also presents a shift in the transition of EUCOMheadquarter elements
to Belgium to consolidate decisionmakers in the vicinity of NATO’s SupremeHeadquarters
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) [120]. Another decisive transition and addition to the U.S.’s
footprint in Europe is encapsulated in the station of 1000 more Marine and Army personnel
in Poland, which shall raise our current commitment to Poland and the corroborating
Defense Cooperation Act to approximately 5500 personnel [119]. Currently, the U.S. only
has a fixed maritime presence at Naval Station Rota in Rota, Spain. These USN cruiser-
destroyer (CRUDES) ships operate as ameans of FDNF, supporting short notice contingency
operations, deterrence, and power projection where applicable in the EUCOM AOR [121].
The impending realignment of forces in Europe includes plans to add two additional forward
deterrence elements in support of NATO’smaritime battle groups located in Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Poland [119]. This intended improvement to the U.S. and NATO’s maritime
and amphibious capabilities is also coupled with intended transitioning from traditional
Maritime Fusion Centers to technically linked data sharing to support maritime domain
awareness.
5.1.3.1 EUCOM Communications Infrastructure
The European continent leverages 3G, 4G, LTE, mobile broadband, fixed broadband, fiber,
and emergent 5G capabilities as a means for connecting the civil and military forms of
society to the infrastructure. The reliance on and the number of European wireless towers
enabling mobile telecommunication and internet connectivity was expected to increase
from 350K in 2018 to 450K by 2025 [122]. This number was met and accounted for in
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light of the Coronavirus-19 pandemic that necessitated the need to supporting a transition 
to teleworking households. Additionally, EUCOM enjoys a large variety of machine-to-
machine and IoT connectivity. Expectedly, such a reliance on and abundance of IoT devices 
and network connectivity have driven the growth and demand for fixed and mobile 
broadband services throughout Europe. Such growth has complemented the ability to 
research, acquire, and develop the foundational infrastructure for 5G, starting in 2018 
[123]. More proof of Europe’s transition towards 5G is indicated by their investment in 
5G technology. The European 5G communications businesses obtained approximately 
$147.5 million in revenue in 2018, and are anticipated to obtain an approximate $27.74 
billion in revenue by 2026. Further, the European 5G communication technology market 
held an estimated value of$359.3 million of net worth in 2019, and is expected to obtain 
$42.70 billion of net worth by 2027 [123].
The use of 5G supports the implementation of high data rate communications, increases 
in bandwidth, and decreases in latency and associated internet lag time. The facilitators of 
Europe’s 5G infrastructure consist of Qualcomm Technologies Inc., Huawei Technologies 
Co. Ltd., Intel Corporation, Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., Ericsson, Nokia Corporation, 
NEC Corporation, Vodafone PLC, Orange Labs, EE Ltd., NTT Corporation, IBM Corpora-
tion, ZTE Corporation, Fujitsu Corporation, CISCO, Interdigital Communication, Alcatel 
Lucent, Siemens, ATOS SE, and Orion Innovations [123].
Of concern is Huawei’s contribution to the European continent’s 5G infrastructure. China, 
as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, has procured a presence and relationship with current 
U.S. partners and allies in trade, infrastructure, and presence. This presence is exemplified 
by China’s real estate investments in seaports located in critical waterways and nations such 
as Belgium, Italy, France, and Greece [124]. These port facilities and associated deals are an 
indicative link to China’s initiative to link its economy and hegemonic pursuits physically and 
logically to Europe via sea, air, and land resources. This presence is culminated with China’s 
presence and sustained access to 10 percent of the shipping rights entering and departing 
Europe, serving as the European Union’s largest source of import and its second largest 
export market [125]. China’s presence in the European communication infrastructure with 
Huawei 5G serves as an imminent threat to network protection and a potential compromise 
of technical and personally identifiable information. The deals of 5G infrastructure and trade 
agreements with China, and the imminent threat imposed by Russia, make the European
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theater ripe for potential uncertainty with regards to the future of UAS operations and
capabilities to conduct C2.
5.1.3.2 EUCOM UAS Threats
The small UAS market in Europe has become insatiable to country government officials,
agencies, and organizations, as well as hobbyists and nefarious actors. It is further enabled
by the broad infrastructure provided by the aforementioned service providers. The low-
cost application of small UASs has given rise to the facilitation of government services
such as agricultural crop management, air traffic monitoring, road traffic management,
and mining [126]. In the European AOR, the rotary-wing portion of the commercial UAS
market is leveraged more over the fixed-wing UAS market for the purposes of military,
institutional, and civilian use. The preference of rotary over fixed wing is attributed to their
versatility and ease of use with regards to in-flight operations, launch and recovery, and
high maneuverability [126].
We assess adversarial actors’ use of UASs in the EUCOM AOR to be limited to ISR,
C2, and potential queuing for follow on targeting to support fear mongering and related
insurgency acts. This is due to the asymmetric nature of warfare conducted against large
governmental and civilian infrastructures with small UASs. An example includes the De-
cember 2018 incident at the London Gatwick Regional Airport, involving a small UAS
causing an incursion with a commercial airliner on the runway resulting in the temporary
closure of airport operations for approximately three days over the New Year period. This
action resulted in the financial loss of millions of euros to airport operators, airlines, and
passengers, as well as resulting in widespread confusion, panic, and chaos [127]. Further-
more, law enforcement reporting from France’s counterterrorism unit has indicated the
potential plotting of non-state actor groups inside Europe to leverage biological payloads
on UASs as a means of conducting a biological attack on large civilian infrastructures, to
include sporting events and ceremonies [128]. Additionally, German intelligence reporting
has warned and thwarted the potential for kinetic UAS attacks against their commercial
airports by means of carrying out intrusive tests on inbound technology to counteract the
ability to amass and introduce nefarious drones into the civilian populace [128].
Although Europe’s telecommunication infrastructure is supportive of new, emergent
technologies, the adversarial UAS tactics exhibited in the EUCOM AOR do not serve as a
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belligerent, aggressive, and a threat to USN and USMC personnel and infrastructure. This
lack of threat, as compared to the CENTCOM and AFRICOM AORs, is attributable to
the EUCOM AOR not containing or being an area of active conflict and warfare. Further,
the EUCOM AOR contains more structure, scrutiny, and ability to prosecute UAS threats
through combined policy and capabilities. As a result to the existing and potential increase
of UAS threats, the EU has begun developing a combined strategy to identify and address
the small UAS threat as a whole. This initiative encompasses researching each countries’
threat, defense plan, and recommending subsequent CUAS capabilities that are able to
interoperate and support subduing the UAS threat [129].
5.1.3.3 UAS C2 Assessment In EUCOM
The EUCOM AOR’s quick adaptation to the emergent 5G infrastructure, as well as the
AOR’smaintenance of the legacy 2G, 3G, 4G infrastructures allows for a variety ofmeans of
UASapplication over varyingC2. Further, theAORs continued use of commercial SATCOM
and WiFi standards allow for mobility and flexibility in areas of poor or no connectivity
to support UAS flight and payload operations. The combined use of these communication
architectures allows for sustained, VLOS operations to include the potential for BVLOS
through daisy chaining techniques in urban areas. The use ofWiFi hotspots in areas of limited
connectivity also allow for the potential to support short range VLOS operations, in addition
to the aforesaid operations. Further, the AORs prevalence of smart devices used to access
mobile and internet services in both rural and urban countries contributes to the ability
to support VLOS and BVLOS UAS flight and payload C2 [130]. UAS operations could
include BVLOS obtained through daisy-chaining techniques between the GCS and BTSs, or
through the use of UAS-to-SATCOMmethods incorporating satellite receivers/transmitters
as relays for long haul communications. The current UAS threats imposed by state and
non-state actors in the AOR, including Russia, allow for more potential of these methods of
C2 to be employed by use of COTS or modified UASs.
5.1.4 North Command Area of Responsibility
The inception of NORTHCOM in 2002 was intended to provide more strategic support
and oversight of the DOD homeland defense endeavors to support civil authorities within
the U.S. Its intent is to enable national power, freedom of action, and defend the homeland
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from international aggression, malign influence, potential subsequent actions. The AOR
geographically encompasses the North American continent and the waterways of the Gulf
of Mexico, Strait of Florida, and portions of the Caribbean neighboring the SOUTHCOM
AOR. NORTHCOM inherently houses the most USN and USMC personnel, equities, and
infrastructure than any other AOR due to its support and contribution to the readiness,
manning, and training of the aforesaid assets before deploying them abroad to other AORs.
Concentrated presence of Sailors and Marines in NORTHCOM are in the areas of Hawaii,
Washington, California, Florida, Georgia, Virginia, Washington DC, and Connecticut to
name a few. Similar to other AORs, NORTHCOM is comprised of the service component
commands as well as associated Joint Task Forces between the military, federal, and state
law enforcement entities. The U.S. Fleet Forces Command, also referred to as U.S. Navy
North, is the USN component to NORTHCOM.
NORTHCOM recognizes the emergent threat of small, commercially available UASs
as a readily available means of enabling nefarious actors from the range of hobbyist to
home-grown extremist. The malign UAS operations and plans presented in the CENTCOM
and SOUTHCOMAORs provide a haven of techniques and ideas for hobbyist and non-state
actors alike. These events represent what the procurement and follow-on modification of
commercially available UASs can present to the operational environment, and serve as a
warning ofwhat theNORTHCOMAORcould become although not traditionally considered
an area of armed conflict.
5.1.4.1 NORTHCOM Communications Infrastructure
The infrastructure to conduct mobile telecommunications and achieve internet access and
connectivity by means of mobile and fixed broadband services, in addition to other wireless
transmission means serves as a versatile and usable means of C2 in the U.S. The com-
munication sector within the U.S. has diversified itself from traditional voice services to
interconnected industrial networks using commercial and government operated satellites
and associated wireless transmissions means. These services have become interconnected
to support communication between satellites, ground stations, cellular towers, andwire lines
providers to achieve consistent, persistent, and reliable communications across the country.
Telecommunication writ large is governed by the Regulatory Commissions, and specifi-
cally by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Under the FCC, the Communi-
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cations Act of 1934 and Telecommunications Act of 1996 hold precedent in the governance
of producing and promulgating voice and data services to the public.
The U.S. leverages a wide variety of means to provide voice and data services throughout
country. These means include GSM, 2G, 3G, 4G, LTE, fixed broadband, mobile broadband,
fiber optics, dial-up, SATCOM, and 5G. Of these, broadband provides the most assurance
in reliability and speed across the U.S. and NORTHCOM AOR. The top broadband service
providers in the NORTHCOM AOR include Comcast, Charter, AT&T, and Verizon [131].
TheCybersecurity and Infrastructure SecurityAgency further codify and divide theNorth
American continent’s communication sector into the following sectors to accomplish the
acquisition, procurement, operationalization, management, and oversight of communication
related infrastructures within the AOR:
• The Energy Sector provides power to run cellular towers, central offices,
and other critical communications facilities. It also relies on communica-
tions to aid in monitoring and controlling the delivery of electricity.
• The Information Technology Sector provides critical control systems and
services, physical architecture, and Internet infrastructure. It also relies
on communications to deliver and distribute applications and services.
• The Financial Services Sector relies on communications for the transmis-
sion of transactions and operations of financial markets.
• The Emergency Services Sector depends on communications for direct-
ing resources, coordinating response, operating public alert and warning
systems, and receiving emergency 9-1-1 calls.
• The Transportation Systems Sector provides the diesel fuel needed to
power backup generators and relies on communications to monitor and
control the flow of ground, sea, and air traffic. [132]
The aforementioned sectors under regulation by the FCC provide and support the use of
the previously mentioned technologies, which enable communications and C2 of equities
within the NORTHCOM AOR. As contemplated, this allows for a wide variety of threat
vectors available to hobbyist, non-state actors, and state actors in regards to UAS operations
and TTPs within the AOR.
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5.1.4.2 NORTHCOM UAS Threats
The use of UASs within the NORTHCOMAOR is becoming incorporated into civil service
elements of society, to include support for meteorological surveys, agriculture, traffic mon-
itoring, criminal surveillance, safety services related to law enforcement and paramedics,
and recreational use [133] [134]. However, this increased civil and governmental use has
amassed and provided room for the UAS threat to promulgate under the cover of recreation.
The UAS threat in the NORTHCOM AOR predominantly stems from hobbyist error and
home-grown extremists. It primarily manifests in the form of ISR, C2, and propaganda,
with the potential for queuing in support of intelligence gain and follow-on targeting.
These threats have often occurred over U.S. bases, facilities, and operational equities
while at sea or in a training capacity. Some instances include:
• January 2015, In Washington, D.C.: a COTS UAS flew in the vicinity and over
the White House fence and inadvertently landed on the White House lawn without
interdiction. The incident caused no harm to U.S. equities or personnel. The operator
of the UAS was observed as an off-duty intelligence official [135].
• July 2016, Savannah River Site: eight COTS UASs were identified by the sites defen-
sive forces and work force [135].
• 2006-2007, Columbus Ohio: a modified COTS small helicopter was leveraged by
al-Qaida trained operative, Christopher Paul, with the intent of carrying out drone
research and acquisition for the terrorism group [136].
These threats, although apparently basic in nature, represent only a small fraction of
the reportable events for apprehended and halted nefarious UAS operations. We assess the
thwarting of UAS operations in the NORTHCOMAOR asmore successful due to sound law
enforcement and interagency cooperation, in addition to governmental policies and CUAS
actions converging on a common means for detecting, locating, and neutralizing adversarial
UAS operations.
5.1.4.3 UAS C2 Assessment In NORTHCOM
The cadre of UAS C2 architectures commercially available, as well as the accessibility
and availability of COTS UASs and sophisticated proprietary software and hardware make
the NORTHCOMAOR ripe for advanced UAS employment techniques. The use of cellular
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networks ranging from 2G to 5G allow for VLOS and BVLOS communication for elongated
coverage to support UAS flight and payload operations. The availability of broadband WiFi
services and hotspots, in addition to the wide accessibility and employment smart devices
lends itself to the use of WiFi as a means of C2 between the UAS and GCS in areas of poor
coverage, enabling short range VLOS operations. Furthermore, the laws protecting civilian
use of electronic communications and availability of proprietaryUAS software and hardware
allow for the programmable modification of UAS C2 methods to support UAS-to-UAS
communications, waypoint navigation, and swarm tactics at the semi-autonomous level. It
is anticipated that the NORTHCOMAOR will serve as a haven of the aforementioned UAS
operations that may threaten surface, maritime, and shore based USN and USMC equities.
5.1.5 Pacific Command Area of Responsibility
The U.S. PACOM architect, now referred to as the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
(INDOPACOM) as directed by SecDef Mattis in 2018, serves as the largest of the AORs
geographically and shares a nonphysical boarder with all other AORs. These factors con-
tribute to the INDOPACOM command being arguably the most arduous of AORs consisting
of the most coverage area with the most diversity in threats. This diversity consists of over
36 recognized nations, five mutual defense treaties with the U.S., and two of the three rec-
ognized super powers in the world. Additionally, INDOPACOM is composed of the world’s
busiest international sea lanes, largest maritime ports, five of the world’s declared nuclear
nations, and complex foreign military competition for assertion of land and maritime rights.
Due to the vast amount of surface area and complexity associated with the area covered
by the INDOPACOM AOR, it plays host to a cadre of supporting component and sub-
unified commands to accomplish the missions of power projection, strategic deterrence,
and supporting coalition partners. These supporting commands consist of the individual
service component commands as well as U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan. U.S.
Pacific Fleet consists of approximately 200 ships, including five CSG and ARGs and
130,000 Sailors and civilians in support of the U.S. maritime interests [137]. U.S. Marine
Forces Pacific consists of two Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) and 86,000 marines
in support of the U.S. land and amphibious endeavors [137]. These forces are consolidated
and dispersed throughout the AOR in the countries of Japan, Guam, South Korea, Australia,
Alaska, and Hawaii. This presence is dispersed through port and host nation agreements
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with the counties of Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, New Zealand, and India.
The assertion INDOPACO provides through the presence of these forces, in addition
to monetary and training facilitation, is to enhance regional stability and security through
security cooperation, regional development, support to HADR, and deterring regional ag-
gression. INDOPACOM’s mission is to provide, operate, and sustain a combat ready force
that is capable of denying adversaries air and maritime dominance in conjunction with
emboldening partner nations. The following serve as focus areas for INDOPACOM:
• Joint Force Lethality – We must continue to develop and field capabil-
ities necessary to deter aggression and prevail in armed conflict should
deterrence fail.
• Design and Posture – We will adapt from our historical service-centric
focus in Northeast Asia to a new more integrated joint forces blueprint
which is informed by the changing threat environment and challenges of
the 21st Century across the entire Indo-Pacific.
• Exercises, Experimentation, and Innovation – Targeted innovation and
experimentation investments will evolve the joint force while developing
asymmetrical capability to counter adversary capabilities.
• Allies and Partners – Through increased interoperability, information-
sharing, and expanded access across the region, we present a compatible
and interoperable coalition to the adversary in crisis and armed con-
flict. [137].
5.1.5.1 PACOM Communications Infrastructure
The socioeconomic infrastructure within the PACOM AOR in both allied and non-allied
countries is influenced by physical Chinese presence or pressure. China’s military modern-
ization in the domains of land, air, sea, space, and cyber provide new risks to previously
forged U.S. alliances as well as threats to the U.S.’s strategic stability policies within the
region. These actions are exemplified by China’s military expansion and agreements in the
PACOM AOR and into the neighboring AORs within the past decade, to include EUCOM,
CENTCOM, and AFRICOM. It is further exemplified by China’s vested activities and re-
liance in defense spending and cooperation with Russia. Their combined defensive tactics
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consist of cyber espionage, theft of intellectual property, information operations against
public target audiences, the funding of long range ballistic missiles, and the controlling of
international waterways and maritime commerce [138].
The countries in Asia and their inherent mobile telecommunications, mobile broadband,
and fixed broadband infrastructures vary based on economic status and cooperation with
neighboring countries. Expectedly, Asia writ large exercises the use of 3G, 3G+, 4G, and
LTE throughout the continent. 2019 and 2020 have also showed a shift frommobile voice to
mobile data, with emerging nations such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore following
in the pursuit ofmobile broadband as ameans of supporting C2 across the country. In light of
the emergence of 5G, many countries in Asia already have or have commenced investing in
the requisite foundational broadband infrastructure to support the operationalization of 5G.
Countries exhibiting a stronger mobile penetration testing delineated a stronger chance for
succeeding in the transition to 5G, which consisted of the previously mentioned countries.
In 2016, the global average for broadband speeds were assessed at 6.1Mbs on fixed lines
and 11.8Mbs when leveraging a mobile device. However, in Asian countries such as South
Korea, they enjoyed approximately 27Mbps on fixed lines and 11.1Mbs when leveraging
mobile devices. India suffered the worst speeds on the Asian continent, with fixed lines at
3.6Mbs and mobile at 3.3Mbps [139]. This information is graphically depicted on Figure
5.1, showing Asia’s leading efforts towards broadband speeds and the ability to provide
consistent, reliable, fast data rates to their general public.
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Figure 5.1. Asia’s Internet Speeds in 2016. Source: [139].
The Asian continent and AOR lead the world in global broadband speeds. The best
peak speeds are too exhibited in the INDOPACOMAOR between Singapore at 157Mbps on
broadband andAustralia at 171Mbps on cellular. This assertions provided about the PACOM
AOR’s mobile telecommunications and broadband infrastructure provide consistent, nearly
assured, and unconstrained access to fast data rates and the capacity to conduct unique,
advanced means of C2 with UASs.
5.1.5.2 PACOM UAS Threats
The 2021 UAS threat in the PACOMAOR arises primarily in the form of aerial surveillance
and propaganda. The threat actors take the form primarily of hobbyist and non-state actors.
Within the continent of Asia, non-state actors leverage drones as an extension of a non-aerial
traditional service element to provide aerial vantage points of political events, monitoring
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civilian socioeconomic infrastructures, and propaganda to include spreading fear about the
potential of weaponizingUASs [140] [39]. Hobbyist government officials primarily leverage
UASs for the purposes of monitoring illegal activities, agricultural support, advertisements,
and recreational use [141]. The commercial drone market accounted for less than three
percent of the $127.3 billion global COTSUASmarket in the INDOPACOMAOR; however,
this is anticipated to grow well beyond 25 percent of this calculation in the impending years.
This growth is highly attributed to the commercialization, cheapening, and variance of UAS
use over the last decade [140].
The use of UASs by hobbyist and non-state actors for the purposes of conducting ISR
against U.S. Naval assets such as CSGs, ARGs, and independent CRUDES deployers tran-
siting narrow traffic corridors and ports in the INDOPACOMAOR, in addition to overflying
USN and USMC equities such as bases is of constant routine [142]. The use of small UASs
as a means to harass USN vessels serves as a low cost power projection for the Chinese
military. The South China Sea has divulged into an area of constant aggression fromChinese
UASs conducting aerial surveillance. The actions have become exacerbated to the point of
contention between Taiwan and China, resulting in Taiwanese declaration to shoot down
Chinese UASs flying in the vicinity of the Taiwan-occupied Pratas Islands in the South
China Sea. This aggression and increase in aerial surveillance in Taiwan’s airspace and
defenses is observed as an escalation in Grey Zone warfare, deepening the level of ten-
sions in the region as a result of China’s excursions and aspirations for regional and global
hegemony [20]. The use of UASs to conduct ISR in the vicinity of bases by hobbyist, state
actors, and non-state actors is also exemplified at Andersen AFB in Guam, which houses
both USN and USMC equities in support of contingency operations [143].
Although the use of UASs in the INDOPACOM AOR has been limited largely to non-
kinetic uses such as ISR, C2, and propaganda, the forethought of using them as a means of
conducting kinetic operations to fulfill terrorist related aspirations exists. In 2020, several
arrests were executed by Indonesia’s Police Detachment 88 against the Jemaah Islamiyah
extremist group based in Bekasi. These arrests revealed plots and intentions to use UASs as
a means of conducting weaponized strikes against local law enforcement, with the suspects
ascertaining both commercial grade UASs and associated batteries [140]. Another instance
of aspirational weaponized UAS employment deterred by law enforcement was observed
in Malaysia by the pro-ISIS militant Mohammad Firdaus [140]. In this instance, Firdaus
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planned a bomb attack with a commercial grade UAS against the Bukit Aman Federal
Police headquarters in Putrajaya and a Free Mason Temple in Bukit Jalil as a means of
demonstration against government institutions. The use of these tactics were observed
to support a means of conducting low cost, high reward tactical level operations against
government infrastructure to support the means of kinetic effects and the end state of
regional political disturbance and public fear.
It is assumed that these kinetic means of using UASs against U.S. interests have yet to
materialize in the INDOPACOMAOR, as similar to the CENTCOM and AFRICOMAORs,
due to the lack of incentive and initiative. Non-state actors in the INDOPACOM AOR have
observably desired to leverage legacy, traditional tactics for spreading fear and mass panic
such as bombings and shootings. These means are not only legacy, but also require less
scheming to plan, procure, and initiate. Additionally, non-state actors have been unable to
operationalize the few instances of aspirations to use UASs for kinetic effects due to the
apprehension and hindrance presented by local law enforcement in the associated countries.
As such, the infrastructure, similar to the EUCOMAOR, presents as more of a challenge to
operationalize UASs for nefarious means.
5.1.5.3 UAS C2 Assessment In PACOM
The PACOMAOR’s pre-existing legacy 3G and 4G communication infrastructure and shift
to 5G allow for the emergence of and employment of steady state VLOS and BVLOS
UAS range operations. Its expeditious broadband internet speeds and commercial WiFi
industry help augment the preexisting cellular communication infrastructure in rural areas
of limited network resources. The use of daisy-chaining related operation using fixed and
mobile BTSs and SATCOM is a currently employed concept in telecommunications, and
can lend itself to elongating and sustaining BVLOS UAS flight and payload operations
overland as well as the maritime environment in the South China Sea [144]. Further, China’s
militarization of its commercial satellite infrastructure to support its strategic objectives of
global and regional hegemony also lends itself augmenting the existing C2 infrastructure
to support state sponsored over the horizon UAS operations in the land and maritime
environment [145].
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5.1.6 South Command Area of Responsibility
Housed in southern Florida, the SOUTHCOM AOR encompasses all of South America,
the Caribbean Sea, and the associated landmasses in and around the Caribbean Sea. The
intent and mission of SOUTHCOM is to strengthen partnerships with surrounding nations
consistent with theU.S.’s strategic priorities, counteringmalign threats in theAOR and those
entering into the U.S., and building a team of nations to support the response to steady state
and potential crisis endeavors in the AOR. The use of partnerships within the SOUTHCOM
AOR is intended to support developing a whole-of-government approach, similar to other
AORs, to support and advance the promotion of security, governance, and economic growth
in the AOR and with the U.S. The threats addressed by SOUTHCOM range in the form
of transnational criminal organizations, extremist organizations, and malign regional and
external state actors to include the presence of China, Russia, and Iran in the AOR. The
instability in the SOUTHCOM AOR is exemplified by the occurrence of drug, weapons,
and human trafficking committed by nefarious governments and VEOs. Global powers
such as China, Russia, and Iran are capitalizing from the instability in the AOR through
influence and coercion campaigns to support their hegemonic pursuits [146]. The intent of
countering these threats is to foster a relationship with the countries in the SOUTHCOM
AOR, making the U.S. a partner of choice for military, economic, and political support and
consultation. Further, the end state is to prevent Chinese, Russian, and Iranian governments
from developing an influence and subsequent presence in the region that threatens the U.S.’s
strategic policies of peace and stability in the region, as well as the U.S.’s homeland security
due to the proximity of the SOUTHCOM AOR to the U.S. The mission of the AOR is
similarly carried out by its supporting service component commands.
U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command employs maritime forces to maintain SOUTH-
COM’s initiatives of freedom of navigation, partner nation interoperability, and building
regional partnerships through the use of combined coalition exercises [147]. U.S. Naval
Forces Southern Command’s lines of operations are as follows:
• Security Cooperative Activities
• Maritime Security Operations
• Contingency Operations [147]
Although SOUTHCOM hosts no distinct FDNF maritime forces, nor any fixed presence
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of CSGs or ARGs, it leverages the Optimized Fleet Readiness Plan and congressional
approved movement of forces to other AORs to support any required presence of power
projection and forward deterrence as needed. The mission of maritime security operations
consists of the use of smaller patrol crafts and associated coast guard ships to support
counter piracy operations, counter smuggling operations, and patrolling of strategic choke
points such as the Panama Canal to ensure freedom of navigation.
U.S. Marine Forces Southern Command serves as a means to provide the requisite
manning and equipment all marine elements assigned to SOUTHCOM. As such, U.S.
Marine Forces Southern Command directs the requisite timelines, planning, and execution
of requirements associated with training, deployment, and redeployment of assigned forces.
SOUTHCOM leverages only one percent of the DOD’s intelligence resources to detect,
identify, and thwart threats in their operational environment. To meet and maintain mis-
sion requirements, SOUTHCOM leverages open-source intelligence techniques of publicly
available information, advanced analytics techniques such as machine learning and artificial
intelligence, and collaboration with allies and regional partners. This work occurs in their
Technical Network Analysis Cell and Asymmetric Target Acquisition Center [148]. These
two entities, supported and run by SOUTHCOM service component commands, work with
domestic and foreign law enforcement entities in the U.S. and SOUTHCOMAOR to support
interagency coordination, information sharing, and the allocation of foreign and domestic
intelligence resources to achieve the SOUTHCOMmission and corroborating lines of effort.
5.1.6.1 SOUTHCOM Communications Infrastructure
The telecommunications, mobile broadband, and fixed broadband infrastructure in South
America and throughout the SOUTHCOMAOR is of the lowest in the global market [149].
Currently, countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR leverage an archaic centralized form of
telecommunications infrastructure, which is geographically focused on large urban cen-
ters of more affluence, vice a recommended decentralized model that places emphasis on
regional support and coordination with neighboring countries. This stove-piping of archi-
tecture stifles the ability to support inter-country communications, data sharing, and the
inherent ability to lift a region up as countries become economically more capable of
progression. It further causes countries to rely on country controlled, unorthodox models,
inhibiting the desire for international businesses to invest and support in the expansion of
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the infrastructure. Wireless network connectivity is a preferred means of communications,
inherently tied to the broadband infrastructure in the region it is employed in. Mobile de-
vices and smart phones, similar to the other AORs, are the preferred means of accessing
wireless content. However, the countries throughout SOUTHCOM are limited to 2G and
3G technology, with struggles to provide 4G coverage to more rural areas of the South
American continent and the Caribbean.
The infrastructure of deploying large scale towers to provide subsequent fixed broadband
access remains an emergent and stagnant concept in the SOUTHCOMAOR.The explanation
for this stagnation in their C2 infrastructure is two-fold [150]. It is first related to the incon-
sistent and disproportionate policies across the continent due to the political and economic
strife between their elected national governing bodies and local municipality leadership.
This division is exacerbated by the systemic fear of government encroachment on local
policies, infrastructure, and quality of life. The second is related to the policies associated
with acquiring and operationalizing the endeavors to support communication infrastructure
improvements and funding. This is caused by the disproportionate fees, spending, zoning,
and use of monopolized equipment to support the development of the infrastructure. Ex-
pectedly, the roll-out of 5G within the SOUTHCOM AOR will inevitably be much further
behind than any other AOR, despite external state actors encroachment.
5.1.6.2 SOUTHCOM UAS Threats
Although the C2 infrastructure in the SOUTHCOM AOR lags behind the rest of the global
market, the lack of government synchronization, coordination, and policy against combating
internal and external nefarious actors provides a haven for malicious UAS actors and their
associated TTPs. There currently exists no regional or international legal framework or
regulatory policy regarding the ownership, registration, oversight, or employment of UAS
use in South America, with the exception of Brazil [151].
The primary control over known UAS technology is withheld for military means and
operations. Therefore, the precedent of the UAS threats in SOUTHCOM is primarily at-
tributed to non-state actors, with the potential for facilitation through state actors such as
Iran’s Qods Force, Lebanese Hezbollah, China, or Russia [104]. These external state actors
seize the initiative of the disenfranchisement of the state actors within the SOUTHCOM
AOR, enabling their operational endeavors by the means of funding and facilitating their
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plans with commercially available UASs and training. The SOUTHCOM and CENTCOM
AORs are the only AORs to experience routine, successful use of UASs to support both
surveillance and propaganda activities, as well as kinetic activities against government and
civilian infrastructures. This is exemplified by the following previous uses of UASs by
non-state actors in the SOUTHCOM AOR [104]:
• 2002: The disclosure of UAS plans and TTPs for the FARC, a paramilitary group.
The TTPs contained details of UAS operations to support drug smuggling as early as
the year 2000. In 2002, several UASs were discovered by the Colombian military at
a FARC camp.
• 2017: The discovery of several armed, commercially available drones in the inventory
of the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, intended to be used for subsequent violent
attacks against government and civilian infrastructures.
• August 2018: Venezuelan military defectors from the Venezuelan military leveraged
and armed two independent, GPS-guided, commercial UASs to attack President Nico-
las Maduro during a speech at a military parade. The attack resulted in the detonation
over the parade, while President Maduro delivered an address to commemorate the
81st anniversary of the Bolivarian National Guard.
The SOUTHCOM AOR has already demonstrated the capability to go kinetic with the
use of UAS operations. It has further displayed the intent to leverage UAS for the foreseeable
future as a means of enabling and augmenting aerial operations and endeavors to support
nefarious activities. As the AOR catches up with the global market for 5G connectivity and
capability, the ability to leverage UASs in the surrounding areas will become more feasible
and difficult to detect and track with legacy forms of CUAS capabilities. These drone attacks
delineate a similar pattern of employment and use as the CENTCOM AOR. These TTPs
serve as the most dangerous options of employment, and require the most attention and
supporting deterrent capability to identify, detect, locate, and neutralize.
5.1.6.3 UAS C2 Assessment In SOUTHCOM
The SOUTHCOM AOR lacks the robust C2 infrastructure experienced in the neighboring
NORTHCOM AOR. Further, SOUTHCOM’s limitation to 2G and 3G technology, with
limited coverage in rural areas provide for rudimentary C2 tactics UAS operators can
leverage to conduct long-range UAS flight and payload operations. 2G and 3G coverage will
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permit the use of singular and potential cluster UAS flight and payload operations in the
vicinity of a BTS or with an associated GCS. However, BVLOS UAS operations is assessed
by our research as a limited possibility. Until 2G and 3G technology becomesmore prevalent
in more rural regions, the possibility of augmenting wireless communication with personal
hotspots via smart phones is restricted. C2 serves as a limiting factor in SOUTHCOM,
limiting UAS flight and payload operations to VLOS.
5.2 Summary
As stated in Chapter 1, in order to counter a threat the threat must first be understood. This
chapter takes the data pertaining to C2 used to support UAS flight and payload operations in
Chapter 4, and applies it to every AOR to support the distinction of current UAS operations
in a region. This chapter further supports our assessment of emergent UAS employment
techniques and tactics in everyAORbased upon the emergent communications infrastructure
and capabilities used to enable communications.
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CHAPTER 6:
Current USN and USMC CUAS Technologies
This chapter discusses current CUAS USN and USMC technology limitations in detection
andmitigation capabilities alongwith interoperability shortfalls andUASadvancements.We
identify solutions using current technologies to address the limitations and interoperability
shortfalls. USN and USMC level of efforts and requirements must be aligned to achieve
CUAS interoperability and to maintain superiority in the joint operational environment.
6.1 The Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems Kill Chain
The CUAS kill chain is a “structure-of-attack” concept comprised of detecting, identify-
ing, locating, tracking, and mitigating a perceived threat UAS. Current CUAS technology
is designed with the ability to affect one or more phases of the CUAS kill chain. State
actors, non-state actors, and hobbyist operate UAS in areas of close proximity to USN and
USMC operations of multiple mission sizes, location conditions, and communication en-
vironments. These malicious UAS operations involve ISR, targeting, interference, or strike
missions against strategic, operational, and tactical USN and/or USMC interests. Under
these conditions, UAS pose a threat and require the employment of CUAS technology with
appropriate and proportionate capabilities against the kill chain to accomplish the desired
effect in the given environment. Current USN and USMC CUASs employ capabilities
using the techniques described in Table 6.1 for initial detection and subsequent identifica-
tion/classification of threatening UAS. These techniques also enable locating and tracking.
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Table 6.1. Detection and Tracking Techniques. Source: [4]
[Technique] [Description]
Radar Detects the presence of small unmanned aircraft by their radar signature, which is generated when the
aircraft encounters RF pulses emitted by the detection element. These systems often employ algorithms to
distinguish between drones and other small, low-flying objects, such as birds.
RF Identifies the presence of drones by scanning for the frequencies on which most drones are known to
operate. Algorithms pick out and geo-locate RF-emitting devices in the area that are likely to be drones.
EO Detects drones based on their visual signature.
IR Detects drones based on their heat signature.
Acoustic Detects drones by recognizing the unique sounds produced by their motors. Acoustic systems rely on a
library of sounds produced by known drones, which are then matched to sounds detected in the operating
environment.
Combined Sensors Many systems integrate a variety of different sensor types in order to provide a more robust detection
capability. For example, a system might include an acoustic sensor that cues an optical camera when it
detects a potential drone in the vicinity. The use of multiple detection elements may also be intended to
increase the probability of successful detection, given that no individual detection method is entirely
fail-proof.
After detecting, locating, and tracking the targeted UAS, current USN and USMC CUASs
employ capabilities using the techniques described in Table 6.2 for mitigation and desired
effects (kinetic or non-kinetic).
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Table 6.2. Mitigation Techniques. Source: [152]
[Technique] [Description]
RF Jamming Disrupts the radio frequency link between the drone and its operator by generating large
volumes of RF interference. Once the RF link, which can include Wi-Fi links, is severed,
a drone will either descend to the ground or initiate a “return to home” maneuver.
GNSS Jamming Disrupts the drone’s satellite link, [(e.g.: GPS, GLONASS, BeiDou)] which is used for
navigation. Drones that lose their satellite link will usually hover in place, land, or
return to home.
Spoofing Allows one to take control of or misdirect the targeted drone by feeding it a spurious
communications or navigation link. (Included within this category is a range of
measures such as cyber attacks, protocol manipulation, and RF/GNSS Deception).
Dazzling Employs a high intensity light beam or laser to "blind" the camera on a drone.
Laser Destroys vital segments of the drone’s airframe using directed energy, causing it to
crash to the ground.
High Power Microwave Directs pulses of high intensity microwave energy at the drone, disabling the drone’s
electronic systems.
Nets Designed to entangle the targeted drone and/or its rotors.
Projectile Employs regular or custom-designed ammunition to destroy incoming unmanned
aircraft.
Collision Drone A drone designed to collide with the adversary drone.
Combined Mitigation Elements A number of [CUASs] also employ a combination of [mitigation] elements to increase
the likelihood of a successful [mitigation] ; Many jamming systems have both RF
jamming and GNSS jamming capabilities in the same package. Other systems might
employ an electronic system as a first line of defense and a kinetic system as a backup
measure.
In 2014, the USN and Office of Naval Research fielded and tested an operational directed-
energy weapon, the LaWS 2.0, a 30-kilowatt (kW) directed-energy system aboard the USS
Ponce (LPD-15), an amphibious transport dock ship. This testing positively demonstrated
the effective use of directed energy against UASs as a means to support the CUAS kill chain.
In November 2019, the USN installed and operationalized Optical Dazzling Interdictor,
Navy (ODIN) onboard theUSSDewey (DDG-105), a Flight IIAArleigh-Burke class guided-
missile destroyer. ODIN leverages a standalone optical dazzler as a means to temporarily
degrade/distort a UAS’s optical sensor. The subsequent High-Energy Laser with Integrated
Optical Dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS) program rapidly developed and fielded a 60kW
class high-energy laser (with growth potential to 150kW) and dazzler in an integrated
weapon system. This demonstrated a maturation in technology and an increased capability
for use in countering UAVs, small boats, and ISR sensors. It further provides a means for
combat identification and battle damage assessment [153].
The management for CUAS systems in the USMC is the responsibility of the Ground
Based Air Defense (GBAD) program office. In [154], GBAD states that Marine Air Defense
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Integrated System (MADIS), the USMC’s modernization of GBAD capabilities, relies on
a complementary pair of Joint Light Tactical Vehicles to host MADIS Mk1 and MADIS
Mk2. GBAD program office states further, MADIS Mk1 is “primarily responsible for
neutralizing fixed and rotary-wing aircraft” and MADIS Mk2 predominantly fulfills the
[CUAS] “mission, while also providing radar and C2 for the pair”. TheMADISMk2 variant
includes a multi-function EW capability, 360-degree radar, direct-fire weaponry, electro-
optical infrared (EO/IR) optic, and supporting C2 communications suite with BVLOS
gateway/server capability [154]. The statedMADISMk2 capabilities are hosted on a Polaris
MRZR all-terrain vehicle to form Light-MADIS (L-MADIS). In July 2019, Marines aboard
the USS Boxer (LHD-4), an amphibious assault ship, employed L-MADIS to neutralize a
UAS Group 1 threat located within the vital area of the warship [155]. Although onboard
the ship, L-MADIS was not integrated with USN targeting equities and performed as a
standalone system. This points to a instancewhere systems are capable of interoperability but
it was not implemented. The USN’s and USMC’s CUAS endeavors should be improved to
achieve sufficient coordination in support of joint amphibious and expeditionary operations.
ODIN and HELIOS are designed to support afloat maritime CUASmissions but have power
margin and power management as limiting factors [153]. At times when ODIN and HELIOS
operations are impacted because of the aforementioned limiting factors, L-MADIS can
serve as bridge between other ship sensors for CUAS operations utilizing its interoperable
C2 communications suite. With L-MADIS serving as bridge, information associated with
UAS threats to the ship’s vital area can be exchanged between L-MADIS and other ships
sensors. The exchanged information can be utilized by L-MADIS and/or the ship’s sensor
to employ detection and/or mitigation techniques against UAS threats. L-MADIS presents
a mechanism to mitigate these limiting factors through future interoperability.
In December 2019, the DOD made the decision to streamline various counter-small
unmanned aerial system (C-sUAS) programs and named the U.S. Army as the executive
agent. In support of this decision, the DOD established (Jan 6. 2020) the JCO Joint C-sUAS
led by the U.S. Army and issued DOD Directive 3800.01E, DOD Executive Agent for
C-sUAS for UAS Groups 1, 2, and 3. In [2], it is stated that JCO identified eight C-sUAS
solutions categorized into three systems-of-systems approaches and one C2 system:
1. Fixed/Semi-Fixed Systems
• Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System
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(FS-LIDS): sponsored by [U.S.] Army.
• Negation of Improvised Non-State Joint Aerial-Threats (NINJA): sponsored by
[U.S.] Air Force.
• Counter-Remote Control Model Aircraft Integrated Air Defense Network
(CORIAN): sponsored by [U.S.] Navy.
2. Mounted/Mobile System
• L-MADIS: sponsored by [U.S.] Marine Corps.
3. Dismounted/Handheld Systems
• Bal Chatri: sponsored by Special Operations Command.
• Dronebuster: no sponsor [but] commercial off-the-shelf capability.
• Smart Shooter: no sponsor [but] commercial off-the-shelf capability.
4. Command and Control
• Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD-C2): sponsored by
[U.S.] Army.
– FAAD-C2 [includes] interoperable systems like the Air Force’s Air Defense
System Integrator (ADSI) and theMarine Corps’ Multi-Environmental Do-
main Unmanned Systems Application Command and Control (MEDUSA
C2) [2].
Currently, the USN employs CORIAN while the USMC employs L-MADIS. CORIAN
detects, identifies, tracks, and mitigates UAS threats for Groups 1-3 using CACI’s Skyview
passive RF sensors and combined mitigation elements with precision techniques to mitigate
damage to the surrounding RF spectrum and existing communications. The components
of L-MADIS are: RPS-42 multi-mission hemispheric air surveillance Active Electronically
Scanned Array radar system, CM202 multi-sensor imaging system, SkyView-Directional
Indication Version 2 passive RF detection architecture, and Modi II Electronic Counter-
measure system. The dismounted/handheld systems are standalone without requirements
for data retention and passing of information when utilized for UAS engagement.
Advances in technology have positively attributed to the augmentation in UAS aerody-
namics, communications, sonar, propulsion, precision navigation, and digital signal pro-
cessing sensors [156]. With these advances, USN and USMC CUAS future technology
must incorporate and ascertain the requisite levels of sophistication and interoperability to
maintain superiority in the joint operational environment.
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6.2 Detection and Tracking Techniques
6.2.1 Radar
CUASs with sensors utilizing radar techniques operate by actively transmitting RF signal on
a specific frequency, with a certain amount of power, and in a chosen direction then subse-
quently detecting the signal reflected from the target. Radars are typically two dimensional,
providing range and direction, or three dimensional, providing range, elevation angle, and
azimuth. The type of radar most common in CUASs is the Doppler radar which uses the
Doppler effect to determine velocity of the reflected signal.
L-MADIS’s RPS-42 radar is software-defined and pulse-Doppler which uses pulse-
timing techniques to determine range and the Doppler effect to determine velocity. RPS-42
applies time to understand the three dimensional (3D) environment with regard to elevation
to create what is considered the four dimension. RPS-42 operates in S-band (2-4 GHz) with
frequencies within the super high frequency (SHF) and UHF bands; it detects, tracks and
classifies UAS Groups 1 and 2 at ranges of up to 10km [157].
The USN’s Advanced Refractive Effects Predication System (AREPS) is a Microsoft
Windows-based software application that provides an electromagnetic (EM) system prop-
agation assessment tool designed to provide assessments for communications, radar, strike
and electronic countermeasures, electronic support measures (ESM) vulnerabilities, and
many other applications with its advance propagation model and its other embedded prop-
agation models [158]. The performance of a radar system is dependent on the environment
in which it operates and the radar cross-section of the targets. Pulse modulations techniques
are used to address the varying radar cross-sections observed with target UASs. Current
CUASs do not provide radar probability of detection, propagation loss, signal-to-noise ra-
tio, passive RF sensor/receivers vulnerability, and radar capability versus range, height,
and bearing from the radar transmitter. AREPS has the capability to compute and display
the aforementioned information using its advance propagation model, a hybrid ray-optic
and parabolic equation model [159]. AREPS’s advance propagation model is accredited
by the Chief of Naval Operations for EM propagation modeling in the 2MHz to 57GHz
range for use in USN systems [158]. Integration of AREPS into future CUASs can provide
the capability to adjust radar and RF detection and tracking techniques for the real-time
environment and mitigate potential vulnerabilities and shortfalls.
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6.2.2 Radio Frequency
In Department of Homeland Security (DHS)’s CUAS technology guide [47], it is stated
that sensors utilizing RF techniques “rely on antennas to [passively] receive and computers
to [process and analyze] RF signals associated with communications between the GCS and
the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)”. Next, the intercepted signals go through analysis to
examine RF signatures and modulation characteristics for correlation to UAS signals. The
technology guide further states, the analysis provides the capability to identify UAS models
and manufacturers and locate where the transmitted signal originates whether it is the UAV
and/or the GCS It is recognized that CUASs utilize libraries of known UAS RF signatures
and modulation characteristics for comparison and correlation to the detected signals for the
purpose of UAS classification and/or identification. The DHS suggests signature libraries
should be periodically updated to include additional UAS signatures and update existing
signatures [47]. There are several methods designed to assist in locating the origin of a
detected UAS associated signal but the more common methods are: direction finding (DF),
time difference of arrival (TDOA), and frequency difference of arrival (FDOA) [47]. The
difference between the methods is the technique use in the calculation/estimation of location
[160]:
• DF utilizes angle of arrival (AOA) involving one or more detection sensors.
• TDOA utilizes the time difference between the same signal received at two or more
different detection sensors.
• FDOA utilize the frequency difference due to the Doppler shift observed in same
signal received at two or more different detection sensors.
The detection ranges of RF sensors are affected by many factors which include terrain,
electromagnetic interference, RF reflecting surfaces (e.g. structures introducingmulti-path),
and line of sight to target UAS. These factors create complex operational conditions for RF
sensors which affects the effective range of the sensor. Due to the complexity associated
with the environment conditions RF sensors are employed in, detection ranges are specified
under ideal conditions. CORIAN and L-MADIS both utilize the CACI Skyview RF sensor
which has a vendor specified detection range of more than 9.9km. Their effective detection
ranges for the passive RF sensor are dependent on mission size, geographic conditions, and
RF environment. The ability to compute and display passive RF probability of detection,
similar to the capabilities of AREPS, would inform the employment of other detection and
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tracking techniques.
As stated in Chapter 4 Section 4.4 UASs utilize radio frequencies within the 433MHz to
5.8GHz range. The most common radio frequencies include, but not limited to, 433MHz,
915MHz, 2.4GHz, and 5.8GHz. Current CUASs’ RF sensors have the ability to detect
in the frequency band of 20MHz to 6GHz. With 5G technology at the center of future
communications, it is expected that UASs will increasingly shift to 5G. 5G frequency range
designations are [161]:
• Frequency Range 1: defined as sub 6GHz range; 450MHz-6GHz.
• Frequency Range 2: defined as the millimeter wave range; 24.25GHz-52.6GHz.
In addition to the aforementioned frequency ranges, there is interest and support in exploring
the 6GHz-24GHz range for 5G use [162]. Current CUAS RF sensors implemented within
CORIAN and L-MADIS lack the capability and modularity to address the 5G frequency
range above 6GHz. Future CUASs should be capable of detecting and tracking UASs
operating at frequencies above 6GHz.
Current technology exists to address the limitations for 5G detection but requires testing
before integration into future CUASs. An example of available technology is CRFS’s RFeye
Node 100-40, a 9KHz-40GHz intelligentwideband receiver. CRFS isUnitedKingdombased
company that specializes in RF spectrum monitoring, management, and geolocation. The
RFeyeNode 100-40 is a single channel receiver with switchable RF inputs. Its signal analysis
features are 100MHz bandwidth with a tuning resolution of 1Hz. The detailed specifications
of RFeye Node 100-40 [163] provide an example baseline of technical considerations for
future RF sensor integrated into CUASs.
6.2.3 Electro-Optical/Infrared
EO/IR techniques collect visible and infrared light information in the electromagnetic spec-
trum. Visible light is limited to daytime collection while infrared light can be collected
daytime or nighttime. CORIAN’s current configuration does not have an EO/IR capabil-
ity while L-MADIS utilizes Ascent Vision Technologies’ CM202U for the capability [1].
CM202U is gyro-stabilized and its software utilizes two Ascent Vision Technologies pro-
prietary threat detection algorithms; moving threat and static threat. The algorithms are
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designed to assist the CUAS human operator with a high probability of detection. The
probability is not advertised. The IR capability operates in the medium wavelength in-
frared (MWIR) range of 3.0-5.0 µm. CM202U is configured with fields of view of 9 degrees
to 1.1 degrees and 28.7 degrees to 1.7 degrees for EO and IR, respectively. The azimuth is
a continuous 360 degrees and the slew rate is 360 degrees per second. Image resolution is
1280x720 for EO and 640x512 for IR. Elevation capability is reported as +130/-30 degrees.
The EO/IR detection technique is limited by environmental conditions which directly affect
detection ranges. The IR detection technique in the MWIR range provides the longest de-
tection ranges when compared to short wavelength infrared (SWIR) and long wavelength
infrared (LWIR) range . It is also less susceptible to absorption and scattering than LWIR.
Line of sight is a necessity for both EO and IR.
Also in the DOD’s inventory of EO/IR capability for CUAS is Ascent Vision Technolo-
gies’ CM262, designed for ground-based CUAS. A maritime version of CM262, CM262M,
is designed for the maritime use. CM262 is gyro-stabilized and has the additional capa-
bilities of SWIR and a laser range finder with range of up to 10km [164]. The SWIR
capability has image resolution of 640 x 512 and a field of view of 14-1.4 degrees. The
MWIR capability differs from CM202 with an image resolution of 1280x1024 and field of
view of 46.2-2.4 degrees. Elevation capability is reported as +90/-10 degrees . The addition
of SWIR detection and the laser range finder, inherent in the CM262, would complement
current L-MADIS EO/IR capabilities. Current EO/IR capabilities have detection range and
image resolution limitations because of the laws of physics. To increase detection ranges
and image resolution for future CUAS EO/IR capabilities, adapting a larger focal plane
array is a solution but comes with a trade-off between size, weight, and power consumption
of the overall sensor.
6.2.4 Acoustic
Acoustic detection techniques are not implemented in CORIAN nor L-MADIS as a primary
detection source. FutureUSNandUSMCCUASs should adapt acoustic detection techniques
for the appropriatemission size, geographic conditions, and acoustic environment secondary
to the primary sensor(s). The adaptation could allow the acoustic detection technique to
validate or further identify a target UAS by uniquely identifying sound signatures associated
with particular UAS. A major factor to consider is the technique’s sensitivity to ambient
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noise. Acoustic detection ranges vary based on the environment which limits acoustic sensor
capabilities.
6.2.5 Combined Sensors
With the aforementioned detection techniques, numerous combinations are implemented
in CUASs to provide detection, tracking, and identification capabilities for the operational
environment. A comparison of detection techniques capabilities against the UAV and GCS
are described in Table 6.3. Detection limitations are described in Table 2.9. Table 2.9
and Table 6.3 describe the information taken into consideration when choosing a singular
detection technique or a combination of techniqueswith respect to the operation environment
of employment.
Table 6.3. Comparison of CUAS Detection Techniques against UAV/GCS.
Source: [47].




Radar Active Yes No Yes No
EO Passive Yes No Yes No
IR Passive Yes No Yes No
RF Passive Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acoustic Passive Yes No Yes No
The capability to detect, track, and locate both components of a UAS, UAV and GCS,
currently resides with only one method/technique; RF.
6.3 Mitigation Techniques
Mitigation techniques are divided into two categories; kinetic and non-kinetic. Of the
techniques described in Table 6.2, RF jamming, GNSS jamming, and spoofing are consid-
ered non-kinetic, while dazzling, laser, high power microwave, nets, projectile, and collision
drone are considered kinetic. Several techniques from both categories are utilized in CUASs
against current threats. Emerging UAS threats present challenges to current CUAS mitiga-
tion techniques in which some are attributed to UAS adaptation of:
• 5G communication technology and protocols.
• Low probability of intercept/detection waveforms.
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• Anti-jamming capabilities integration.
In addition to the adaptations listed above, further development of automation and UAS col-
laboration add to the challenges and the need for improved interoperability. UAS automation
is described as shown in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4. UAS Automation Level. Source: [165]
Level 1: Slave Assisting piloting, [with] reaction to disturbance [environment/interference].
Level 2: Automated Maintains its flying order and receives higher level orders[; automation minimal].
Level 3: Automated Navigation a priori mission plan.
Level 4: Response from Contextual Data Collision Avoidance [without] human intervention; [Requires] minimum knowledge
of surrounding environment, reacts to events, uses active [sense and avoid system],
and requires mission plan.
Level 5: Decision-Maker (Expert System) [Decision are made] from contextual data: navigation in unknown environment,
complex missions, coordination and collaboration of signals.
UAS Groups 1, 2, and 3 commonly have the capabilities of Level 1 and Level 2 automation.
There is an increase in the availability of Level 3 and Level 4 automation while Level 5
automation has current limited availability commercially. Level 5 automation consists of
artificial intelligence and advance sense and avoid systems. The objective is to provide
decision making with networked computing, perceptive sensors for time and space, intel-
ligent adjustment capabilities, and adaptive control [165]. Often employed with a type of
automation, UAS collaboration is divided into four types as describe in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5. UAS Collaboration Types. Source: [165]
Type 1: Isolated Individual UAS Advantages [of use]: piloted or autonomous [with] specific
mission to perform; [affordability].
Type 2: Group of Individuals UASs (Isolated with own mis-
sion but not coordinated)
Advantages [of use]: sphere of action may be different for each
mission, increased numbers, and increases success of attacks by
defenses saturation.
Type 3: Team of UASs (All members assigned specialized
tasks and coordinated by [master controlling node])
Advantages [of use]: particularly effective against divided
attack targets, Level 3 [automation] allows automatic
navigation, synchronized actions, but no update to mission
plans based on field activities.
Type 4: UAS Swarm Uniform mass of undifferentiated individual UAS [without a
master controlling node] at Level 4 or 5 [automation].
Advantages of use: efficient based on numbers, emergent large
group behaviors and reactions, not controllable or automated,
decentralized intelligence.
UAS Group 1, 2, 3, and threats employing combinations of high level automation (Table 6.4
Levels 3 and above) and certain types of collaboration (Table 6.5 Types 2, 3, and 4) present
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challenges (i.e., saturation limitations) for defensive measures utilizing current CUASs. The
combinations are also in line with UAS use tactics presented in Section 2.6.
6.4 USN and USMC CUAS Interoperability
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff states that interoperability is “the ability to act
together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic
objectives” [166]. In theDOD’s C-sUASs Strategy [32], interoperability shortfalls in interim
CUASs are identified as:
• Lack of common architecture standard as basis for systems.
• Need for common C2 standards to meet future joint common architecture.
• Lack of modularity for plug-and-play.
• Need for central repository for common UAS threat database.
It is recommended that a common baseline architecture be used as the foundation for DoN
CUASs to enable interoperability and supported by applying:
• Configuration management to develop and apply procedures and standards to manage
evolving software.
• Change management to manage change requests created by requirements or mission
shifts.
Along with configuration and change management, applying the Doctrine, Organization,
Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) framework to lever-
age a joint vantage point can assist in meeting joint requirements and interoperability while
developing capabilities and training to obtain the best effects possible.
6.5 Summary
In summary, current CUAS USN and USMC technologies have limitations in detection
and mitigation capabilities along with interoperability shortfalls (Section 6.4). Coupled
with the limitations and shortfalls is UAS adaption of 5G technology, low probability
of intercept/detection waveforms, and anti-jamming capabilities. UAS are also being de-
veloped with advanced automation, collaboration, aerodynamics, communications, sonar,
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propulsion, precision navigation, and digital signal processing capabilities [156]. Current
technologies exist to address the limitations and we identified solutions to address interop-
erability shortfalls. To counter UAS technological advances, future CUAS must adapt the
technology that:
• extends its RF detection frequency ranges to encompass 5G frequency ranges,
• provides radar and RF propagation modeling,
• extends EO/acIR detection ranges and image resolution, and
• incorporates two or more techniques for each of its detection andmitigation functions.
Interoperability shortfalls are addressed by adapting a common baseline architecture and
applying configuration management, change management, and the DOTMLPF framework.
USN and USMC level of efforts and requirements must be aligned to ascertain the requisite
levels of sophistication and interoperability to maintain superiority in the joint operational
environment.
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CHAPTER 7:
Modeling and Simulation of the Effectiveness of
CUAS Technologies
This chapter discusses the effectiveness of the current CUAS technologies against current
and emergent UAS threats. We leverage generic modeling and simulations based upon
current CUAS subsystems to highlight shortfalls and limitations associated with varying
degrees of UAS threats. We further establish recommended means to address current and
emergent UAS threats. For the full code set see https://gitlab.nps.edu/allen.golphin/cuas-
simulation-and-modeling.
7.1 Counter Unmanned Systems Effectiveness Factors
Factors in the effectiveness of CUAS technologies are the detection and mitigation tech-
niques, discussed in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, selected for employment against the CUAS kill
chain. A CUAS can consist of a singular or multiple subsystem configurations. A proba-
bility of detection or probability of mitigation can be determined for the subsystems in the
CUAS. With interoperability, the introduction of a new subsystem or removal of a current
subsystem can affect the overall effectiveness and reliability of the system or an individual
subsystem. To assess overall effectiveness of a CUAS, a model was designed and simulated
to demonstrate how the probabilities and reliabilities of individual subsystems affect the
overall effectiveness of the CUAS in addition to the factors of range, targets, and terrain.
The model is applied to current and emerging UAS threats with hypothetical probabilities
for detection and mitigation functions of the subsystem. All probabilities are represented in
decimal format.
7.2 Model Description, Limitations, Assumptions, and
Constraints
We define the following reserved terms for this chapter.
Definition 7.2.1 (Effectiveness). We define Effectiveness as the degree to which a CUAS is
successful in detection and mitigation functions against UAS threats.
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Definition 7.2.2 (Reliability). We define Reliability as the degree to which a system and/or
subsystems can be depended on to be functionally operable, as perceived, regardless of
accurate functionality.
Definition 7.2.3 (Probability of Detection). We define Probability of Detection as the
likelihood of a CUAS accurately discovering the presence of UAS threats.
Definition 7.2.4 (Probability of Mitigation). We define Probability of Mitigation as the
likelihood of a CUAS meaningfully disabling the UAS threat, with meaningful defined
dependent on system goals (e.g. denial of service, kinetic destruction, disorientation, etc.).
The model is able to simulate effectiveness against current UAS threats or emerging UAS
threats. Equation (7.1) gives a description of the model.
(*() = '(*() × %> 5  (*() × %> 5 "(*() (7.1)
Where (*() is Effectiveness of the CUAS, '(*() is Reliability of the CUAS,
%> 5  (*() is Probability of Detection for the CUAS, and %> 5 "(*() is Probability
of Mitigation for the CUAS. The model is limited to CUASs that have a detection capa-
bility and a mitigation capability. Each capability has one or more subsystems employing
a specific technique discussed in Chapter 6. The overall reliability is calculated assuming
the CUAS subsystems are in a series as shown in Figure 7.1. The detection system and
mitigation system represent the underlying subsystems shown in Figure 7.2. Equation (7.2)
gives a description of the '(*() component of the overall model, (*() .
'(*() = ' × '" × '(*) (7.2)
In Equation (7.2), ' is the Reliability of the Detection subsystem, '" is the Reliability of
theMitigation subsystem, and '(*) is the Reliability of the User Interface which is constant
for this model and represents a user interface that has a very low failure rate.
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Figure 7.1. CUAS Reliability Block Diagram.
The detection capability consists of a base configuration of three detection subsystems
each representing a detection technique discussed in Chapter 6. This is assumed for the
mitigation capability as well. It is assumed subsystems are operating as an active redundant
parallel system each requiring 1 of 3 parallel branches to operate. Figure 7.2 shows the
relationship and dependency of the subsystems, reflected as parallel subsystems.
Figure 7.2. CUAS Subsystems Reliability Overview.
The reliability for the detection and mitigation subsystems are components of the '(*()
are described as:
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' = (1 − '1) × (1 − '1) × (1 − '3) (7.3)
'" = (1 − '"1) × (1 − '"2) × (1 − '"3) (7.4)
where '= and '"< are each calculated using the formula 4−_C [167]. The mean time
between failures (MTBF) is assumed different for each subsystem and will be applied and
allocated in the model as hypothesized for mission time for 30-90 days which converts
to 720-2160 hours of mission time, respectively. The 5 08;DA4B are the estimated number
of equipment failures that occur over the course of total mission time. In the formula,
_ = 1/(MTBF), C is the mission time represented in hours, and 4 ≈ 2.718281828. MTBF
is represented by the ratio C/ 5 08;DA4B. The purpose is to show variation that is observed
during the different mission sets and environments. The model allows for the addition or
subtraction of subsystems with the appropriate application of subsystem dependency for
reliability.
The probability of detection, %> 5  (*() , component of (*() is determined by the
hypothetical probability of detection,%*( (4C42C) , which is limited to the factors of range,
targets, and terrain to show their effects on the overall effectiveness of the CUAS. Equation
(7.5) represents the probability of detection with factors of range, targets, and terrain taken
into account.
Definition 7.2.5 (C0A4CB02C>A). We define C0A4CB02C>A as the degree to which the
number of simultaneous UAS threats affects the probability of detection and mitigation of
the CUAS.
Definition 7.2.6 (C4AA80=02C>A). We define terrainFactor as the degree to which the
physical features of the environment and terrain where the CUAS is employed affects the
probability of detection and mitigation of the CUAS.
%> 5  (*() = %*( (4C42C) − C0A4CB02C>A − C4AA08=02C>A (7.5)
where %*( (4C42C) probability ranges are hypothesized based on UAS tactics described
in Section 2.6. %*( (4C42C) is a continuous variable with uniform distribution. We define
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the hypothetical ranges for probability of detection as:
• If the range is 1 mile, %*( (4C42C) = .97 − .99.
• If the range is 2 mile, %*( (4C42C) = .85 − .97.
• If the range is 3 mile, %*( (4C42C) = .75 − .85.
Definition 7.2.7 (C0A4CB(|48ℎC)). We define C0A4CB(|48ℎC) as the degree of degradation
for the number of simultaneous UAS threats.
Definition 7.2.8 (C4AA08=(|48ℎC)). We define C4AA80=(|48ℎC) as the probability range to the
physical features of the CUAS’s environment and terrain where the CUAS is employed
affects the probability of detection and mitigation of the CUAS.
The number of targets factor, C0A4CB02C>A , and terrain factor , C4AA08=02C>A , affects
the hypothetical probability of detection as such:
C0A4CB02C>A = %*( (4C42C) × C0A4CB(|48ℎC) (7.6)
C4AA08=02C>A = %*( (4C42C) × C4AA08=(|48ℎC) (7.7)
where the weights of targets and terrain are hypothetically as follows to demonstrate an
effect on the hypothetical probability of detection:
• C0A4CB(|48ℎC) = .01 − .15.
• C4AA08=(|48ℎC) = .01 − .25.
The variables C0A4CB(|48ℎC) and C4AA08=(|48ℎC) are continuous and uniformly distributed.
The probability of mitigation, %> 5 "(*() , component of (*() is determined the by
hypothetical probability of mitigation, %*( ("8C80C4) , which is limited by the same factors
as %*( (4C42C) . Equation (7.8) represents the probability of mitigation with factors of
range, targets, and terrain taken into account.
%> 5 "(*() = %*( ("8C80C4) − C0A4CB02C>A" − C4AA08=02C>A" (7.8)
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where %*( ("8C80C4) probability ranges are hypothesized in the same manner as
%*( (4C42C) . %*( ("8C80C4) is a continuous variable with uniform distribution. The
hypothetical ranges for probability of mitigation are defined as:
• If the range is 1 mile, %*( ("8C80C4) = .90 − .99.
• If the range is 2 mile, %*( ("8C80C4) = .80 − .90.
• If the range is 3 mile, %*( ("8C80C4) = .65 − .80.
The number of targets factor, C0A4CB02C>A" , and terrain factor , C4AA08=02C>A" , affects
the hypothetical probability of mitigation as such:
C0A4CB02C>A" = %*( ("8C80C4) × C0A4CB(|48ℎC" ) (7.9)
C4AA08=02C>A" = %*( ("8C80C4) × C4AA08=(|48ℎC" ) (7.10)
where the weights of targets and terrain are hypothetical to demonstrate an effect on the
hypothetical probability of mitigation:
• C0A4CB(|48ℎC" ) = .01 − .25
• C4AA08=(|48ℎC" ) = .01 − .20.
The variables C0A4CB(|48ℎC" ) and C4AA08=(|48ℎC" ) are continuous and uniformly dis-
tributed.
The model is limited to UAS Groups 1, 2, and 3 as identified in Figure 2.1 employed
by adversarial operators as describe in Chapter 3. Table 7.1 provides the assumptions of
the capabilities and reliability factors of CUASs against current UAS threats. The assumed
values in Table 7.1 are estimations and are hypothetical based on professional experience
and generic vendor statements. There is no correlated data or actual use of documented
data to avoid inadvertently compromising any sensitive information. The model can be used
with actual data values to provide a system specific representation but should be used in a
facility and on a system at the appropriate classification level.
134
Table 7.1. CUASs Assumptions against Current UAS Threats.
Nominal Min Max
5 08;DA4B1 (# of failures) 3 1 12
5 08;DA4B2 (# of failures) 2 1 16
5 08;DA4B3 (# of failures) 4 1 9
5 08;DA4B"1 (# of failures) 2 1 4
5 08;DA4B"2 (# of failures) 4 1 10
5 08;DA4B"3 (# of failures) 3 1 6
C (hours) 1350 720 2160
4 2.718281828 - -
%*((4C42C ) .95 .75 .99
C0A4CB(|48ℎC ) .04 .01 .15
C4AA08=(|48ℎC ) .05 .01 .25
%*(("8C80C4) .95 .65 .99
C0A4CB(|48ℎC" ) .03 .01 .25
C4AA08=(|48ℎC" ) .05 .01 .20
Themodel was applied against CUAS assumptions for emerging UAS threats. The emerg-
ing UAS threats are assumed to be utilizing combinations of high level automation Levels 3
and above as described in Table 6.4 and collaboration of Types, 2, 3, and 4 from Table 6.5.
In addition to the automation and collaboration, emerging UAS threats are assumed to be
utilizing alternate communication channels in which current CUASs have limitations in RF
detection as identified in Section 6.2. It assumed emerging UAS threats have reduced their
radar, EO/IR, acoustic detection signatures to an acceptable level of risk for stealth [165]. It
is assumed the aforementioned advances for emerging UAS threats results in a conservative
reduction in %*( (4C42C) and %*( ("8C80C4) by five percent each with all other factors
remaining the same. This resulted in the ranges for hypothetical probability of detection for
emerging threats is defined as:
• If the range is 1 mile, %*( (4C42C) = .92 − .94.
• If the range is 2 mile, %*( (4C42C) = .81 − .92.
• If the range is 3 mile, %*( (4C42C) = .71 − .81.
The new weight of targets to show a 15-25% effect on hypothetical probability of detection
for emerging threats is defined as:
• C0A4CB(|48ℎC) = .15 − .25.
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The variable C0A4CB(|48ℎC) is continuous and uniformly distributed.
The new ranges for hypothetical probability of mitigation for emerging threats is defined as:
• If the range is 1 mile, %*( ("8C80C4) = .86 − .94.
• If the range is 2 mile, %*( ("8C80C4) = .76 − .86.
• If the range is 3 mile, %*( ("8C80C4) = .62 − .76.
%*( ("8C80C4) is a continuous variable with uniform distribution.
The new weight of targets to show a 15-30% effect on hypothetical probability of miti-
gation for emerging threats is defined as:
• C0A4CB(|48ℎC" ) = .15 − .30
The variables C0A4CB(|48ℎC" ) is continuous and uniformly distributed.With the adjustments
for emergent UAS threats, Table 7.2 provides the assumptions of the capabilities and
reliability factors of CUASs against emerging UAS threats.
Table 7.2. CUAS Assumptions against Emerging UAS Threats.
Nominal Min Max
5 08;DA4B1 (# of failures) 3 1 12
5 08;DA4B2 (# of failures) 2 1 16
5 08;DA4B3 (# of failures) 4 1 9
5 08;DA4B"1 (# of failures) 2 1 4
5 08;DA4B"2 (# of failures) 4 1 10
5 08;DA4B"3 (# of failures) 3 1 6
C (in hours) 1350 720 2160
4 2.718281828 - -
%*((4C42C ) .90 .71 .94
C0A4CB(|48ℎC ) .15 .15 .25
C4AA08=(|48ℎC ) .05 .01 .25
%*(("8C80C4) .90 .62 .94
C0A4CB(|48ℎC" ) .15 .15 .30
C4AA08=(|48ℎC" ) .05 .01 .20
The model was run as a Monte Carlo Simulation under each set of assumptions discussed
in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2, separately. The number of simulations in the Monte Carlo
Simulation was set to 10,000.
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7.3 Effectiveness Against Current UAS Threats
The results from the model run under Table 7.1 assumptions showed reliability for detection
subsystems varied between a minimum probability of 0.3301 and a maximum probability
of 0.9985 as seen in Table 7.3. The data is skewed to the left with 75% of the probabilities
above 0.7588 and the remaining 25% below 0.7588, see Figure 7.3. The graph shapes
shows that the majority of the simulations produce detection subsystems that are calculated
to be reliable 75.88% of the mission time. This translates to only 3/4 of CUAS detection
subsystems operating with reliability at or above 75.88%. The standard deviation is 0.1293
and considered high with the probabilities more spread out from the mean of 0.8486. The
model indicates the detection subsystemswould be up and operating at an average of 84.86%
of the time. The data spread is also reflected in the large interquartile range (IQR) probability
of 0.2009. In the data, it is assessed that a probability value of (1.5×IQR)more than the 75th
quartile or (1.5 × IQR) less than the 25th quartile is an outlier. Therefore, any probability
values lower than 0.4575 are considered outliers. There are outliers present below the
probability of 0.4575 which is attributed to when the number of 5 08;DA4B for the detection
subsystems occur near or at themax value for the course of their respective totalmission time.
This results in a low MTBF (represented in hours), which means the detection subsystems
failures are occurring closer together in time. CUAS detection subsystems experiencing low
MTBF show reduced reliability probabilities. This highlights that all detection subsystems
of a CUAS must demonstrate very low number of 5 08;DA4B or no number of 5 08;DA4B
for the entire duration of the mission to maintain high probability of reliability. High
probability of reliability in the detection subsystems contributes to the overall effectiveness
and reliability of the CUAS for operations against current UAS threats. Future CUASs
development and design must feature improved operating functionality to get better system
reliability. Discounting the outliers, the reliability probabilitywould range fromprobabilities
of 0.4575 to 0.9985 indicating uncertainty in the reliability of the detection subsystem.
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Figure 7.3. Detection Subsystem Reliability Histogram (Current).
Note: Scale 0-500 for number of simulations and 0.3-1.0 for reliability prob-
ability.











Reliability for themitigation subsystems varied between aminimumprobability of 0.2866
and a maximum probability of 0.9788 as seen in Table 7.4. The data is skewed to the
left with 75% of the probabilities above 0.6897 and the remaining 25% below 0.6897,
see Figure 7.4. The graph shapes shows that the majority of the simulations produce
mitigation subsystems that are calculated to be reliable at least 68.97% of the mission
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time or greater. This translates to only 3/4 of CUAS mitigation subsystems operating with
reliability at or above 68.97%. The standard deviation is 0.1307 and considered highwith the
probabilities more spread out from the mean of 0.7854. The model indicates the mitigation
subsystems would be up and operating at an average of 78.54% of the time. The data
spread is also reflected in the large IQR probability of 0.2058. In the data, it is assessed
that a probability value of (1.5 × IQR) more than the 75th quartile or (1.5 × IQR) less
than the 25th quartile is an outlier. Therefore, any probability values lower than 0.3810 are
considered outliers. There are outliers present below 0.3810 which is attributed to when
the number of 5 08;DA4B for the mitigation subsystems occur near or at the max value for
the course of their respective total mission time. This results in a low MTBF (represented
in hours) which means the mitigation subsystems failures are occurring closer together
in time. CUAS mitigation subsystems experiencing low MTBF show reduced reliability
probabilities. With 75% of the reliability probabilities below 0.8955, there is an indication
that a majority of mitigation subsystems 5 08;DA4Bwere moderate to high for their respective
mission times. This highlights that all mitigation subsystems of a CUAS must demonstrate
very low 5 08;DA4B or no 5 08;DA4B for the entire duration of the mission to maintain a
high probability of reliability. High probability of reliability in the mitigation subsystems
contributes to the overall effectiveness and reliability of the CUAS for operations against
current UAS threats. Discounting the outliers, the reliability probability would range from
probabilities of 0.3810 to 0.9788 indicating uncertainty in the reliability of the mitigation
subsystem. The differences between Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 is attributed to the minimum
and maximum values estimated for the number of 5 08;DA4B in the detection and mitigation
subsystem. It highlights the need for the number of 5 08;DA4B to be low as possible when
considering a CUAS.
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Figure 7.4. Mitigation Subsystem Reliability Histogram (Current).
Note: Scale 0-250 for number of simulations and 0-1.0 for reliability proba-
bility.











With the reliability of the individual subsystems calculated, they collectively formulate
the overall reliability of the CUAS defined in the model by Equation (7.2). The reliability
for CUAS varied between a minimum probability of 0.1691 and a maximum probability
of 0.9624 as seen in Table 7.5. The data is slightly skewed to the left with 75% of the
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probabilities above 0.5516 and the remaining 25% below 0.5516, see Figure 7.5. This
translates to only 3/4 of CUASs operating with a reliability at or above 55.16%. The standard
deviation is 0.1504 and considered high with the probabilities more spread out from the
mean of 0.6599. The model indicates the CUAS would be up and operating at an average of
65.99% of the time. The data spread is also reflected in the large IQR probability of 0.2275.
In the data, it is assessed that a probability value of (1.5× IQR) more than the 75th quartile
or (1.5 × IQR) less than the 25th quartile is an outlier. Therefore, any probability values
lower than 0.2104 are considered outliers. There are outliers present below the probability
of 0.2104 which is attributed to when the reliability probabilities for either the detection
or mitigation subsystems exhibit low probabilities because the number of 5 08;DA4B in the
respective system(s) is near or at a high value for the course of the total mission time. This
shows how the number of 5 08;DA4B each individual subsystem may experience affects the
overall reliability of the CUAS. When designing or selecting the detection and mitigation
subsystems for a CUAS, consideration should be given to each subsystem’s reliability for
the effects it could have on CUAS reliability.
Figure 7.5. CUAS Reliability Histogram (Current).
Note: Scale 0-200 for number of simulations and 0-1.0 for reliability proba-
bility.
141











Equation (7.5) defined the hypothetical probability of detection for CUAS which resulted
in probabilities varying between the minimum value of 0.5231 and maximum value of
0.9378 as seen in Table 7.6. Figure 7.6 indicates the distribution a fairly normal with 75%
of the probabilities above 0.6617 and the remaining 25% below 0.6617. This translates
to only 3/4 of CUASs operating with a probability of detection at or above 66.17%. The
standard deviation is 0.0780 and considered low with the probabilities less spread out
from the mean of 0.7200. The data spread is also reflected in the small IQR probability
of 0.1148. In the data, it is assessed that a probability value of (1.5 × IQR) more than
the 75th quartile or (1.5 × IQR) less than the 25th quartile is an outlier. Therefore, any
probability values greater than 0.9487 and lower 0.4895 are considered outliers. There are
no outliers present that could skew the data. The input values for Equation (7.5 were varied
to demonstrate the effects the factors of range, number of targets, and terrain can have on a
CUAS’s probability of detection against current UAS threats. In the data produced by the
simulations, the average hypothetical probability of detection was 0.7200 which equates to
72.00%. The model indicates that when the CUAS is operating, it has an average 72.00%
chance of detecting current UAS threats. Examining Figure 7.6 and Table 7.6, only 25% of
the hypothetical probabilities of detection occurred above 0.7765 which indicates a majority
of probabilities were at or lower than 0.7765 which equates to 77.65%. The data suggests
that to overcome these factors CUAS capabilities should consider designs or developments
that provide:
• high probability of detection at extended ranges.
• sensor placement taking into account threat axis and geometry for terrain.
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• high probability of detection for a high number of targets simultaneous targets.
Figure 7.6. CUAS Probability of Detection Histogram (Current).
Note: Scale 0-250 for number of simulations and .5-1.0 for probability of
detection.











Equation (7.8) defined the hypothetical probability ofmitigation for CUASwhich resulted
in probabilities varying between the minimum value of 0.4532 and maximum value of
0.8670 as seen in Table 7.7. Figure 7.7 indicates the distribution is fairly normal with 75%
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of the probabilities above 0.5938 and the remaining 25% below 0.5938. This translates to
only 3/4 of CUASs operating with a probability of mitigation at or above 59.38%. The
standard deviation is 0.0781 and considered low with the probabilities less spread out from
the mean of 0.6505. The data spread is also reflected in the small IQR probability of 0.1112.
In the data, it is assessed that a probability value of (1.5× IQR) more than the 75th quartile
or (1.5 × IQR) less than the 25th quartile is an outlier. Therefore, any probability values
greater than 0.8718 and lower 0.4270 are considered outliers. There are no outliers present
that could skew the data. The input values were varied to demonstrate the effects the factors
of range, number of targets, and terrain can have on a CUAS’s probability of mitigation
against current UAS threats. Additionally, the factors of range, number of targets, and terrain
weighed differently than in the detection subsystems to simulate the difference that could
be present in detection and mitigation subsystems. The data produced an average (mean)
probability of mitigation of 0.6505 which equates to 65.05%. The model indicates that
when the CUAS is operating, it has an average 65.05% chance of mitigating current UAS
threats. Examining Figure 7.7 and Table 7.7, only 25% of the hypothetical probabilities
of mitigation occurred above 0.7050 which indicates a majority of probabilities were at
or lower than 0.7050 which equates to 70.50%. It demonstrates how those factors affect a
CUAS’s probability of mitigation against current UAS threats. It cannot be expected that
successful detection equates to mitigation because range, number or targets, and terrain
dictate which mitigation technique is optimal for employment.
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Figure 7.7. CUAS Probability of Mitigation Histogram (Current).
Note: Scale 0-200 for number of simulations and 0.4-0.9 for probability of
detection.











With all components of Equation (7.1) calculated, the effectiveness of CUAS for the
simulations resulted in an approximately normal distribution as displayed in Figure 7.8.
The effectiveness probabilities varied between the minimum value of 0.0678 and maximum
value of 0.6573 as seen in Table 7.8. The standard deviation is 0.0869 and considered low
with the probabilities less spread out from the mean of 0.3090. The data spread is also
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reflected in the small IQR probability of 0.1220. Calculating for outliers, any probability
values greater than 0.5503 and lower 0.0623 are considered outliers. There are outliers
present above 0.5503. The model produced an average effectiveness against current UAS
threats of 30.90%. The highest observed effectiveness was 65.73% but could be viewed as
a rare occurrence. Only 25% of the calculated effectiveness occurred above 0.3673. This
demonstrates that when the probabilities for reliability, detection, and mitigation are not
at optimal levels, they directly affect a CUAS’s overall effectiveness against current UAS
threats.
Figure 7.8. CUAS Effectiveness Histogram (Current).
Note: Scale 0-275 for number of simulations and 0-0.7 for effectiveness prob-
ability.
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The model indicates that CUAS reliability, probability of detection, probability of mitiga-
tion, range, targets, and terrain all are significant factors in calculating the effectiveness of a
CUAS.With the conservative values in the model, effectiveness as defined by the model was
relatively low. When considering interoperability in future system, addressing the shortfalls
and establishing a foundation as discussed in Section 6.4 should be done with respect to the
effects they could have on effectiveness of the CUAS.
7.4 Effectiveness Against Emerging UAS Threats
A 5% conservative reduction in %*( (4C42C) and %*( ("8C80C4) along with the adjust-
ments to C0A4CB02C>A and C0A4CB02C>A" are reflected in Table 7.2 assumptions. All
other factors remain the same. The reduction and adjustments is to account for technological
advances (discussed in Section 6.3) that are expected to be present in emerging UAS threats.
The reliability for detection subsystems varied between a minimum probability of 0.3316
and a maximum probability of 0.9985 as seen in Table 7.9. The histogram from Figure
7.9 is skewed to the left with 75% of the probabilities above 0.7559 and the remaining
25% below 0.7559. This translates to only 3/4 of CUAS detection subsystems operating
with reliability at or above 75.59%. The standard deviation is 0.1300 and considered high
with the probabilities more spread out from the mean of 0.8471. The model indicates the
detection subsystems would be up and operating at an average of 84.71% of the time. The
data spread is also reflected in the large IQR probability of 0.2028. Any probability values
lower than 0.4517 are considered outliers. There are outliers present below the probability
of 0.4517 which is attributed to when the number 5 08;DA4B for the detection subsystems
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are near or at the max value for the course of their respective total mission time. Similar
to the discussion in Section 7.3, this results in a low MTBF (represented in hours) which
means the detection subsystem failures are occurring closer together in time. CUAS de-
tection subsystems experiencing low MTBF show reduced reliability probabilities. This
highlights that all detection subsystems of a CUAS must demonstrate very low number of
5 08;DA4B or no number of 5 08;DA4B for the entire duration of the mission to maintain high
probability of reliability. High probability of reliability in detection subsystems contributes
to the overall effectiveness and reliability of the CUAS for operations against emerging
UAS threats. Discounting the outliers, the reliability probability would range from 0.4517
to 0.9985 indicating uncertainty in the reliability of the detection subsystem. Detection
subsystems exhibiting a high number of 5 08;DA4B in future CUAS will negatively impact
the CUAS’s ability to apply detection techniques discussed in Table 6.1 thus reducing the
CUAS’s effectiveness and reliability.
Figure 7.9. Detection Subsystem Reliability Histogram (Emerging).
Note: Scale 0-600 for number of simulations and 0.25-0.1 for reliability prob-
ability.
The summary statistics in Table 7.9 show the central tendency and spread of the reliability
probabilities for the detection subsystem in the model updated for emerging UAS threats.
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The reliability probabilities of the detection subsystem remained relatively the same which
it attributed to no changes made for the minimum and maximum input values for number
of 5 08;DA4B and C represented in hours in Table 7.2 for the detection subsystem.











The reliability for the mitigation subsystem varied between the minimum probability of
0.2947 and maximum probability 0.9791 as displayed in Table 7.10. The data is skewed to
the left with 75% of the probabilities above 0.6879 and the remaining 25% below 0.6879,
see Figure 7.9. This translates to only 3/4 of CUAS mitigation subsystems operating with
reliability at or above 68.79%. The standard deviation is 0.1311 and considered highwith the
probabilities more spread out from the mean of 0.7845. The model indicates the mitigation
subsystems would be up and operating at an average of 78.45% of the time. The data
spread is also reflected in the large IQR probability of 0.2081. Any probability values
lower than 0.3758 are considered outliers. There are outliers present below 0.3758 which
is attributed to when the number of 5 08;DA4B for the mitigation subsystems occur near
or at the max value for the course of their respective total mission time. Similar to the
discussion in Section 7.3, this results in a low MTBF (represented in hours) which means
the detection subsystem failures are occurring closer together in time. This highlights that
all mitigation subsystems of a CUAS must demonstrate very low number of 5 08;DA4B or
no number of 5 08;DA4B for the entire duration of the mission to maintain high probability
of reliability. High probability of reliability in mitigation subsystems contributes to the
overall effectiveness and reliability of the CUAS for operations against emerging UAS
threats. Discounting the outliers, the reliability probability would range from 0.3758 to
0.9791 indicating uncertainty in the reliability of the mitigation subsystem. The differences
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between Figure 7.9 and Figure 7.10 is attributed to the minimum and maximum values
estimated for the number of 5 08;DA4B in the detection and mitigation subsystem. This
highlights the need for the number 5 08;DA4B to be low as possible when considering a
CUAS. Mitigation subsystems exhibiting a high number of 5 08;DA4B in future CUAS will
negatively impact the CUAS’s ability to provide kinetic or non-kinetic mitigation effects
thus reducing the CUAS’s effectiveness and reliability.
Figure 7.10. Mitigation Subsystem Reliability Histogram (Emerging).
Note: Scale 0-250 for number of simulations and 0.32-1.0 for reliability prob-
ability.
The summary statistics in Table 7.10 show the central tendency and spread of the reliability
probabilities for the mitigation subsystem in the model. The reliability probabilities of the
mitigation subsystem remained relatively the same which it attributed to no changes made
for the minimum and maximum input values for number of 5 08;DA4B and C represented in
hours in Table 7.2 for the mitigation subsystem.
150











With the reliability of the individual subsystems calculated for emerging UAS threats, they
collectively formulate the overall reliability of the CUAS defined in the model by Equation
(7.2). The reliability for CUAS varied between a minimum probability of 0.1936 and a
maximum probability of 0.9657 shown in Table 7.11. The data is skewed to the left with
75% of the probabilities above 0.5491 and the remaining 25% below 0.5491, see Figure
7.11. This translates to only 3/4 of CUASs operating with a reliability at or above 54.91%.
The standard deviation is 0.1496 and considered high with the probabilities more spread
out from the mean of 0.6575. The model indicates the CUAS would be up and operating
at an average of 65.75% of the time. The data spread is also reflected in the large IQR
probability of 0.2276. Any probability values lower than 0.2077 are considered outliers.
There are outliers present below the probability of 0.2077 which is attributed to when
the reliability probabilities for either the detection or mitigation subsystems exhibit low
probabilities because the number of 5 08;DA4B in the respective system(s) is near or at a high
value for the course of the total mission time. This shows how the number of 5 08;DA4B each
individual subsystem may experience affects the overall reliability of the CUAS. The model
assumptions input values for 5 08;DA4B, 4, and C in Table 7.2 is kept the same to reflect current
CUAS with no improvements added. This is to focus on how emerging threats affect the
detection and mitigation subsystems with respect to probability of detection and probability
of mitigation. Therefore, it is expected that system reliability for a CUAS when dealing with
emerging UAS threats would remain relatively the same in the absence of improvements
designed to reduce the occurrence of 5 08;DA4B in the CUAS.
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Figure 7.11. CUAS Reliability Histogram (Emerging).
Note: Scale 0-215 for number of simulations and 0.1-1.0 for reliability prob-
ability.
The summary statistics in Table 7.11 show the central tendency and spread of the reliability
probabilities for the CUAS in the model. No significant changes observed when compared
to Table 7.3.











Equation (7.5) defined the hypothetical probability of detection forCUAS.The component
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of %*( (4C42C) in Equation (7.5) was reduced by 5% for each range which affected the
overall probability of detection against emerging UAS threat. The probabilities of detection
varied between theminimum value of 0.3613 andmaximum value of 0.6713 as seen in Table
7.12. Figure 7.12 indicates the distribution is fairly normal with 75% of the probabilities
above 0.4634 and the remaining 25% below 0.4634. This translates to only 3/4 of CUASs
operating with a probability of detection at or above 46.34%. The standard deviation is
0.0603 and considered low with the probabilities less spread out from the mean of 0.5098.
The data spread is also reflected in the small IQR probability of 0.0923. Any probability
values greater than 0.6942 and lower than 0.3249 are considered outliers. There are no
outliers present that could skew the data. The input values for Equation 7.5 were varied
to demonstrate the effects the factors of range, number of targets, and terrain can have on
a CUAS’s probability of detection against emerging UAS threats. In the data produced by
the simulations, the average hypothetical probability of detection was 0.5098. The model
indicates that when the CUAS is operating, it has an average 50.98% change of detecting
emerging UAS threats. The 50.98% average is a 21.02 percentage point reduction from
what was observed in the hypothetical probability of detection for current UAS threats. It
demonstrates that a reduction in detection capabilities is compounded by the effects range,
number of targets, and terrain for emerging UAS threats. To address potential reductions in
detection capabilities that could be present in emerging UAS threats, CUASs developments
should consider detection subsystems with techniques identified in Table 6.1 that provide
high probability of detection against emerging UAS threats operating with a high level
automation (Table 6.4 Levels 3 and above) and certain types of collaboration (Table 6.5
Types 2, 3, and 4) leveraging command and control discussed in Section 4.4.
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Figure 7.12. CUAS Probability of Detection Histogram (Emerging).
Note: Scale 0-225 for number of simulations and 0.32-0.70 for probability of
detection.
The summary statistics in Table 7.12 show the central tendency and spread of the probability
of detection for the CUAS with the changes observed from the reduction in capability.











Equation (7.8) defined the hypothetical probability of mitigation for CUAS. The compo-
nent of %*( ("8C80C4) in Equation (7.8) was reduced by 5% for each range as well. The
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reduction affected the overall probability of mitigation against emerging UAS threat. The
C0A4CB(|48ℎC" ) component in Equation (7.9) was adjusted to show a 15-30% effect on the
hypothetical probability of mitigation from the number of simultaneous UAS targets. The
probabilities of mitigation varied between the minimum value of 0.3186 and maximum
value of 0.6281 as seen in Table 7.13. Figure 7.13 indicates the distribution is fairly normal
with 75% of the probabilities above 0.4207 and the remaining 25% below 0.4207. This
translates to only 3/4 of CUASs operating with a probability of mitigation at or above
42.07%. The standard deviation is 0.0557 and considered low with the probabilities are less
spread out from the mean of 0.4622. The data spread is also reflected in the small IQR
probability of 0.0799. Any probability values greater than 0.6209 and lower 0.3009 are
considered outliers. There are outliers present above 0.6209. The input values for Equation
7.8 were varied to demonstrate the effects the factors of range, number of targets, and terrain
can have on a CUAS’s probability of mitigation against emerging UAS threats. Additionally,
the factors of range, number of targets, and terrain weighed differently than in the detection
subsystems to simulate the difference that could be present in detection and mitigation
subsystems for emerging UAS threats just as it was done for current UAS threats. In the
data produced by the simulations, the average hypothetical probability of mitigation was
0.4622. The model indicates that when the CUAS is operating, it has an average 46.22%
chance of mitigating emerging UAS threats. The 46.22% average is a 18.83 percentage point
reduction from what was observed in the hypothetical probability of mitigation for current
UAS threats. As seen with the detection subsystems, it demonstrates that a reduction in
mitigation capabilities is compounded by the effects range, number of targets, and terrain
for emerging UAS threats. To address potential reductions in mitigation capabilities CUASs
development should consider mitigation subsystems with techniques identified in Table 6.2
that provide high probability of mitigation against emerging UAS threats operating with a
high level automation, collaboration, and advance command and control.
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Figure 7.13. CUAS Probability of Mitigation Histogram (Emerging).
Note: Scale 0-225 for number of simulations and 0.30-0.70 for probability of
mitigation.
The summary statistics in Table 7.13 show the central tendency and spread of the probability
of mitigation for the CUAS in the model with the changes observed from the reduction in
capability.











With all components of Equation (7.1) calculated for emerging UAS threats, the effec-
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tiveness of CUAS for the simulations resulted in an approximately normal distribution as
displayed in Figure 7.14. The effectiveness probabilities varied between the minimum value
of 0.0341 and maximum value of 0.3296 as seen in Table 7.14. The standard deviation is
0.0446 and considered low with the probabilities less spread out from the mean of 0.1549.
The data spread is also reflected in the small IQR probability of 0.0624. Any probability
values greater than 0.2782 and lower 0.0286 are considered outliers. There are outliers
present above 0.2782. The model produced an average effectiveness against emerging UAS
threats of 15.49%. The highest observed effectiveness was 32.96% but could be viewed as
a rare occurrence. Only 25% of the calculated effectiveness occurred above 0.1846 which
indicates a majority of calculated effectiveness were at or lower than 18.46%. This demon-
strates that when the probabilities for reliability, detection and mitigation are not at optimal
levels, they directly affect a CUAS’s overall effectiveness against emerging UAS threats.
Figure 7.14. CUAS Effectiveness Histogram (Emerging).
Note: Scale 0-300 for number of simulations and 0-0.65 for effectiveness
probability
Table 7.14 show the central tendency and spread of the effectiveness CUAS as defined by
the model with the changes for emerging UAS threats.
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The model indicates that CUAS reliability, probability of detection, probability of mitiga-
tion, range, targets, and terrain all are significant factors in calculating the effectiveness of a
CUAS. Table 7.15 provides a side-by-side comparison of the differences observed in the sim-
ulations from the significant factors. With a conservative 5% reduction of (%*( (4C42C)
and %*( ("8C80C4) ), the model demonstrated how probability of detection and probability
of mitigation would be affected which subsequently reduced the effectiveness of the CUAS
against emerging UAS threats. Future interoperability should take into account the factors
identified in the model to increase effectiveness, address shortfalls, and balance the trade-off
between effectiveness and interoperability. Interoperability should not come at the cost of
effectiveness against emerging UAS threats.
Table 7.15. Comparison of Model Results based on a 5% estimated reduction
and C0A4CB02C>A adjustments in the hypothetical probability of detection
and hypothetical probability of mitigation.
CUAS vs. Current UAS threats CUAS vs. Emerging UAS threats
Reliability ('(*() ) 65.99% 65.75%
Probability of Detection (%> 5 (*() ) 72.00% 50.98%
Probability of Mitigation (%> 5 "(*() ) 65.05% 46.22%
Effectiveness ((*() ) 30.90% 15.49%
The rationale for a 5% reduction and C0A4CB02C>A adjustments for detection and
mitigation capabilities was to be conservative and demonstrate that even with a small
degradation in capabilities, effectiveness would be reduced against emerging UAS threats.
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It is expected that emergingUAS threats effects on detection andmitigation probabilitieswill
be greater than 5% which would result in even lower effectiveness percentages. We assess
current CUASs are not adequately effective and future CUAS will be inherently inadequate
if improvements are not made to increase effectiveness and implement interoperability.
7.5 Summary
This chapter provides a foundational level of research to support the arguments for USN and
USMCCUAS effectiveness against current and emergent UAS threats in a generic operating
environment, as identified in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The values used to support our calculations
and generic models in Sections 7.3 and 7.4 are intentionally hypothetical in nature to
obfuscate the classified values associated with the currently employed USN and USMC
CUASs. Further, these values should be tailored to the reader’s specific CUAS to support a
real-world application of CUAS effectiveness assessment in a classified environment. ,aility
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CHAPTER 8:
CUAS Legal Limitations in Each Area of
Responsibility
This chapter discusses the legal constraints associated with the use of CUAS capabilities
in each AOR. We define the existing legal restraints associated with RF capabilities in
continent of the united states (CONUS) and OCONUS, followed by the lack of U.S. or
internationally recognized policies to combat adversarial UASs with emergent CUAS ca-
pabilities. We further demonstrate the lack of USN and USMC doctrine associated with
monitoring the effectiveness and suitability of CUAS employment in an AOR. We lastly
provide recommendations to support the monitoring, predictive analysis, and assessment of
CUAS capabilities with existing spectrum analysis tools.
8.1 CounterUnmannedAerial SystemsEmploymentFrame-
work
Currently, there exists no international standard or regulation governing the acquisition and
operational employment of both UAS and CUAS equities and their associated or underlying
capabilities. However, as product availability proliferates throughout the commercial and
contractual environments, the ability to procure acUAS and CUAS COTS and aftermarket
capabilities becomes increasingly availablewithmodifications and variances. This challenge
is exacerbated by the exponential growth of the technologically inclines UAS industry, and
its reactive CUAS counterpart.
As delineated in Chapter 3, UAS and CUAS capabilities, TTPs, and modifications are
subject to the technological feasibility of the host nation and its subsidiary civil infrastruc-
ture. Not only is the ability to regulate UAS use in a contested and congested operational
environment dependent upon the subjective rules and authorities of the nation they are
operated in, the ability to adequately leverage a CUAS capability and properly exercise the
elements of a proposed CUAS kill chain is also heavily reliant upon the legal infrastructure
of the associated AOR and host nation. Furthermore, the inherent legal restraints of the
hosting government are compounded by the U.S.’s armed forces agreements, internation-
161
ally recognized treaties, and international recognized standards for a region of interest.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea supports the framework associated
with territorial land ascribed to a country from their geographic land mass to the open
oceans [168]. Country bilateral agreements address the negotiations entered in between two
or more countries addressing the level of efforts for support, basing, staging of forces, and
use of force in host nations [169]. These standards are also intertwined with the current rules
of engagement associated with the regions’ previous, current, and projected levels of hos-
tility and endangerment towards civilians and military affiliated personnel. To understand
these aforementioned elements is to better understand what means of CUAS is best lever-
aged to protect against UAS threats to USN and USMC installations and forward deployed
elements. This chapter therefore addresses legal limitations according to the considerations
in each AOR.
8.2 Overview Of CUAS Legal Implications In The Conti-
nent Of The United States
Within the CONUS region, UAS and CUAS capabilities are constrained to the rules and
regulations set in place by state and federal agencies designed to protect civilian and
military infrastructure. The material in Section 8.2 covers the application laws as they
pertain to local U.S. laws and associated law enforcement. Per the 4th Amendment and
Federal Communications Commissions, electronic surveillance and the use of electronic
techniques within the U.S. that could result in unintentional EMI or jamming is prohibited
for recreational use by official government personnel. Further, the employment of exercising
of capabilities that could unintentionally cause EMI or jamming in the EMImay only be used
by federal and state agencies and affiliated personnel after the attainment of the appropriate
legal considerations [170], [171].
8.2.1 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), electronic surveillance is the non-
consensual gathering and attainment of electronic or wire communications from an original
source by means of surveillance capabilities and technologies, where that source has the
entitlement to privacy [172]. “The contents of a communication consists of any information
concerning the identity of the parties, or the existence, substance, purport, or meaning of
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the communication” [172]. Examples of electronic surveillance in this regard include the
use of sensors and radio frequency to detect signals of interest emanating from a UAS. The
first step within the CUAS kill chain is to detect active UASs within a proximity of interest
pertaining to the CUAS capability and asset or assets to be protected. Detection implies the
threat UAS is within the range of the CUAS sensing capabilities, and therefore within range
to pose a discernible threat to the underling military infrastructure. The ability to detect
can encompass one or many of the following as outlined in Table 6.1: the use of active
and passive radar, radio frequency libraries, electro optical sensing, infrared sensing, and
acoustic sensing.
8.2.2 Wiretap Act
In the U.S., the use of CUAS detection means such as radar to intercept electronic communi-
cations, including telemetric data, spatial and temporal information, and associated source,
destination, and operator details is considered a direct violation of the Wiretap Act [173].
Often referred to as Title I of the Electronic Communication Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986,
the Wiretap Act prohibits the intentional or attempted interception and procurement of any
other person and their associated equities via wire, verbal, or electronic means [173]. How-
ever, Title I “provides exceptions for operators and service providers for uses in the normal
course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to
the rendition of his service and for persons authorized by law to intercept wire, oral, or
electronic communications or to conduct electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101
of the FISA of 1978” [173]. As written, section 101 of the FISA of 1978 empowers Federal,
State, and other government servants the authority to exercise the use of capabilities that
allow the interception of UAS communication necessary for accomplishing the detection
phase of the CUAS kill chain, only after the requisite approvals.
8.2.3 Stored Communications Act
The second and third steps in the CUAS kill chain are to locate/track and classify/identify. To
locate and track require the CUAS capability and operator to discern the activity of a UAS
in any geographic area of interest. To classify and identify require the CUAS capability and
operator to discern the UAS from the ambiguity of the operational environment and other
UASs. These steps are accomplished through the successful implementation of the detection
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phase, followed by the storage of the collected information for processing, discernment, and
subsequent cataloging of the information for future and more expedited use. The Stored
Communications Act, also referred to as Title II of the ECPA of 1986, protects against
the privacy of the data and records stored by and about the commercial service providers,
to include their name, serial number, model, and internet protocol address [173]. Further-
more, the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. constitution protects the rights of U.S. citizens
and their private data from unreasonable searches and seizures without prior coordination
and suspected probable cause. However, this is waivable under the U.S. FREEDOM Act,
also referred to as the ’Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and En-
suring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring’ Act [174]. The FREEDOM Act superseded
the Patriot Act in 2015, and modifies aspects of laws governing the requisition and col-
lection of electronic communication, including the previously mentioned ECPA and FISA.
The FREEDOM Act maintains the broadening of the authority for Federal and state law
enforcement entities to combat adversarial use of nefarious activities through electronic
surveillance on suspected U.S. persons that are affiliated with terrorist or violent extremist
organizations.
8.2.4 Computer Fraud And Abuse Act
The use of cyberattack, spoofing, or directed energy are all active capabilities for a CUAS
to usurp, degrade, or destroy an adversarial UAS upon detection, location, tracking, and
classification. However, these means are all identified as forms of action that can induce
considerable harm and erroneous consequences in the civilian and military domains and
are therefore heavily guarded with legal action and ramification. The use of cyberattack
to exploit and spoof a C2 RF link between the UAS and its operator could be potentially
prosecuted under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act [55]. The Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act is intended to address hacking and serves as an amendment to the originally enacted
Federal Computer Law. This act prohibits intentionally accessing the computer of a U.S.
citizen without the proper and requisite legal oversight and authorization. However, this
too is waivable with the FREEDOM Act, allowing Federal and state agencies to prosecute
suspected malign individuals while in the pursuit of protecting U.S. assets, persons, and
equities. Moreover, if a UAS link between the UAS and its operators is intercepted and
spoofed, and that spoofing results in the commandeering of the original link, then the
spoofing entity must possess a remote certificate to pilot the vehicle in accordance with
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the FAA. This certification ensures the protection of all civilian and military assets either
airborne or on the ground from uncertain circumstances that could arise from a UAS that
has been commandeered by Federal and state authorities for the purposes of protection.
8.2.5 Directed Energy Weapon Review And Approval Process
The use of electronic attack means through emissions quantifies as directed energy, and
therefore must undergo rigorous oversight and approval to meet deconfliction for civilian
and military aerial operations. This process is formalized as the DEWRAP, and oversight is
exercised in the Office Under the Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for installation and authority
to operate. The DEWRAP instantiates the CUAS capability’s range, power output, intended
use, and the service component intending to operate it. It further defines the required
means to ensure deconfliction with any surrounding infrastructure impacting safety of flight
and transportation. The DEWRAP is contained in DOD Instruction 5000.69, and must be
consistent with the DOD Directive 5134.01 for advanced research project acquisition [53].
The fifth step of the CUAS kill chain encompasses mitigation measures to either kinetically
or non-kinetically neutralize the adversarial UAS platform as a threat and is subject to all
the previously mentioned constraints unless otherwise deconflicted and coordinated with
the federal government and law enforcement.
8.3 Overview Of CUAS Legal Implications Outside The
Continent of the United States
OCONUS, the use of military capabilities and subsequent force is not as restrained as
in the CONUS. Further, the use of military application, as will be presented in Sections
8.3 and 8.4 pertains to military application only. The legal discussion OCONUS for CUAS
employment is primarily attributed to the UAS targets of interest, their history of proprietary
employment, and their subsidiary armaments and components leveraged in varying AORss.
Furthermore, UASs and their associated operators are often not considered U.S. citizens
or property of the U.S. when operating and prosecuting targets OCONUS. Therefore, they
are not protected by the U.S. 4th Amendment, the ECPA, or any supporting or inherent
legally recognized constrictions [170]. Furthermore, the U.S. FREEDOM Act, supports
the deterrent and punishment of violent extremist organizations’ acts in and outside of the
U.S. [174]. This act and subsequent legislation supports federal law enforcement entities in
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their abilities to identify, deter, degrade, disrupt, dissuade, and prevent terrorist activities
and facilitation by also encouraging U.S. and foreign law enforcement entities and financial
institutions to coordinate and share information where possible. As expected, this act allows
agencies and organizations such as theDrug EnforcementAgency (DEA), CIA, andNational
Security Agency (NSA) to coordinate and operate under mutual jurisdiction with foreign
U.S. partnering countries and their associated agencies for the successful identification and
prosecution of nefarious activities. Some additional purposes empowered by the legacy
Patriot Act of 2001 and its successor, the FREEDOM Act, are as follows:
• To strengthen U.S. measures to prevent, detect and prosecute international
money laundering and financing of terrorism;
• To subject to special scrutiny foreign jurisdictions, foreign financial insti-
tutions, and classes of international transactions or types of accounts that
are susceptible to criminal abuse;
• To require all appropriate elements of the financial services industry to
report potential money laundering;
• To strengthen measures to prevent use of the U.S. financial system for
personal gain by corrupt foreign officials and facilitate repatriation of
stolen assets to the citizens of countries to whom such assets belong. [175]
The FREEDOM Act encourages the interoperability of efforts, assets, and personnel
between and within the DOD [174]. The FREEDOM Act further empowers the DOD with
the requisite abilities and legal framework to track information pertaining to the purchase of
hardware and software that could be used in nefarious manners [174]. This tracking, similar
to the UAS DRIP requirement, can be used to support CUAS capabilities by cataloguing
and incorporating findings into the associated CUAS libraries to better categorize UASs.
This categorization can improve the ability to detect and classify threat UASs.
8.3.1 Rules of Engagement
In addition to the privileges afforded to the U.S. Federal government and its affiliated enti-
ties regarding the use of cyberattack and directed energy means to deter adversarial actions
in the operational environment, the DOD is also governed by rules of engagement (ROE)
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when operating OCONUS [176]. Per Joint Publication 1-02 ‘Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms’, ROE are the authoritative rules and regulations issued and enforced by
military authorities that demonstrate when and how U.S. forces can and will initiate or con-
tinue combatant operations with encountered adversarial forces. ROE provides commanders
with the requisite tools to regulate their employment of force with the preponderance of
equities under their command [176]. The inherent abilities to exercise these DOD equities
are provided by subsidiary treaties, foreign policies, international norms, and rules of law. A
Judge Advocate (JA) assists in this endeavor as a legal advisor to the commander to support
appropriate decision making for the use of force and escalation where required. However,
commanders bear ultimate responsibility for the use of force.
ROE are set in place by the Theater and/or Geographic Combatant Commander after
successful coordination, deconfliction, and integration with the host nations associated
within that AOR. Further, to ensure ROE are reflective of the host nations’ civil and
governmental authorities, U.S. embassies and consulates serve as liaisons between U.S.
DOD and host nation officials. Specifically, Chiefs of Mission, Chiefs of Station, Senior
Defense Officials, and Defense Attaches serve in this capacity as liaison between both
parties. This is done to ensure ROE remains versatile to the environment it is applied in,
understandable to the operators regardless of operational background and pedigree, and
tactically attainable to ensure both operators and JAs are uniformly aware and capable of
executing operational requirements and authorities within the scope of legal and ethical
ramifications given the operational circumstances and current events. ROE are therein
intended to fulfil the purposes of providing guidance from the U.S. President, Secretary of
Defense, and subordinate Combatant Commanders to military deployed elements pertaining
to the use of force. They further serve as a decision point for when an interaction between
opposing forces is in a transitory position from peacetime to wartime and support associated
planning.
8.3.1.1 Rules Of Engagement And CUAS
Holistically, ROEprovide a framework politically in support of national security,militarily in
support of the aforementioned operational planning, and legally in support of U.S. domestic
and international law. Politically, ROE ensures that U.S. national strategic policies and
objectives are reflective of our actions and ideals both domestically and abroad. Additionally,
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it protects the image and assertion of the U.S. as a global participant for fair and equal
treatment for any country’s constituents. By doing so, ROE may restrict the use of certain
capabilities within a host nation or AOR writ large, such as the employment of directed
energy, electronic attack, or cyberattack capabilities.
The C2 specifications of the varying UAS operations indicated in Chapter 4, associated
with the disparity of UAS methods of employment indicated in Chapter 5 necessitate the
need for clear and concise ROE dictating the methods of CUAS to be employed to protect
USN and USMC equities domestically and abroad. ROE can set, establish, or reinforce a
precedent for the use of specific CUAS capabilities in an AOR. These capabilities, based on
established norms, EM deconfliction, and host nation allowance could range from the use
of kinetic projectiles to the employment of directed energy. ROE therein would provide the
legal framework necessary to conduct succinct operations for CUAS.
8.3.2 Supplemental Rules For The Use Of Force
ROE and the associated details for the supplemental rules for the use of force (SRUF)
delineate the appropriate legalities associated with military operational capabilities within
an AOR and host nation [176]. Similar to ROE, SRUF apply to both civil support missions
and homeland defense operations for all U.S. owned and leased territories, both ashore
and abroad. Furthermore, SRUF provides the basic statements of posture and response for
self-defense associated with peacetime and wartime operations in the associated areas of
operations. Both ROE and RUF are set by the SecDef, and delegated to theater commanders
for oversight and executions.
8.3.2.1 Supplemental Rules For The Use of Force And CUAS
SRUF serves as the associated right to use specific force as a deterrent, self-defense, and
to initiate offensive [176]. SRUF arms the tactician with the legal boundaries they are
to operate in for combat and non-combat operations. It further provides the appropriate
tripwire steps associated with the allowance for the escalation in force during combat and
non-combat operations and AORs. SRUF can therefore assist the CUAS operator with the
proactive knowledge of when specific CUAS capabilities may be leveraged against a UAS
threat to meet mission requirements.
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8.4 CUAS Legal Implications in each Geographic Area of
Responsibility
Theater commanders in conjunction with Chiefs of Mission, Chiefs of Stations, Defense
Attachés, and country teams coordinate with Host Nations to ensure the adequate rule of
law and military operations are executed in a manner consistent with both U.S. and host
nation’s policies and procedures. From this cooperation, a multinational force (MNF) ROE
or a combined ROE (CROE) is either produced and executed, or the U.S. remains consistent
with the existing ROE for the region [176].
Multinational ROE becomes relevant when conducting operations aboard in host nations
out of U.S. forward operating bases and territories, or when theU.S. is conducting operations
with Coalition partners as part of a greater MNF. MNF ROE only takes precedence however
when authorized and stated by the SecDef; otherwise, U.S. ROE stands. However, the U.S. is
always entitled to the inherent right of unit self-defense should any hostile intent or hostile act
befall our territories or equities. Furthermore, CUAS OPORDs delegate the approval from
the SecDef to theater commanders to leverage and utilize non-kinetic CUAS capabilities to
deter and degrade Group 1 through 3 UASs to protect U.S. personnel and facilities. Within
the CONUS, it leverages deconfliction with the FAA via OPNAV for the USN and USMC.
OPNAV deconfliction provides the necessary protections against interference with critical
and key civilian infrastructure.
Additionally, classified supplemental rules of engagement (SROE) further empower The-
ater Commanders to engage adversarial UASs in CONUS and OCONUS for the protection
of U.S. equities. Such empowerment allows theater and subordinate unit commanders to
leverage CUAS against Groups 1 through 3 UASs as necessary to prevent the potential harm
to U.S. personnel or infrastructure, without the potential of political blowback following
engagement.
With the aforementioned authorities and privileges, USN and USMC commanders are
emboldened to leverage existing CUAS technologies against UASs that are non-responsive
to queries, or determined to demonstrate hostile intent or action regardless of the area’s
designation as being peaceful, an area of armed conflict, or wartime. However, these same
commanders are still confronted with the truths of our current circumstances. Depending on
the AOR and corresponding host nation, certain neutralizationmeans of existing U.S. CUAS
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capabilities are not permitted to be used for fear or potential of unforeseen consequences to
the surrounding civilian infrastructure.
8.4.1 Africa Command
Within AFRICOM, the U.S. maintains only one fixed presence in the country of Djibouti.
Djibouti houses Naval Expeditionary Base Camp Lemonnier, established by formal agree-
ment in 2003, located next to the Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport [177]. Camp
Lemonnier houses the U.S. military’s Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-
HOA), which serves as a means of deterring, degrading, and neutralizing VEO threats
within the AOR, emboldening supporting countries’ civilian and military infrastructures,
and building partner relations through combined exercises. Further, Djibouti’s location pro-
vides strategic access and influence to the Horn of Africa and Bab el Mandeb, enabling
U.S. led security, regional stability, and humanitarian efforts throughout the AFRICOM and
CENTCOM AORs.
8.4.1.1 Africa Command Weapons Employment in Host Nations
The Djiboutian government is supportive of the U.S.’s presence and interests, as demon-
strated in the bilateral agreement between the two countries allowing for the U.S. to access
Djibouti’s port facilities and airport in support of U.S. civil-military operations [178].
Djibouti also houses the first overseas military base operated by China and its People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) [178]. In light of this, the precedence of employing elec-
tronic attack weaponry within the AFRICOM AOR and specifically in Djibouti was set by
the Chinese military when the first Notice to Airmen was disseminated between April 14th
2018 to June 14th 2018 in preparation for China’s directed energy weapon testing in the
Djiboutian port [178].
As the presence of affluent countries increases within Djibouti, so does Djibouti’s so-
cioeconomic infrastructure and the potential for adverse collateral effects due to cyber- and
electronic attack. Although Djibouti is still considered a developing country, there exist
broadening civil-military infrastructure that must be considered when using active means
of CUAS capabilities within the host nation. Urban sprawl and associated renovation initia-
tives are improving the communication and transportation infrastructures. Transportation
upgrades include new railways, maritime ports, airports, and power plants [179]. Therefore,
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use of active CUAS means encompassing electronic- or cyberattacks must consider adverse
ramifications against the expanding Djiboutian infrastructure, as well as the potential for
meeting criteria for war against adversaries that are operating in the country as well.
8.4.2 Central Command
Within CENTCOM, the U.S. maintains and operates several bases of strategic location and
position to support its initiatives for freedom of navigation, continuity of seas, safety of com-
merce, suppression of malignant Iranian influence as well as that of its surrogates/proxies,
and building relations to promote regional stability. Figure 8.1 depicts the plethora of
operating locations leveraged by the U.S. within the CENTCOM AOR [180].
Figure 8.1. U.S. Naval Facilities in CENTCOM AOR. Adapted from: [180].
The U.S. houses the service elements to CENTCOM in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and
the United Arab Emirates. Bahrain is host to U.S. Naval Forces Central (NAVCENT) and
elements of the U.S. Marine Forces Central (MARCENT), referred to as the 5th MEB and
it forward deployed Command Task Force (CTF) 51/5. Kuwait is host to elements of U.S.
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Army Forces Central (ARCENT) and serves as a Joint Mail Terminal for large operations
and supporting equipment entering the CENTCOM AOR. Both Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates host elements of the U.S. acAFCENT between Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and
Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates. The U.S. maintains close diplomatic and
operational ties with the aforementioned countries as part of the GCC, which serves as a
socioeconomic and sociopolitical union of Arab states bordering the Arabian Gulf. The
U.S.’s bilateral relation to the countries within the GCC, and it diplomatic ties to the GCC
reiterate and corroborate its strategic focuses of maritime security, regional defense, non-
proliferation, free trade, law enforcement against piracy and smuggling operations, energy
policies, and cultural exchanges/partnerships [181].
8.4.2.1 Central Command Weapons Employment In Host Nations
There exist increased potential for unintended consequences on third party territories when
exercising activeRF capabilities inCENTCOM.Although theU.S. successfully collaborated
with the previously mentioned countries as target audiences to the use and employment
of directed energy aboard the USS PONCE between 2014 to 2017, the amphibious dock
landing ship only performed directed energy engagements while operating in internationally
recognized waters, 12 nautical miles outside the territory of any neighboring countries [50].
Further, the USS PONCE acknowledged operation of its LaWS only in widely publicized
and heavily planned exercises, and never against actual UAS threats it encountered during
choke point transits observed in Bab el Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, the use
of directed energy in the CENTCOM theater, inside the territories of host nations has been
met with uncertainty.
The use of UASs by anything other than governmental features and entities is strictly
forbidden in GCC countries [182]. As such, any use of associated CUAS that leveraged
active means of neutralizing a hostile UAS was considered exaggerated and necessitated the
requisite program indoctrination and familiarization with host nation leadership and law
enforcement, including foreignmilitary sales. From a domestic perspective, the employment
of the USS PONCE’s LaWS commenced what is referred to as the DEWRAP, which
is a review and approval process for a theater to operate high energy weaponry within
an AOR [53]. This process is approved by the office of the SecDef, and is intended to
oversee and ensure host nation civil-military equities are protected and the electronic attack
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capability possessing high energy capabilities is operated in manner that prevents fratricide
to host nation infrastructure. The DEWRAP further ensures host nation entities’ equities
are considered in the review and approval process by the associated country teams.
The legal implications and regulations required to leverage active means associated
with our current and potentially future CUAS capabilities is further compounded by the
complications associated with the Great Power Competition. As quoted by USCENTCOM
Commander General McKenzie:
The United States faces increasing competition in the region from Russia and
China both vying for power and influence through a combination of diplomatic,
military and economic means. The CENTCOM AOR is and always has been
a crossroads of global interests and, historically, a prime arena for foreign
powers to compete for influence for resources and for access. In 2020, Russia
and China exploited an ongoing regional crisis; financial infrastructure needs;
perception of declining U.S. engagement; and opportunities created by COVID-
19 to advance their objectives across the Middle East and central and southern
Asian nations to gain or strengthen footholds in the region. [183]
The increased presence of foreign actors and their associated doctrines and policies compli-
cates the issue and ramifications for the misuse of electronic and cyberattack capabilities.
This complication increases the likelihood of miscalculation and escalation of force against
regional and foreign peers in the CENTCOM AOR and must be accounted for. To meet the
growing cadre of CUAS capabilities fielded in AORs and future operational needs, there
exists a necessity to have a means to conduct environmental monitoring with near real time
atmospheric modeling to ensure the use of active CUAS capabilities do not interfere with
the surrounding infrastructure if leveraged.
8.4.3 Europe Command
The EUCOM AOR houses major naval and marine installations and detachments in Spain,
Italy, Greece, and Crete, as shown in Figure 8.2 [184].
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Figure 8.2. U.S. Naval Facilities in EUCOM AOR. Source: [184].
It further houses the headquarters for EUCOM, AFRICOM, and our NATO in Germany.
The EUCOM AOR therein serves as an essential focal point of U.S. strategy and planning
against our near peer, Russia. It further provides the requisite footprint to support our
alliances and shared military resources with our European partners. The U.S.’s alliances
with the countries of Spain, Greece, and Crete are dated back to the inception of the U.S.
as an independent country.
8.4.3.1 Europe Command Weapons Employment In Hosts Nations
Besides our participation in NATO, security cooperation between the U.S. and the previ-
ously mentioned countries are maintained and overseen by the Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreement and Agreement on Defense Cooperation [169]. This is exemplified with the U.S.
strategic and operational relationship shared with Spain through its authorization of the U.S.
to use designated and agreed upon facilities at existing Spanish military installations such as
Naval Station Rota. In 2012 and 2015, Spain and the United States updated this agreement to
allow for the housing and feeding of additional U.S. personnel and equities on Naval Station
Rota and in Moron, Spain, which houses the SPMAGTF. Furthermore, Spain assisted in the
previous defeat ISIS campaign in Iraq and Syria through the pledging of troops and sup-
port to coalition training [185]. Further coordination with the Mutual Defense Cooperation
Agreement is delineated by the strategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean provided
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by Greece and Crete, and their shared installations with the U.S. The Greek peninsula and
associated islands serve as a strategic point of influence and basing for military forces
operating in and out of Europe and northern Africa. The U.S. and Greek Mutual Defense
Agreements allows for access and operations from Crete with the U.S.’s naval base and
airfield located in Souda Bay [186].
These cooperative agreements and the mutually shared benefits from the foreign military
sales (FMS) of real estate and equipment benefit the U.S. in its use of capabilities involving
electronic attack and cyberattack capabilities on foreign soil and within host nation territo-
ries. The U.S. is not hindered in classification, reliability, and disclosure of CUASweaponry
in these counties, and is therefore able to cooperatively plan and deconflict the use of CUAS
equipment and capabilities with host nation governments and law enforcements in a more
transparent manner as compared to other AORs. However, there will always exist a threat
to interference and safety of navigation with civilian infrastructures when introducing new
capabilities with directed energy or offensive cyber traits. As such, sustained deconfliction
and mapping of the environment must ensure between U.S. military and host nation leader-
ship through the requisite country team affiliated personnel which shall always include the
Defense Attaché Office, Attachés, Chiefs of Mission, and Chiefs of Station.
8.4.4 Pacific Command
Amidst the emergence of the Great Power Competition, the U.S. maintains a massive ‘ready
force’ in the Asian Pacific theater in the countries of Singapore, Guam, South Korea, and
Japan as shown in Figure8.3 [187].
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Figure 8.3. U.S. Naval Facilities in PACOM AOR. Source [187].
The presence and posture within the PACOM AOR maintains a ‘fight tonight’ mentality
in support of its power projection, strategic deterrence, and national security policies and
doctrine [137] [188]. The ‘fight tonight’ mentality is intended to directly address the neces-
sity of meeting the requisite manning, equipment, and availability requirements to meet our
near peers should the need for combat manifest. The vision for PACOM’s readiness focuses
on the Great Power Competition from a vantage point of understanding the adversary’s
capabilities, and therefore adjusting your own to meet the potential threat in the land, air,
sea, space, and cyber domains.
8.4.4.1 Pacific Command Weapons Employment In Host Nations
The ‘fight tonight’ ideal is commensurate through the U.S.’s mutual defense guidelines and
policies with the aforementioned countries, allowing for the sharing of resources and the
basing of forward deployed Naval and Marine personnel through the region to promote
domestic and regional security. Exemplary ties between the U.S. and the Asian AOR is
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the alliance shared with Japan. The alliance between the U.S. and Japan in the PACOM
AOR serves as the pinnacle of strategic location, influence, forward basing, and access to
critical resources in the region [188]. The Alliance between the two is rooted in the shared
interests and values in the region being the free flow of economic commerce in the maritime
environment, support for human’s rights and freedoms, and the expansion of civil liberties.
The U.S. and Japan also work together in support of regional agreements for framework
encompassing the use of cyber and electronic emissions and subsequent communications.
This is exemplified with the countries’ cohesive approach to the information and commu-
nications technology supply chains for the use of 5G networks [189]. Such coordination
supports the Supplemental ROEs for the AOR and host nation, authorizing the use of non-
kinetic CUAS capabilities, to include cyber and electronic attack, inside of a host nation
without the need to for deconfliction. This is delineated by the FDNF CSG and ARG operat-
ing in the PACOM AOR, who are home-ported from Japan. The CUAS policies associated
with the U.S. Naval Forces Pacific Fleet and the 7th Fleet staff embarked in Yokosuka, Japan
against Groups 1 through 3 UASs enable senior decision makers to take decisive actions
to protect ships and shore bases against UASs that enter inside the designated vital areas
pertaining to those equities.
However, such ROEs are in place for current CUAS technologies that have been decon-
flicted and routed through the applicable service chains of custody and command, such as
OPNAV. This does not immediately satisfy the fielding of new, emerging technologies in the
AOR and host nation. To meet this requirement, subsequent approval is currently required
through the service administrative chain of command, which conducts the requisite decon-
fliction between the host nation and against U.S. standing domestic policies. Furthermore,
there exists no standard to model the environment from a military situational perspective
as it changes over time. Therefore a more transparent picture of what equities are at stake
when cyber- and electronic attack capabilities are leveraged against a threat UAS would be
beneficial.
8.4.5 North Command
The USN and USMCmaintain a plethora of bases within the U.S., in CONUS for manning,
training, and equipping its forward deployed forces and maintaining a ready force to meet
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emerging requirements, as shown in Figure 8.4 [190].
Figure 8.4. U.S. Naval Facilities in NORTHCOM AOR. Source: [190].
As delineated in Figure 8.4, NORTHCOM’s jurisdiction resides within CONUS. There-
fore, there is overlap observed between local U.S. laws as well as associated SRUF in the
military’s application of force during military engagements on federal property. The Naval
presence within the U.S. is dispersed across both the East Coast and West Coast of the
U.S., the concentration of Fleet elements that necessitate a need for considering and using
CUAS capabilities in support of share battle space reside amongst Florida, Georgia, Vir-
ginia, Connecticut, California, Washington, and Hawaii. These states maintain a direct and
deliberate concentration maritime and ground traffic and capabilities that necessitate a need
for elucidation by hobbyist, non-state actors, and state actors leveraging the previous groups
as proxies and surrogates alike.
8.4.5.1 North Command Weapons Employment
Current military application is also subjected to the legal framework of FISA, ECPA, and
the FREEDOM Act to identify and prosecute nefarious actors and actions. Unlike other
countries OCONUS, there exist no potential or foreseeable declaration of armed conflict
178
in CONUS. Therefore, there exists no ROE or SROE to govern the use of electronic or
cyber-attack capabilities associated with CUASs on U.S. sovereign soil. Due to this, the
use of CUAS active and passive capabilities is governed by U.S. laws and regulations, with
oversight by the Federal government. The U.S. has not been declared an area of armed
conflict since the American Civil War. Furthermore, the persons and their associated UASs
that would be prosecuted if operating in a dangerously ostentatious manner in the vicinity
of armed forces’ personnel and equities are more likely to be considered U.S. citizens,
and therefore protected under the U.S. Constitution and its associated acts. As anticipated,
the USN and USMC require authorities to leverage CUAS cyber and electronic attack
capabilities in a manner to protect their personnel and equities while complying with state
and federal regulations.
8.4.6 South Command
Of the several hundreds of bases maintained by the U.S. across the globe, approximately 70
of them are located in South America and the Caribbean to serve as an immediate response
and presence against threats around and entering the U.S., as delineated by Figure 8.5 [191].
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Figure 8.5. U.S. Military Facilities in SOUTHCOM AOR. Adapted
from: [192].
The concentration of USN and USMC presence in South America and the Caribbean
is amongst Panama, Puerto Rico, Colombia, Cuba, and Peru. These bases are under the
operational purview of U.S. Southern Command, located outside of Miami, Florida. The
focus of the threats in this AOR are intended to address weapons and narcotics smuggling
and facilitation networks, regional and transnational criminal enterprises and networks,
the encroaching presence of Iran, Russia, and China in Latin countries, humanitarian aid
and disaster response, maintain freedom of navigation through the Panama Canal, and
provide support to regional allies and partners. The primary countries that contribute to
the aforementioned threats are Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela. Due to the relative closeness
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of the threats posed by nefarious activities in the SOUTHCOM AOR, the United States is
most easily affected by destabilizing actions undertaken in this AOR [193]. As such, these
locations directly support the U.S.’s regional hegemonic endeavors and aspirations.
8.4.6.1 South Command Weapons Employment In Host Nations
Since the Spanish American War, Puerto Rico has been a U.S. territory and therefore
subjected to similar laws and policies observed in the U.S. regarding the U.S. of electronic
and cyberattackmilitary capabilities to subvert UAS threats. Therefore, similar deconfliction
between the USN and USMC service components and the government of Puerto Rico must
ensue to use the currently available CUAS capabilities, especially due to the area’s lack of
designation as an area of armed conflict. Panama and the surrounding areas are, however,
not U.S. territories although the U.S. temporarily controlled zones around the U.S.-built
PanamaCanal under former policies. Figure 8.6 shows the PanamaCanal and the importance
it provides to freedom of navigation to the Caribbean and SOUTHCOM AOR, connecting
the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean and dramatically improving transit time between
AORs.
181
Figure 8.6. Panama Canal. Source: [194].
Panama, as anticipated, plays a strategic role with the U.S. and it’s ability to assert dom-
inance and positive influence in the AOR. Following the U.S.’s occupation and purchase of
the territory surrounding the Panama Canal, it constructed the waterway as a means to sup-
port and enable freedom of navigation [195]. However, following the 1977 Torrijos-Carter
Treaties between former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and former Panamanian leader Omar
Torrijos Herrera, the U.S. relinquished its lease and subsequent perpetuity of occupation
in the region back to the Panamanian government. As anticipated, the use of CUAS equip-
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ment, primarily for the safety of naval navigation through the narrow corridor, must be
deconflicted with the Panamanian government. The narrowness of this waterway presents
very minute room for error, and necessitates the room for understanding the surrounding
areas radio frequency patterns and modeling to prevent potential fratricide.
The U.S.’s presence in Colombia, Cuba, and Peru each represents a shared commitment
to promoting regional and transnational security and democratic governance across the
WesternHemisphere [196]. TheU.S.’s shares a commitmentwith the countries of Colombia,
Cuba, and Peru to identify, and prosecute members of transnational criminal and terrorist
organizations whose activities pose a threat both to the host country as well as the U.S. These
countries serve as a strong partner and coordinating focal point for U.S. law enforcement on
domestic and foreign security issues pertaining to counterterrorism and counternarcotics
for the purposes of dismantling criminal organizations [196]. Due to these host countries
residing in areas that are not considered areas of armed conflict, they too are not covered
under the previously mentioned ROE and SROE for using current CUAS capabilities against
UAS threats that serve as an immediate, imminent threat to U.S. USN and USMC personnel
and infrastructure. As expected, similar coordination must ensue between U.S. service
components, the U.S. government, and host nation governments to ensure current and
future capabilities are leveraged in a manner that is agreed upon by all parties involved.
8.5 CUAS Employment – Legal Framework Way Ahead
A survey of the operational environment prior to the employment of tools that ascertain the
risk of adversely impacting civilian transportation, operations, and safety can contribute
to the assessment of fratricide prior to operationalization. Surveys of the EM spectrum
can further assess how effective a passive or active RF emissions CUAS capability will
perform under the provided circumstances of weather, terrain, and surrounding infrastruc-
ture. Lastly, assessment of the EM spectrum and how an active and passive RF capability
will perform can support the associated legal arguments for employing the aforesaid ca-
pabilities. Currently, neither the USN nor the USMC exercise any ability to determine the
environmental effects pertaining to the real-time use of CUAS electronic and cyberattack
detection, tracking, and neutralization capabilities. This is exemplified in the necessity and
subsequent creation and establishment of the EM spectrum operations (EMSO), which
is intended to blend the EW and electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) communities into one
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community [197]. Historical applications of EW capabilities, to include CUASs, resulted
in the operation of capabilities with little regard for the operational environment and un-
derlying EM spectrum. Such operations resulted in fratricide related to EMI. Furthermore,
neither service possesses a CUAS TTPs, concept of operation (CONOP), tactical memo, or
standard operating procedure (SOP) that supports the standardized use of spectrum analysis
capabilities to support understanding, modifying, or improving upon CUAS RF effective-
ness [198]. Understanding the efficacy or inefficacy of an RF or cyber capability associated
with a CUAS may support criteria associated with whether the capability should or could
be leveraged. It further helps determine at what frequency, level of power, and direction a
capability should be used in order to prevent or minimize the potential for fratricide against
friendly forces and civilian infrastructure.
The operational environment and the associated RF spectrum’s the USN and USMC
operate in is neither fixed nor stagnant in nature. Civilian and military operations and daily
activity is never completely routine, and operates from the advantage of having alternative
courses of actions and solutions should a primary resource be restricted or obstructed.
This includes the shift of frequencies for mobile communications, shift of frequencies and
associated call signs for air traffic control and corresponding flights, the repositioning of
assets to support improved movement of forces, and the use of alternate communications
and associated crypto for maritime traffic operating in busy traffic separation schemes. All
of these limited examples serve as a daily, weekly, or monthly change to the operational
environment that must be considered and accounted for before employing capabilities that
may either hinder of remove these methods of movement and positioning of assets from
civil and military operations.
8.5.1 Current Electronic Warfare Protection Tools
The use of RF modeling and spectrum management capabilities is, however, germane to
other aspects of USN and USMC sensitive compartmentalized operations for the very
purposes of mitigating the potential of fratricide. The USN and USMC signals intelligence
personnel leverage several capabilities that provide RF modeling, mapping, and battle
damage assessments. These capabilities range in classification of use, from the unclassified
Builder interactive scenario modeler, to the classified Own Force Monitoring (OFM) and
AREPS. These RF modeling and prediction capabilities are managed under the DoN’s
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legacy Afloat Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (AESOP) program.
8.5.1.1 Afloat Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations
AESOP serves as the DoN tool for ARG and CSG radar and communications planning and
coordination to support RF spectrum interoperability for global maritime operations [199].
The intent of AESOP is to leverage previously allocated frequencies to generate optimal
radar plans and operational tasking (OPTASK) order for communications that shall adhere
with associated domestic and international laws, policies, treaties, and USN and USMC
service components’ emission policies. AESOP simplifies a complicated RF infrastructure
for tactical warfighters by integrating and deconflicting RF capabilities with the surrounding
operational environment they are intended to be employed in, as delineated in Figure 8.7.
Figure 8.7. Multi-national CSG Communication, Radar, NAVAID, EW Mili-
tary Equipment Commercial Spectrum Use. Source: [199].
8.5.1.2 Real-time Spectrum Operations
To support joint electromagnetic spectrum operations and in accordance with Joint Publi-
cation 3-85, AESOP was replaced by Real-Time Spectrum Operations (RTSO) in 2018, as
delineated in Figure 8.8 [200].
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Figure 8.8. Real-time Spectrum Operations. Adapted from: [200].
RTSO supplies the same features as AESOP, still supporting the ability to promulgate OP-
TASK communications for tactical warfighters [201]. However, RTSO is a Windows-based
USN non-program of record. Similarly, it ensures frequency compatibility and minimizes
the potential for RF fratricide among radar emissions. It further allows the assignment
and selection of automated circuits and frequencies and produce communications tasking
for dissemination and adherence to. It is deployed on U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Army
vessels.
Holistically, RTSO optimizes EM spectrum usage by the aforementioned means while
providing real-time awareness of the operational environment and inevitable changes to
the RF spectrum to the tactical decision makers and operators. This enhanced situational
awareness of the RF spectrum can be leveraged to provide a premeditated response to
adversarial UASs with electromagnetic and cyberattack capabilities associated with CUAS,
and can further advise both military and civil decision makers on whether these capabilities
will yield intended or unintended consequences following use.
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8.5.1.3 Advanced Refractive Effects Prediction System
To support the enforcement of AESOP and its successor RTSO, the USN and USMC
teams leverage AREPS to provide predictive analysis for their classified SIGINT capa-
bilities [202]. AREPS serves as the successor to the legacy Integrated Refractive Effects
Predictions System (IREPS). IREPS, just as its successor, was intended and provided the
first capability to assess the effects of atmosphere weather against the performance of EM
systems. AREPS succeeded IREPS as computing became more robust and EM propagation
modeling required more advancements to account for inherent Naval system capabilities
and limitation under current and future weather predictions. AREPS performs automated
computation and displays the results pertaining to radar effectiveness, probability of detec-
tion of an asset, and propagation atrophy of HF, UHF, and VHF communications against
the associated distance, altitude, and line of bearing from the transmitter. Similar to RTSO,
AREPS leverages a Windows interface for ease of usability and operator familiarity.
AREPS uses the Advanced Propagation Model, which natively leverages the hybrid ray-
optic and parabolic equationmodel to perform timely and accuratemodeling and simulations
for various sea and terrain scenarios [202]. Its calculations include, but are not limited to,
the use of range-varying dielectric ground constants in support of polarization calculations
and the absorption of EM energy by oxygen and water gases across a designated area of
interest. These inclusions support the attainment of how far organic EM capabilities such as
electronic attack may propagate from the source to a destination and the surrounding areas.
AREPS natively arrives as an unclassified program with no preestablished database. As
expected, users are responsible for establishing their own baselines of classified databases
and network interconnectivity if required or desired. AREPS therein serves as a convenient
tool to support the tactical warfighter for modeling the potential of CUASEM emissions that
are of an electronic attack definition and profile. This modeling would serve as a positive
reinforcement to the preexisting rules, regulations, and policies set forth for operating
current and future CUAS equipment both in CONUS and OCONUS. This modeling could
be leveraged to serve as a proof-of-concept for whether CUAS capabilities should and could
be used in an area of high concentration with civil and military equities. It could further
support the assessment of whether CUAS capabilities could observe or yield interference
as a result of fratricide.
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8.5.1.4 Builder
Builder serves as a three-dimensional, interactive RF tactical decision aid currently lever-
aged by the USN [203]. Similar to AREPS, Builder is intended to provide the tactical
warfighter an improved and comprehensive understanding of the implications associated
with use of their EM capabilities. Builder accomplishes this by modeling RF propaga-
tion losses, incorporate antenna and radar cross section data as well as the effects of the
surrounding environment’s terrain. Builder leverages currently available National Geospa-
tial Agency map products and Compressed Acquisition Research Center Digitized Raster
Graphics and Controlled Image Base imagery and Digital Terrain Elevation Data to sup-
port interoperability and the inclusion of maximum resources to improve accuracy. Unlike
AREPS, Builder does not account for atmospheric and effects impacting weather in the
terrain its applied to; therefore Builder serves as a best-case tool for propagation modeling.
The Builder software is unclassified as well, and therefore warrants the user to specify
database and classification of subsequent drives once it is applied to a mission set. Builder
serves as a cheaper alternative to solving the dilemma of modeling to support real world
applications and implications associated with the use of electronic attack capabilities and
potential battle damage assessment thereafter.
8.5.2 Legal Jurisdiction For Future CUAS Defeat Capabilities
As the threat evolves and advances, the counter weaponry tools must progress to meet
the threat. There exists a requirement to codify the legalities and associated concept of
operations for employment into an integrated cyber- and electromagnetic doctrine to support
the employment of future CUAS electromagnetic and cyber capabilities. Further, there
exists a necessity to update doctrine, planning, and methods of employment on a recurring
basis to maintain pace with the rapidly changing operational environment. Motivation
can be taken from the Army’s previously released Field Manual (FM) 3-12, ‘Cyberspace
and Electronic Warfare Operations’. FM 3-12 provides EW and cyberspace employment
guidance and direction to the Army by defining cyberspace operations and EW authorities
and relationships to support Army and joint operations [204].
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8.5.2.1 Codifying Advanced CUAS Tactics In Universal Doctrine
FM 3-12 captures the required tactical level decision and actions needed to support the
rudimentary coordination and integration of both Army cyberspace and EW operations to
support both unified land operations and joint operations in a designated AOR. Like many
services, the Army too strived to converge and collate RF, cyber, and EM operations at
the tactical level of warfighter to better arm tactical level commanders’ and warfighters’
decision making. Conversely, this allows and better informs senior decisions makers at
both the operational and strategic levels of war between the Combatant Commands and
their associated service elements, as well as Country Teams and host nations, with the
foundational level of details needed to better support the allowance of certain capabilities
and TTPs in an AOR. Further motivation can be derived by FM 3-12’s distinction between
electronic attack and cyberattack capabilities, and the associated authorities that govern
their use. As described under the standing ROE and their supplementally classified SROE,
the ability to engage an adversarial UAS through cyber or electronic attack capabilities is
typically derived from a top-down authoritative process. This process involves the delegation
of authority to operate from the Secretary of Defense to the DOD through executive orders
(EXORDs) and ROE.
Joint forces leverage their inherent cyber and EM capabilities in non-kinetic operations in
accordance with EXORDs, ROE, and other associated policies negotiated and set in place
by the Secretary of Defense and Combatant Commanders. However, FM3-12 also provides
a clear, distinct means of requesting approval to use new, emergent capabilities against
unforeseen threats that warrant said use [204]. It is highly recommended and encouraged that
a tactical unit requesting permission for the employment of a new cyber or EM capability
have the network topology of the adversarial network they wish to engage, hence the
necessity to leverage tools such as the DoN’s Builder or AREPS to mitigate fratricide and
provide battle damage assessment [204]. FM 3-12 addresses the placement of new cyber
and EW capabilities in theaters of interest, based on priority of mission, location, and unit
size and training. The placement of CUAS capabilities to support the high demand needs
of RF deconfliction, modeling, and mapping in an area of interest is paramount to support
tactical decision making [205].
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8.5.2.2 Rectifying The CUAS Weapon Employment Legal Framework
The inherent defeat capabilities of CUAS equipment lie among electronic attack, cyberat-
tack, and the mundane use of kinetic weaponry such as netting, projectiles, and small arms.
We have identified and codified electronic attack as jamming or the use of directed energy
to neutralize and defeat an adversarial UAS platform. We have further addressed directed
energy’s increased likelihood of unintended consequences to the civil-military environment
it is employed in. Contrary to passive, non-directed energy methods of warfighting capabil-
ities intended to obfuscate tactical vision aides such as smoke and camouflage, anti-optic
directed energy is intended to overwhelm or burn out electronic and thermal sensors [206].
Cyberattack encompasses the use of spoofing or manipulating behavior of the adversarial
UAS C2.
It is befitting of the USN and USMC to address the potential use of current and future
CUAS non-kinetic and kinetic capabilities under similar constructs as addressed in other
warfare areas of the DoN and Army. There uniquely exists a need to better understand
the operational environment and the associated RF environment and network topology of
friendly and adversarial nodes, networks, and infrastructure before leveraging non-kinetic
CUAS techniques such as jamming, interference, directed energy, and cyber attack to deny,
degrade, usurp, or destroy a positively identified adversarial UAS in support of a CUAS kill
chain. To positively identify the surrounding civil-military and adversarial infrastructure,
tools such as Builder and AREPS have proven success within the Information Warfare
Community of the DoN. Such systems not only leverage current network topology based
on detected emissions and the use of national technical means from classified collection
agencies and networks, but they also include and address the impacts of RF propagation in
the EM spectrum under weather constraints. This information serves the warfighter in two
distinct areas of decision making. It provides the tactical warfighter with the understanding
and risk of fratricide to the surrounding public and military services, while providing
awareness of the likelihood of success should a non-kinetic technique be leveraged.
Additionally, there exists an urgent need to standardize and codify the TTPs, authorities,
and review and approval process to leverage current and emerging capabilities from a cyber
and EW perspective. Such inspiration can be derived from the Army’s FM 3-12, which
arms warfighters with the ability to determine the requisite level and use of force in an
AOR to support defense in depth, force protection, and offensive operations in regards to
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cyber and EW operations holistically. To be effective in CUAS operations, the USN and
USMC require a combination of doctrine addressing the policies and authorities for use of
emergent non-kinetic CUAS capabilities and the employment of tools to support situational
awareness of the ever changing environment.
8.6 Summary
This chapter identifies the legal constraints associated with the use of weaponry yielding
effects in the EMS. It further presents our assessment of the lack of synchronization across
the DOD to support the deconfliction and assessment of effectiveness of CUAS capabilities
in an AOR. This assessment is twofold, proving support to CUAS effectiveness under given
weather, terrain, and RF propagation in an area, as well as deconfliction against fratricide
from civilian and military spectrum use in an AOR. This chapter further presents options
available to conduct measurement of effectiveness and deconfliction in the EMS to support
host nation authorities to operate CUAS capabilities.
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CHAPTER 9:
Conclusion and Future Work
The current threat imposed by hobbyist, non-state actors, and state actors using UASs in
the operational environment has the potential to undermine USN and USMC strategic,
operational, and tactical endeavors domestically and abroad. The advantage held by UAS
operators is the plethora of UAS capabilities available as COTS technology. The advantage
is further exacerbated by the ability to customize and modify UAS behavior and C2 to
operate in different environments with varying means of communication infrastructures
and specific flight profiles such as semi-autonomy, full autonomy single use, cluster use,
or swarm employment. Group/cluster UASs operating with high levels of automation is an
emerging threat in several of the DOD’s AORs.
From Chapters 2 and 3, we assessed the ease of accessibility for Groups 1 through 3
UASs, their historic applications in nefarious manners, and their massive appeal to users
as posing a significant threat to USN and USMC personnel and equities. We further find
that UASs are operated in manners that are consistent with traditional air domain services
to include, but not limited to ISR, C2, smuggling, information operations, and weapons
delivery.
In Chapter 4, our observations delineated standard UAS C2 between the vehicle and
the GCS converging at frequencies between 2.4GHz and 5.8GHz for flight and payload
operations. However, the emergence of 5G delivers the potential for UASs to operate in the
bands of 30GHz to 300GHz. This wide disparity in coverage for the potential use of C2
between the vehicle and the GCS or other vehicles further complicates the ability to detect,
track, and neutralize UASs identified as threats.
Our analysis in Chapter 3 illustrates the varying tactics adversaries leverage under the
aforesaid C2 options. These tactics vary from single use, cluster use, and swarm use. We
detail in Chapter 6 the lack of effectiveness current CUAS capabilities possess against
cluster and swarm UAS employment options. This is related to the inability to adequately
detect and neutralize multiple, successive targets over a sustained period of time.
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In Chapter 4, we assess the use of UASs as partially dependent upon the area they are op-
erated in and therein dependent upon the area’s communication infrastructure, accessibility
of commercial and proprietary hardware and software, and availability of IoT communi-
cation devices. Many AORs are advancing towards institutionalized 5G communication
as demonstrated in Chapter 5. At this frequency band of operation, the available CUASs
leveraged by the USN and USMC are identified as ineffective due to their limitation of
5GHz. CUAS capabilities and their associated operations are currently limited to early
21st century detection techniques, such as radar, RF, EO/IR, and acoustic. In Chapter 6
we provide evidence showing the inability among the USN and USMC’s currently fielded
CORIAN or L-MADIS CUASs to detect and mitigate emerging technology against e.g. 5G
or completely autonomous UASs.
Our research in Chapter 8 draws on the lack of legal doctrine or standardization for em-
ploying current and advanced CUAS capabilities needed to thwart emergent UAS threats,
such as the use of 5G for C2. There further exists a lack of implemented spectrum analysis
techniques to justify the effectiveness and legality associated with preventing or minimizing
fratricide in an area of intended CUAS employment. This can be remedied with current
spectrum analysis capabilities to support determining the effectiveness of CUAS RF emis-
sions and detection. Such capabilities consist of AREPS, RTSO, OFM, and Builder. These
capabilities also support the subjectivity of EMI and its potential for occurrence in an area
of operation. Further, the implementation of these capabilities with CUASs can support
the deconfliction and authority to operate in host nations through mission planning and
assurances of limiting the potential for EMI in an area of operation.
The operational environment is saturated with both UAS and CUAS products. There
remains an emergent need for the USN and USMC to conduct joint, interoperable CUAS
operations against Groups 1 through 3 UAS threats. Furthermore, there now exists a re-
quirement to support joint CUAS operations between the DOD as prescribed by the JCO.
We assess current USN and USMC CUAS capabilities as only moderately effective against
the UAS single and cluster methods of employment. In Chapter 7 we demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of current USN and USMC CUAS capabilities against emergent UAS threats as
inadequately effective and worsening as more UAS are operated in an area of interest. With
a conservative reduction in hypothetical probability of detection and hypothetical probabil-
ity of mitigation and the adjustments to the degree to which the number of simultaneous
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UAS threats affects the probability of detection and mitigation of the CUAS, the model
demonstrated how probability of detection and probability of mitigation would be affected
which subsequently reduced the effectiveness of the CUAS against emerging UAS threats.
In Chapter 6 interoperability shortfalls are identified and UAS employing different levels
of collaboration for groups/clusters are discussed. One of the interoperability shortfalls is
the lack of employment of common C2 standards which would enable information sharing.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff states the need for interoperability for tactical
objectives [166]. We assess CUASs should interoperate and share tactical data pertaining
to the detection, tracking, and classification of the UAS in a timely and accurate manner
to address the varying individual UAS threats within a group/cluster. To meet the demand
of joint CUAS requirements, the USN and USMC must divest from the previous mentality
of temporary solutions for a permanent problem set. Long-term, interoperable CUAS so-
lutions, capable of performing at high rates of effectiveness against current and emergent
UAS threats must remain a priority for USN and USMC CUAS agendas.
9.1 Recommendations
The following list encapsulates suggested recommendations to improve CUAS interoper-
ability in the geopolitical environment:
• Establish a common baseline architecture to be used as the foundation for the DoN
CUAS supported by:
– Configuration management to management evolving software.
– Change management to manage changes in requirements or mission shifts.
• Integrate AREPS into existing and future CUASs to provide the capability to adjust
radar and RF detection and tracking techniques and to compute and display passive
RF probability of detection.
• Implement CUAS capability designs that provide:
– high probability of detection at extended ranges.
– sensor placement accounting for threat axis and geometry of the terrain.
– high probability of detection for a high number of simultaneous UAS targets.
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9.2 Future Work
Advances in technology will continue to be adopted by emerging UAS threats and adver-
saries will likely increase their utilization of UASs to achieve their objectives. Therefore,
future research should examine the integration of new techniques such as machine learning
and other cyber capabilities into emergent CUASs to enhance detection and mitigation and
support the promulgation of UAS threat libraries. Future integration efforts must also con-
sider the level of impact to current and emergent CUAS interoperability and effectiveness.
Additionally, understanding how terrain impacts UAS TTPs leveraged by adversaries may
show the subsequent need for CUAS terrain-based TTPs to counter adversaries.
The threat UASs pose today are here to stay and will likely worsen in the near future.
USN and USMC CUAS lines of efforts need to be closely aligned to counter the growing
threat imposed by COTS UASs threat. It is necessary to establish clear requirements for
current and future CUAS acquisitions to be interoperable.
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